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REGULATING MERCHANTS OF LIQUIDITY: 
MARKET MAKING FROM CROWDED FLOORS TO 
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 
Stanislav Dolgopolov* 
This Article develops a framework for analyzing the very existence of 
regulation of market makers and singles out such key factors as 
externalities in the market for liquidity, vulnerability of these market 
participants to certain trading strategies, and their own opportunism.  This 
framework is explored through the evolution of the market making segment 
of the securities industry from crowded floors to high-frequency trading, 
and the regulatory outlook is analyzed from the standpoint of the current 
market structure crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The market for liquidity, as any other market, is governed by the 
forces of supply and demand, and the business of providing liquidity by 
specialized entities known as market makers occupies a unique niche in the 
securities industry.1  While market makers may also be crossing their own 
 
* Regulatory Consultant, Decimus Capital Markets, LLC; J.D., University of Michigan; 
M.B.A., University of Chicago; B.S.B.A., Drake University; member of the North Carolina 
State Bar.  The author thanks Haim Bodek, Vladislav Dolgopolov, Shayna Gordon, and 
Kate Im for their help, comments, and expertise. 
1.  Market makers are not uncommon in markets for asset classes other than securities, 
such as futures, commodities, and currencies, and the experiences of these markets are often 
relevant for securities markets.  Unsurprisingly, markets for cryptocurrencies, a novel asset 
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clients’ orders or playing a role in order-matching/auctioneering/price-
setting mechanisms on trading venues, the essence of market making is to 
provide liquidity by committing capital.  As keenly observed back in 1877 
in connection with jobbers operating on the London Stock Exchange 
(“LSE”), the distinguishing feature of a market maker is being “pretty well 
always even.”2  However, a specific timeframe for this balancing process 
and a needed capital commitment may vary greatly, depending on a host of 
factors, such as the underlying business strategy, natural liquidity in the 
security in question, mandatory capital requirements and other regulatory 
constraints, and technological advances.  Interestingly, Myron S. Scholes of 
the Black-Scholes fame characterized the business of providing liquidity as 
living off “omega,” as opposed to “alpha” and “beta,” the better known 
sources of return.3  The value provided by market makers in return for 
omega is no trifle.  As pointed out many years ago, “Were it not for this 
intermediary class . . . the public would experience great delay and 
inconvenience in their sales or purchase of stock.”4 
 
class, and their derivatives are also seeing the emergence of market makers.  See, e.g., 
Francois Poupard, Interview with Market Maker BitSpread, BITCOIN VOX (Apr. 27, 2015, 
11:12 AM), http://bitcoinvox.com/article/1645/interview-with-market-maker-bitspread 
[https://perma.cc/45BY-9C6W] (discussing the market making role played by BitSpread, a 
self-described “cryptocurrency investment management firm”); HitBTC and the March of 
the Market Makers, COINFINANCE (Sept. 15, 2014, 6:18 PM), 
http://www.coinfinance.com/news/hitbtc-and-the-march-of-the-market-makers 
[https://perma.cc/DF3P-NZ9S] (describing the emergence of market makers for such 
cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin and the practical advantages they 
provide to other market participants).  Some cryptocurrency trading platforms are already 
offering special contracts for market makers that entail certain trading obligations bundled 
“with very attractive conditions [such as] cash incentives and rebate bonuses,” as well as the 
access to “the best [application interface protocols].”  Market-Making on HitBTC, HITBTC, 
https://hitbtc.com/mm [https://perma.cc/FB2W-2475] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
2.  LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE 
COMMISSIONERS, 1878, C. (2d series) 2157-I para. 2817, at 102 (U.K.) [hereinafter LSE 
COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE] (testimony of Lionel Louis Cohen, a dealer at the 
LSE).  For pioneering academic contributions on market makers’ inventory management, 
see Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Dealership Market: Market-Making with 
Inventory, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1980); James Bradfield, A Formal Dynamic Model of Market 
Making, 14 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 275 (1979); Mark B. Garman, Market 
Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1976). 
3.  See Myron S. Scholes, The Changing Price of Liquidity and Risk Transfer: Risk 
Management and Lessons from the Current Market Crisis 3–6 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished 
presentation) (on file with author), 
http://www.eurobank.gr/Uploads/pdf/EurobankAthensFinalPresentation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HY6W-HGS9] (defining alpha, beta, and omega and describing them as 
alternative sources of return). 
4.  HENRY KEYSER, THE LAW RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
23 (London, Henry Butterworth 1850); see also Lodewijk Petram, The World’s First Stock 
Exchange: How the Amsterdam Market for Dutch East India Company Shares Became a 
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Market making is both restrained and enabled by regulation, which 
encompasses governmental and private ordering.  Such regulation, which 
often has its own dark side of rent-seeking, anticompetitive behavior, and 
selective enforcement, may serve a variety of general or specific purposes, 
such as creating fair and orderly markets, protecting different types of 
market participants, or operating as a valuable signaling/commitment 
device.  The applicable regulatory framework, as the totality of statutes, 
rules, enforcement actions, and case law, is established by a blend of 
governmental regulation and self-regulation, with the latter being set by 
trading venues themselves, with some of them acting as self-regulatory 
organizations, and other private regulators, such as the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).  Indeed, providing a private regulatory 
regime for market makers in the form of a set of rules and their application 
— as a part of the underlying business model — is a dimension of 
competition among trading venues.5 
Liquidity providers with special trading obligations and privileges, as 
creatures of the applicable regulatory regime, are commonly known as 
“designated market makers” (“DMMs”), and there may be several tiers of 
DMMs with varying features operating under different names on the same 
trading venue.6  Perhaps the most famous example of DMMs is the famed 
 
Modern Securities Market, 1602-1700, at 38–40, 181 (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of 
Amsterdam) (on file with author), http://dare.uva.nl/document/201694 
[https://perma.cc/5BWC-F6SL] (analyzing the emergence of market makers in 
Amsterdam’s equities marketplace in the first half of the 17th century, describing services 
provided by these market participants, and noting that “[t]he standardization that was the 
result of [such] market-maker services brought transaction costs down.”). 
5.  See Letter from Andrew Bowley, Managing Dir., et al., Nomura Int’l plc, to Werner 
Bijkerk, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns 4 (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KMY-
HKZK] [https://perma.cc/2AUP-23TV] (arguing that “[m]arket making regimes are part of 
the commercial DNA of competitive venues.”); Letter from Andrew Procter, Global Head of 
Gov’t & Regulatory Affairs, Deutsche Bank AG, to Werner Bijkerk, Int’l Org. of Sec. 
Comm’ns 6 (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2AUP-23TV] (asserting that “[m]arket making is an area on which 
function venues compete and seek to differentiate themselves.”); see also Jos Schmitt, Chief 
Exec. Officer, Aequitas Innovations, Remarks Before the Economic Club of Canada: What 
Is Wrong with Canada’s Capital Markets? 20 (June 2, 2014) (transcript available from 
Aequitas Innovations, Inc.) (stating that a start-up trading venue would “provide issuers with 
the support of re-energized market makers”); Patent Portfolio, DEEP LIQUIDITY, 
http://deepliquidity.com/patents.html [https://perma.cc/SWT6-NMRG] (last visited Feb. 15, 
2016) (describing a portfolio of order types, with some of them specifically oriented at 
market makers, for a start-up trading venue).  
6.  For a recent illustration of a potential multiplicity of tiers of market makers 
designed by individual trading venues, see Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by 
NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc. Relating to Directed Market Makers, Exchange Act Release No. 
74,129, 80 Fed. Reg. 4954 (Jan. 23, 2015); Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change by 
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institution of the “specialist” on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), 
which dates back to the nineteenth century,7 although specialists were 
recently renamed “designated market makers” and relieved of their agency 
and priority-yielding obligations with the NYSE’s restructuring of its 
trading architecture.8  While the exact timing of the transition of NYSE 
specialists from mere matching agents/“brokers’ brokers” to active dealers 
entrusted with agency responsibilities is not entirely clear,9 there is little 
doubt that committed principal trading became pivotal quite early.  As 
remarked by an industry insider two decades before the passage of the 
federal securities statutes, 
If it be urged that the specialist should not speculate, but should 
confine himself solely to executing the orders on his books, it 
may be answered that in such a case he would often be useless, 
for in many instances the orders on his books are insufficient in 
volume to establish a close market or anything approaching it. By 
reason of his speculations a market is created; without them it 
may not exist.10 
By definition, the DMM category is narrower than the universe of 
market participants providing liquidity, and, accordingly, regulatory 
 
NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc. Relating to Directed Market Makers, Exchange Act Release No. 
73,784, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,930 (Dec. 8, 2014). 
7.  For a description of the birth of the specialist system as a means of transition from 
periodic auctions to continuous trading, see ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE FINANCIAL DISTRICT 29–30 (1977). 
8.  For a description of the NYSE’s “New Market Model” phasing out the specialist 
system and the relevant comparisons between specialists and DMMs, see Order Approving 
a Proposed Rule Change To Create a New NYSE Market Model, Exchange Act Release No. 
58,845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379 passim (Oct. 24, 2008).  
9.  As reflected upon by an industry insider during the New Deal era, by the end of the 
first decade of the twentieth century, “a trading specialist was more or less unknown,” but it 
had emerged during the following quarter century “from a natural demand.”  Stock 
Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong. pt. 
15, at 6792 (1933–34) [hereinafter 1933–34 Senate Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices] 
(testimony of Paul Adler, a specialist and a member of the NYSE).  On the other hand, a 
government report from the described time period noted “the practice of specialists in 
buying and selling for their own account [that] often serves to create a market where 
otherwise one would not exist.”  STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF GOVERNOR HUGHES’ 
COMMITTEE ON SPECULATION IN SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES 10 (June 7, 1909).  See also 
George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implications for 
the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217, 223 (2005) (“The specialists were . . . permitted to trade for 
their own account, but the broker functions predominated through the early 1900s.  Over 
time, though, the ‘dealer-specialist’ role grew in importance as floor brokers and 
commission houses came to expect the specialists to purchase and sell their specialty stocks 
for their own account in more thinly traded markets, to provide price continuity as well as 
timely trade execution.”). 
10.  W.C. VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN 280 (1913). 
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regimes for DMMs have more specificity than sets of rules explicitly or 
implicitly applicable to trading strategies with a market making substance. 
The interdependence of regulation of market makers and the 
architecture of securities markets, including the very function of providing 
liquidity, can neither be ignored nor divorced from a forward-looking 
perspective on regulatory reform.  The nature of liquidity in the current 
market structure may, by some accounts, appear puzzling,11 and there are 
indications that several key regulatory changes connected to market makers 
have had a significant impact on different facets of liquidity.12  Moreover, 
there may be a shadow of doubt about the economic feasibility of market 
making with meaningful trading obligations and privileges in today’s fast, 
competitive, and fragmented trading process in many segments of 
securities markets.13  On the other hand, technology and electronic trading 
 
11.  See Gregg E. Berman, Assoc. Dir., Office of Analytics & Research, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, What Drives the Complexity and Speed of Our Markets?: Remarks at the 
North American Trading Architecture Summit (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541505819#.U0469Fc9Qel 
[https://perma.cc/AW44-N4M4] (“[T]he data show that the majority of all of displayed 
quoting activities occur in the depth-of-book, away from the inside spread.  But these quotes 
are only accessed a minority of the time by any market participants. . . [M]odern market 
structure has evolved to the point where liquidity takers, including buy-side participants, 
focus their trading efforts on nothing more than what’s available at the [National Best Bid 
and Offer].  But that’s not necessarily how market makers are posting their liquidity.  I’m 
starting to wonder whether there is some fundamental mismatch between the nature of 
liquidity takers and liquidity makers.” (footnote omitted)). 
12.  See, e.g., Kee H. Chung & Chairat Chuwonganant, Uncertainty, Market Structure, 
and Liquidity, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 476, 478 (2014) (“[T]he uncertainty elasticity of 
liquidity . . . has increased dramatically around regulatory changes in the US markets that 
increased the role of public traders in liquidity provision, reduced the minimum allowable 
price variation, weakened the affirmative obligation of NASDAQ dealers, and abolished the 
specialist system on the NYSE.”); Yashar Heydari Barardehi et al., Trading Costs and 
Priced Illiquidity in High Frequency Trading Markets 33 (June 2, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2615823 [https://perma.cc/K32C-
XMBX] (“[T]he Reg[ulation] NMS reform and the advent of high frequency trading seem 
to have reduced the trading costs of stocks that were already more liquid, at the expense of 
less liquid stocks.”). 
13.  See, e.g., JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, 
SUMMARY REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE 
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 10 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sec-
cftcjointcommittee/021811-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WPP-GR59] [hereinafter CFTC-
SEC ADVISORY COMM., REGULATORY RESPONSES REPORT] (“The increased market 
competition and dramatic market fragmentation which has occurred subsequent to 
Regulation NMS, however, have effectively eliminated much of the profitability of the 
registered market maker function and therefore, eliminated the ability for the Exchanges to 
impose significant quoting or trading obligations.”); see also Dark Pools, Flash Orders, 
High-Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 85 (2009) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-Frequency 
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in particular, while in many instances enhancing the interaction of natural 
liquidity, have not made market makers obsolete.14 
The existence of a true market making crisis is salient in the space 
covering smaller-cap stocks,15 but this crisis has also spread to larger-cap 
stocks and top-tier securities exchanges.  As one important sign, the 
decrease in the value of the NYSE’s DMM franchise, which was much 
coveted in the past, is staggering.  For instance, Goldman Sachs recently 
sold its DMM unit with the allocation of over 600 symbols on the NYSE 
for around $30 million.16  For the sake of comparison, Goldman Sachs paid 
 
Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues] (prepared statement of Peter Driscoll, 
Chairman, Securities Traders Association) (“[Market makers] retained all of their 
obligations to the market . . . but the rewards for these obligations were cut dramatically.  
Traditional market making became unprofitable and most market making firms reduced 
their market making activity or bowed out of the business altogether.”). 
14.  See also ANDY HILL, INT’L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS’N, THE CURRENT STATE AND 
FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT GRADE CORPORATE BOND SECONDARY 
MARKET: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MARKET paras. 35–36, at 17 (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Secondary-markets/The-state-of-
the-European-investment-grade-corporate-bond-secondary-market_ICMA-SMPC_Report-
251114-Final3.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6VX-H99U] (“As one [multilateral trading facility] 
explained, electronic platforms are merely the oil that greases the engine.  They do not 
provide liquidity.  For that, you still need market-makers who can make prices and take risk.  
Some participants, however, are more sanguine about the potential for electronic platforms 
to provide liquidity.  This is essentially through the enhancement of ‘big-data’, and better 
cross-market (and participant) networking.”); Ian Domowitz, Liquidity, Transaction Costs, 
and Reintermediation in Electronic Markets, 22 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 141, 151 (2002) 
(“Electronic market structure does not eliminate the market making function, for example, 
although it may change its character.”). 
15.  For a general discussion of the market making crisis for smaller-cap stocks and 
potential regulatory tools to address this problem, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Linking the 
Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation: Incentives for Market Makers?, 16 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 1 passim (2013) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market 
Structure and Capital Formation].  See also David Weild et al., Making Stock Markets 
Work To Support Economic Growth: Implications for Governments, Regulators, Stock 
Exchanges, Corporate Issuers and Their Investors 20 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., 
OECD Corporate Governance Paper No. 10, 2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/making-stock-markets-work-to-support-economic-
growth_5k43m4p6ccs3-en [https://perma.cc/MDL4-Z2GU] (“The erosion of aftermarket 
economics is most keenly felt at the small cap, less liquid end of the market, where active 
support from market makers and liquidity providers is crucial.”). 
16.  Bradley Hope & Justin Baer, Dutch Firm To Buy Goldman Sachs NYSE Floor 
Trading Business, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2014, 8:39 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303749904579576530862652294 
[https://perma.cc/9JDL-26US]; see also Press Release, IMC Grp. & NYSE Euronext, IMC 
Financial Markets To Become Designated Market Maker on the NYSE (May 22, 2014, 6:30 
AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140522005108/en/IMC-Financial-
Markets-Designated-Market-Maker-NYSE [https://perma.cc/EZE9-AXFY] (stating that 
“IMC will be the DMM for over 630 securities and approximately 400 operating companies, 
including many U.S. and international blue chip corporations”); Sam Mamudi & John 
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approximately $6.5 billion for Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, one of the largest 
specialist firms on the NYSE, back in 2000.17  Moreover, this high-priced 
deal was not the only acquisition of a specialist firm by this investment 
bank, which at some point had the most significant market making 
presence on the Big Board.18  Another bit of news from the same camp is 
Virtu Financial’s purchase of Cohen Capital Group’s DMM unit with the 
allocation of 258 symbols on the NYSE and NYSE MKT for a paltry 
amount of $3 million in 2011.19  On the other hand, the merger of GETCO 
and Knight Capital, with both of these firms operating as DMMs on the 
NYSE,20 produced a much higher price tag, approximately $1.4 billion, for 
the latter.21 However, it is likely that the primary attraction was Knight 
Capital’s off-exchange market making franchise and long-term order flow 
relationships rather than its DMM status.  Another shocking thought for the 
entire securities industry is that dedicated market making as such in the 
equities space may be hardly profitable.22 
 
Detrixhe, Speed Traders Seize NYSE Floor as IMC Takes Goldman Post, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 
28, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-28/speed-traders-seize-
nyse-floor-as-imc-takes-goldman-post.html [https://perma.cc/8JG8-GCLB] (describing the 
completion of this transaction and characterizing the existing state of affairs as “the 
conquest of the NYSE floor by high-frequency trading firms”). 
17.  See Hope & Baer, supra note 16 (contrasting the price tags of these deals in the 
context of the evolution of securities markets); see also The Professor [Craig Pirrong], 
Michael Lewis’s HFT Book: More of a Dark Market Than a Lit One, STREETWISE 
PROFESSOR (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=8333 
[https://perma.cc/VJT6-X22N] (“Why was the price [paid by Goldman Sachs] so high back 
in 2000? Because under the rules of the time, a monopoly specialist franchise on a near 
monopoly exchange generated substantial economic rents . . .  Electronic trading, and the 
socialization of order flow and the resultant competition between execution venues, 
ruthlessly destroyed those rents.”). 
18.  See WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: HOW GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO 
RULE THE WORLD 188, 421 (2010) (describing several acquisitions of specialist firms by 
Goldman Sachs that had made it “the largest market maker on both the New York Stock 
Exchange and American Stock Exchange”). 
19.  Virtu Fin., Inc., Registration Statement Under Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), 
at F-18 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
20.  See also Matthew Philips, Knight Shows How To Lose $440 Million in 30 Minutes, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-08-02/knight-
shows-how-to-lose-440-million-in-30-minutes [https://perma.cc/T7ZT-EQ4M] (describing 
the computer glitch that led to Knight Capital’s enormous losses on August 1, 2012 and 
immediately put into question its future as an independent firm). 
21.  For a description of the merger and its valuation, see Press Release, Knight Capital 
Grp., Inc. & GETCO Holding Co., Knight Capital Group and GETCO Holding Company 
Agree To Merge (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/knight-
capital-group-and-getco-holding-company-agree-to-merge-184079381.html 
[https://perma.cc/5MSD-HQDZ]. 
22.  See, e.g., Roundtable on Equity Market Structure, Panel III: Market Making and 
Trading in the 21st Century at 63:22-:34, THOMPSON REUTERS (July 28, 2014), 
ARTICLE 2 (DOLGOPOLOV) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:33 PM 
658 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
The strains on the model of dedicated liquidity provision by DMMs 
with clearly defined trading obligations and privileges can be counted 
among the ingredients of the broader market structure crisis, which is 
particularly evident in the equities space.23  At the same time, this state of 
affairs exists in markets in other asset classes, often extends to other types 
of liquidity providers, and is not even necessarily U.S.-centric.  As 
described by an official of an international group of securities regulators, 
“We have seen a ‘Houdini’ disappearance of market makers in general. . . . 
It’s a new frontier-type issue.”24  In fact, several major players have pushed 
for strengthening the DMM model.25  Indeed, liquidity in securities markets 
may be seen as a public good, which points to the importance of the role 
played by market makers.26  Moreover, in one of the most comprehensive 
market structure overviews by the leadership of the U.S. Securities and 
 
http://insider.thomsonreuters.com/link.html?cn=uid470006&cid=1276928&shareToken=Mz
o3ZDFiYWI1ZS1hNzY1LTQ2MzctYmNhNC1jNGViMzgxOTVmNjE%3D&playerName=
liveReutersNews [https://perma.cc/S345-3LY2] [hereinafter EMS Roundtable: Market 
Making and Trading in the 21st Century] (remarks of Douglas Cifu, Chief Executive 
Officer, Virtu Financial) (a CEO of one of the leading market making firms, describing his 
company’s technology and infrastructure costs as “extraordinary” and stating that, “if we 
were just applying that cost against our U.S. equities business, I’m not sure . . . that we 
would be profitable”). 
23.  For an extended discussion of the market structure crisis, see HAIM BODEK & 
STANISLAV DOLGOPOLOV, THE MARKET STRUCTURE CRISIS: ELECTRONIC STOCK MARKETS, 
HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING, AND DARK POOLS (2015). 
24.  Huw Jones, Regulators Concerned at Banks Scaling Back Market Making 
Commitments, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2014, 7:32 PM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/12/09/us-markets-regulations-idINKBN0JN1HN20141209 
[https://perma.cc/FLQ2-FXXS] (quoting David Wright, Secretary General of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions). 
25.  See, e.g., Computerized Trading: What Should the Rules of the Road Be?:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 47 (2013) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Computerized 
Trading] (prepared statement of Chris Concannon, Partner and Executive Vice President, 
Virtu Financial, LLC) (arguing that “we need to increase obligated liquidity in our markets” 
and that “enhanced market maker obligations should be targeted where they are most 
needed and that is in our less liquid stocks”); A Parting Thought, MKT. STRUCTURE REV. 
(KCG Holdings, Inc., Jersey City, N.J.), 1st Q. 2014, at 8, 8–9, 
http://www.kcg.com/uploads/documents/233002_KCG_ES_MarketStructureNewsletterQ1-
2014_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX82-9N46] (maintaining that “[i]ntermediaries, such as 
market makers, should be registered and subject to stricter quoting and trading obligations 
for when they trade directly with their customers and on public markets” and that such 
market participants “should be encouraged to enhance price discovery on public markets, 
which helps promote fair and orderly trading”). 
26.  See Letter from Brent Robertson, Dir., Trading, Beta Portfolio Mgmt., OMERS 
Capital Mkts., to Mkt. Regulation Branch, Ont. Sec. Comm’n 5 (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Marketplaces/com_20131004_aequitas_omers-
capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKL9-RJV9] (“Since the benefits of proper market making 
will accrue to all investors, market making itself can be viewed as a type of public good.”). 
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”), it was asserted that one of the key 
priorities “should be to support the interests of the market participants that 
support our markets, such as registered dealers and market makers, because 
they are an indispensable part of an efficient and liquid market.”27 
The phenomenon of high-frequency trading (“HFT”) is of particular 
significance for regulatory reassessment and reform of market making, as 
new players, high-frequency traders (“HFTs”), are often seen as another 
iteration of market makers.28  However, this multifaceted phenomenon does 
not always fit the traditional definition of market making, and perhaps 
many forms of HFT can be better analogized to older and more familiar 
practices of “floor trading” and “scalping.”  In many instances, HFTs have 
played the role of informal liquidity providers, which raises the issue of 
their impact on other types of market makers.  On the other hand, some 
HFTs are now assuming the role of DMMs and often supplanting 
integrated securities firms in the process.29  Moreover, numerous issues 
raised by the phenomenon of HFT need to include a macroeconomic 
perspective.  For instance, while addressing “potential liquidity risks” 
posed by the current market structure, the Financial Stability Oversight 
 
27.  Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, U.S. Equity Market 
Structure: Making Our Markets Work Better for Investors (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/us-equity-market-structure.html 
[https://perma.cc/8KVX-WKKL]. 
28.  See, e.g., MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING, at vi, 40 
(2010) (arguing that “[t]he high-frequency trader evolved from the ranks of the traditional 
market-maker,” although noting that such market participants “must resort to more 
innovative, aggressive, and (some would say) predatory strategies than those of traditional 
market-makers”). 
29.  As an illustration, not a single firm serving as a NYSE specialist in 2006 would 
remain a NYSE designated market maker with the anticipated purchases of Barclays’ 
franchise by GTS, an HFT firm, and KCG’s franchise by Citadel, a more diversified firm 
that could still be classified as belonging to the HFT camp, with both of these deals 
announced in January 2016. See Press Release, Citadel Sec., Citadel Securities To Become 
#1 Designated Market Maker on NYSE (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/citadel-securities-to-become-1-designated-market-maker-on-nyse-300215855.html 
[https://perma.cc/7J59-VGNG]; Press Release, GTS, GTS To Become Designated Market 
Maker on the New York Stock Exchange (Jan. 26, 2016), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gts-to-become-designated-market-maker-on-the-
new-york-stock-exchange-300209592.html [https://perma.cc/QAE2-S845].  Citadel and 
GTS would be in the company of two other HFT firms, IMC and Virtu Financial, and two 
“old school specialist” firms, Brendan Cryan and J. Streicher.  In addition to Barclays’ 
looming departure, such integrated securities firms as Bank of America, Bear Wagner, 
which was owned by Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs have exited this business.  See 
Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC Making 
Permanent the Rules of the New Market Model Pilot and the Supplemental Liquidity 
Providers Pilot, Exchange Act Release No. 75,153, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,717, 34,723–24 (June 
11, 2015) (describing departures and other changes relating to firms that operate as DMMs 
on the NYSE). 
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Council made the following observation: 
Across all markets that feature electronic trading, non-traditional 
liquidity providers engage exchanges and other electronic 
markets by rapidly submitting multiple bids and offers at 
different prices and sizes through automated systems. These 
orders are often cancelled and resubmitted at extremely fast 
speeds to avoid becoming stale, especially during volatile 
periods.30 
While there is no perfect taxonomy for factors behind the existence of 
regulation of market makers, this Article singles out such key — and 
sometimes overlapping — factors as externalities in the market for 
liquidity, vulnerability of these market participants to certain trading 
strategies, and their own opportunism.  This framework is explored through 
the evolution of the market making segment of the securities industry from 
crowded floors to high-frequency trading, and the regulatory outlook is 
analyzed from the standpoint of the current market structure crisis.  While 
firms that engage in market making may indeed wear multiple hats at the 
same time, with some of their other functions being unrelated or merely 
complementary, this framework retains its significance.  Indeed, the 
function of providing liquidity may be intricately connected to other 
functions, often involving economies of scope and sometimes being 
unviable on the standalone basis.31  Furthermore, the presence of other 
functions may create conflicts of interest and thus lead to regulatory 
scrutiny or even pressure for mandatory segregation.  As an illustration, the 
traditional approach to regulating the specialist system on securities 
exchanges was founded on the dual role of these market participants as 
 
30.  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 107–08 (2015), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8VB-
4YXP]. 
31.  For instance, one commentator posed the following question about the integrated 
model of market making on NASDAQ: “[W]hy [is] market making . . . typically bundled 
with brokerage, analyst coverage and underwriting in the same firm[?] . . . One possibility is 
that the information generated in one of these activities is valuable in the others . . .”  Paul 
Schultz, Who Makes Markets?, 6 J. FIN. MKTS. 49, 72 (2003).  Furthermore, market makers 
may be involved in the very process of creating a security, such as custom-made — and 
possibly opaque — synthetic collateralized debt obligations, which may raise additional 
issues.  For instance, as observed in connection with a recent scandal involving the role 
played by Goldman Sachs in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 deal, “When the market maker 
becomes involved in the creation of inventory, not just obtaining it on the market, there are 
additional asymmetrical incentives that can distort the market-making function.”  Robert B. 
Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the 
Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 342 (2011). 
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dealers and order-matching agents,32 and the recent evolution of securities 
markets has led to the “deagentization” of market makers, thereby 
dissolving the old paradigm.33  Of course, market makers are also regulated 
as belonging to wider categories, such as broker-dealers or members of 
securities exchanges, and, in addition, they may be affected by broader 
regulatory shifts.  Overall, the function of providing liquidity is impacted 
by a myriad of regulatory factors, with some of them having specific 
burdens or exceptions for markets makers and others having more general 
application.  These factors, with some of them aimed at prudential 
regulation/systemic risk aspects, may address such areas as clearing and 
settlement procedures, capital requirements/leverage, inventory financing, 
market access, and short selling.34 
 
32.  A historical slice of this approach, based at that time on self-regulation responsive 
to threats of government regulation, is evident from the series of congressional hearings 
leading to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  For extensive references to 
such self-regulation in one of these hearings, see 1933–34 Senate Hearings on Stock 
Exchange Practices, supra note 9, passim.  Also, as observed later, “During the New Deal, 
the propriety of specialists serving both as brokers, with their unique ability to anticipate 
price trends because of their physical presence on the exchange floor and possession of the 
specialists’ order books, and dealers . . . had been the single most controversial issue in 
exchange regulation.”  JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 335–36 
(3d ed. 2003).  Furthermore, from 1932 to 1934, a time period characterized by widespread 
allegations of market manipulation, the NYSE took measures to prevent its specialists from 
participating in much-criticized trading pools in their specialty stocks or dealing in options 
on such stocks, and similar anti-manipulation measures directed at the NYSE’s membership 
in general were adopted as well.  For a discussion of these measures, see S. COMM. ON 
BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 47–50 (1934) 
[hereinafter S. COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES]. 
33.  For a discussion of the process of deagentization and its implications, see Stanislav 
Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World: Trading Obligations and 
Privileges of Market Makers and a Private Right of Action, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 303, 343–44 (2013) [hereinafter, Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency 
World]. 
34.  For a discussion of a host of regulatory measures in the context of their impact on 
market makers and liquidity, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS LIQUIDITY STUDY 35–50 (Aug. 2015), http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/financial-
services/publications/assets/global-financial-market-liquidity-study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G8SD-PDC5] [hereinafter PWC, LIQUIDITY STUDY].  As a recent 
illustration, several industry groups have expressed their concerns in connection with the 
Fundamental Review of Trading Book undertaken by the Bank for International 
Settlements, arguing that proposed regulatory measures “may lead to a substantial increase 
in overall capital requirements [which] would fundamentally alter the market making 
capacity of regulated entities, resulting in significant changes in market structures and 
secondary market liquidity.”  Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., CEO, Global Fin. Mkts. 
Ass’n, Scott O’Malia, CEO, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., & Timothy D. Adams, 
CEO, Inst. of Int’l Fin., to Mario Draghi, Chairman, Grp. of Governors & Heads of 
Supervision, & Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Int’l Bank 
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I. CONSEQUENCES OF EXTERNALITIES IN THE MARKET FOR 
LIQUIDITY 
The proposition that trading obligations of market makers have to be 
balanced with trading privileges, whether formal or informal, is common 
sense.  However, the pivotal issue is whether this combination of 
obligations and privileges is needed at all, as contrasted to a free flow of 
capital into market making activities for a risk-adjusted return.  However, a 
mere availability of capital for, or specialization in, providing liquidity 
does not guarantee a well-functioning market.  Likewise, technological 
developments may not be sufficient.  As it was asserted back in 1877 and is 
still true today, “[Y]ou cannot convert a non-current [i.e., inactive] market 
into a current market by any machinery which you can invent; if dealings 
are few and far between[,] you cannot make [market makers] ready.”35  
Moreover, illiquidity may create a self-reinforcing cycle with market 
makers minimizing or even abstaining from principal trading, given 
difficulties with managing inventories.  With respect to very illiquid 
securities, market makers have traditionally preferred to play the role of 
matching agents,36 and shifts from principal to agency trading have been 
documented in environments becoming more problematic to market 
makers.37 
 
for Settlements 2 (Oct. 30, 2015), 
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/Nzk4OQ==/FRTB%20Letter%20to%20GHOS%20%203
0%20October%20FINAL%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/VQL3-MZL7]. 
35.  LSE COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 2, para. 5186, at 206 
(testimony of Thomas Wilde Powell, a broker at the LSE). 
36.  For instance, this phenomenon was discussed in the context of trading on the LSE 
in the nineteenth century.  As one market participant observed, jobbers in “limited non-
current stock profess to be dealers, but in a great many cases they are only brokers between 
brokers . . .”  Id. para. 4555, at 178 (testimony of Frederick Banbury, a broker at the LSE). 
37.  The importance of this perspective is connected to several recent reforms.  For 
instance, one commentator provided the following description of the impact of 
decimalization: “[B]y some estimates the margins on trading have declined by as much as 
80%, creating fewer incentives for dealers and risk-takers to commit capital to support 
trading activities, thus prompting a greater migration toward an agency-brokerage model of 
matching buyers/sellers.”  ERIK BANKS, DARK POOLS: OFF-EXCHANGE LIQUIDITY IN AN ERA 
OF HIGH FREQUENCY, PROGRAM AND AUTOMATED TRADING 15 (2d ed. 2014).  Likewise, 
another source described the impact of MiFID II adopted in the European Union: “Bank 
capital rules and bank structural reform, while delivering increased systemic safety, result in 
increased cost for banks to warehouse risk on their balance sheet.  This renders market 
making an increasingly unattractive business line for banks and has precipitated a wholesale 
shift from principal trading to an agency model.”  BLACKROCK, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE 
MARKET REVIEW, at v (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/br.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EWQ-
WLQJ]. 
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Overall, the vision shared by many financial economists38 of an 
egalitarian marketplace lacking participants with trading obligations and 
privileges has proven to be unrealized.  Similar statements of insiders from  
the securities industry39 also have to be taken with a grain of salt.  Another 
perspective on this egalitarianism is represented by efforts to coopt other 
constituencies into market making.  One repeated suggestion is that 
institutional investors themselves should play the role of market makers, 
given their perceived advantages, perhaps combined with some tweaks to 
the trading infrastructure.40  Furthermore, some agency brokers offer and 
actively market to institutional investors algorithms that would allow them 
 
38.  See Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange (pt. 2), FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1971, at 24, 87 (“[With some changes relating to automation and 
order matching] there will be little need for dealers, market makers, or block positioners 
who maintain quotes for their own accounts. . .  There will be no need for a prohibition of 
market making; in an efficient market, market making will simply be unprofitable.”); 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 399 n.22 (1970) (“It does not seem technologically impossible to replace the entire 
[trading] floor . . . with a computer, fed by many remote consoles, that kept all the books 
now kept by specialist, that could easily make the entire book on any stock available to 
anybody (so that interested individuals could then compete to ‘make a market’ in a stock) 
and that carried out transactions automatically.”); Daniel R. Siegel, The Competitive World 
of Electronic Trading, in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MARKETS: A REORDERING 
OF THE WORLD’S CAPITAL MARKET SYSTEMS 3, 11 (Daniel R. Siegel ed., 1990) (“The most 
likely scenario is that by the year 2000 . . . [t]here will be no designated market-makers or 
other entities with special access to the market.”); Hans R. Stoll, Reconsidering the 
Affirmative Obligation of Market Makers, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 72, 80 
(“That an affirmative obligation reduces volatility or makes markets more efficient is not 
evident. . . Markets will function well without an affirmative obligation.  Market makers 
need no regulatory obligations and should not receive special privileges.”). 
39.  See, e.g., Examining the Efficiency, Stability, and Integrity of the U.S. Capital 
Markets: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urban Affairs and the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 41 (2011) (remarks of Manoj Narang, 
Chief Executive Officer, Tradeworx, Inc.) (“I cannot think of any empirical evidence that 
market maker obligations actually matter in practice.”). 
40.  See, e.g., Paul Brakke, Commentary on On the Existence of an Optimal Tick Size, 
10 REV. FUTURES MKTS. 75, 76 (1991) (“[W]hy couldn’t pension funds, for example, be the 
market-maker?  They have very large inventories of assets and pretty much zero cost of 
inventory since they are already long in these assets.  It seems to me that the pension funds 
are in a much better position on any given trade to take a position, and are much better 
capitalized than any market-maker on the floor. . . The only thing missing is . . . the 
electronic hookup to a centralized exchange.”); Paul Reynolds, Shining a Light on Fixed 
Income Dark Matter, TABB FORUM (Sept. 12, 2014), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/shining-
a-light-on-dark-matter [https://perma.cc/89DF-RR3P] (“Compared to the sell-side, the buy-
side has an almost zero cost of capital.  It has little or no leverage so does not need the same 
restrictions to protect the taxpayer from failure.  As a result the buy-side can provide a far 
superior price for a large and illiquid order, given the opportunity to price it.  Not 
surprisingly the buy-side lacks the market-maker infrastructure of the sell-side.”).  
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to serve as informal liquidity providers.41  However, an overall substantial 
impact of this type of market making, let alone a disintermediation of sell-
side market makers, remains to be seen.  While institutional investors may 
in fact benefit from sophisticated technological tools or regulatory or other 
market-wide changes that would encourage them to engage in liquidity-
providing trading strategies,  the very business model and practices of a 
typical institutional investor may be a substantial obstacle.42  Still, there is 
some evidence that certain groups of hedge funds have functioned as 
liquidity providers,43 which is not surprising in light of their operational and 
 
41.  See John D’Antona Jr., Instinet Helps MAKE Liquidity, TRADERS MAG., Mar. 
2014, 50, 50 (“The new algorithm, MAKE, is geared toward passive traders and gives them 
electronic access to the same type of advanced liquidity-providing tactics used by market 
makers.  Using historical information, recent trading patterns and real-time market data, 
MAKE sizes and distributes child orders at multiple price levels and across destinations, 
controlling adverse and negative selection while reducing exposure to signaling, gaming and 
predatory techniques.”); Press Release, Inv. Tech. Grp., Inc., ITG Launches Smart Limit 
Algorithm (Feb. 26, 2014), http://investor.itg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=100516&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1903736&highlight= [https://perma.cc/C8PQ-XKNF] (“Smart Limit 
Algorithm [is] an innovative tool which helps institutional investors meet the challenge of 
trading passively in a highly competitive, fragmented market.  [This algorithm] is built on 
ITG’s next-generation, low-latency trading infrastructure, providing powerful high-
frequency trading technology to institutional investors.  ITG Smart Limit Algorithm 
employs sophisticated logic to determine optimal order pricing, sizing and routing in order 
to balance spread capture opportunities and adverse selection risk.”). 
42.  See BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 85TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APRIL 2014–31 MARCH 
2015, at 39 (June 28, 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2015e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XE7Q-S6P2] [hereinafter BIS, 85TH ANNUAL REPORT] (“[A]sset managers 
and institutional investors are less well placed to play an active market-making role at times 
of large order imbalances.  They have little incentive to increase their liquidity buffers 
during good times to better reflect the liquidity risks of their bond holdings.  And, precisely 
when order imbalances develop, asset managers may face redemptions by investors.”); 
Letter from Colm Kelleher, Managing Dir. & President, Institutional Sec., Morgan Stanley, 
to the Bank of Eng., HM Treasury & Fin. Conduct Auth. 6–7 (2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/ms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8HU-89T9] (“The market-making function undertaken by dealers 
cannot be performed in the same manner by buy-side participants, particularly in stressed 
markets, as they would be faced with significant conflict issues in performing a role (and 
absorbing risks) traditionally undertaken by sell-side participants (and would face the same 
capital and other constraints of sell-side participants if they markedly changed their 
structures or strategies).”).  These observations were made in the context of fixed income 
markets, but they still have some relevance for other markets. 
43.  For empirical studies suggesting this result, see Petri Jylhä et al., Do Hedge Funds 
Supply or Demand Liquidity?, 18 REV. FIN. 1259 (2013); Francesco Franzoni & Alberto 
Plazzi, What Constrains Liquidity Provision? Evidence from Hedge Fund Trades (June 3, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239327 
[https://perma.cc/WE74-9AXT]; Russell Jame, Do Hedge Funds Create Value from 
Liquidity Provision? (Aug. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://russelljame.com/hf_liquidity_provision_aug2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4GK-FR8L]; 
Mathias Kruttli, Are Hedge Funds Smart Money? Liquidity Provision to Noninformational 
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regulatory differences from traditional institutional investors.44  On the 
other hand, the model of liquidity provision by hedge funds, as more 
fundamental and longer-term traders compared to traditional market 
makers and their modern permutations, may involve less liquid assets, have 
a different timeframe or capital capacity, or lack double-sided quotations.45 
The very existence of a balance of trading obligations and privileges 
may be explained through the lens of externalities in the market for 
liquidity.  Framing this issue as an externality means finding the wedge 
between the socially optimal amount of liquidity and the profit-maximizing 
amount of liquidity for market makers, given their costs and benefits: “To 
the extent . . . that liquidity and efficiency are associated with positive 
externalities, the private benefit of market participants does not capture the 
full social benefit of an efficient and liquid market.  In other words, market 
participants are not compensated for the wider benefits that their 
participation brings about.”46  In an early discussion touching on this issue, 
 
Traders (Dec. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2525989 [https://perma.cc/69M6-DEV2].  This involvement by 
hedge funds is even observed in the options space, which has traditionally been dominated 
by DMMs.  See, e.g., Hedge Funds Pump Liquidity into Options Markets, MKTS. MEDIA 
(May 9, 2014), http://marketsmedia.com/hedge-funds-pump-liquidity-options-markets/ 
[https://perma.cc/YZR6-BCTW] (“What we are seeing in recent years is the line between 
the pure market makers and liquidity takers is getting a little bit more blurred.  People like 
us, a volatility trading firm, bring a lot of liquidity to the market.  Even though we are 
coming in as a liquidity taker, more than half of our trades are providing liquidity. . .  It 
turns out that a quantitative volatility system interfacing with the intelligence of electronic 
execution and institutional liquidity providing is a pretty good combination, and we are 
seeing a very good and consistent outcome in the past three years.” (quoting Derek Wang, 
founder and CEO of Bell Curve Capital, a quantitative hedge fund)). 
44.  See, e.g., Jame, supra note 43, at 1 (“[C]ompared to other institutional investors, 
hedge funds generally have better liquidity management tools, such as lockups and share 
restrictions, which likely provide them with a comparative advantage in patient liquidity 
provision.”).  For an illustration of much scarcer evidence of the role of liquidity providers 
played by some mutual funds at least during the pre-HFT era, see Zhi Da et al., Impatient 
Trading, Liquidity Provision, and Stock Selection by Mutual Funds, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 675 
(2011).  A subsidiary issue is whether certain groups of retail investors provide liquidity on 
their own rather than through intermediated aggregation and how they are compensated for 
doing so.  For empirical studies in this area, see Jean-Noel Barrot et al., Are Retail Traders 
Compensated for Providing Liquidity?, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457051 [https://perma.cc/FT83-M243]; Eric K. Kelley & Paul C. 
Tetlock, How Wise Are Crowds? Insights from Retail Orders and Stock Returns, 68 J. FIN. 
1229 (2013). 
45.  See, e.g., Jame, supra note 43, at 36 (suggesting that certain hedge funds “create 
significant short-term value from liquidity provision, but due to their relatively long holding 
periods, the impact of liquidity provision on the performance of their holdings is more 
modest”). 
46.  Evangelos Benos & Anne Wetherilt, The Role of Designated Market Makers in the 
New Trading Landscape, 52 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 342, 344 (2012). 
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the SEC pointed to the perceived gap between private and social benefits of 
market making: 
Since the potentialities for profit are greatest in the more active 
stocks, specialists’ dealer activities tend to be concentrated in 
these stocks.  Furthermore, the risks of acquiring an inventory are 
smallest in active stocks . . . . Responsible professional 
participation is needed most, however, in the least active stocks, 
where risks are greater and profit potentials are more limited.47 
Of course, a market maker is guided by profit motives, and a liquid 
security, while attracting more traders, is likely to boost the bottom line of 
this market participant.48  In this sense, the benefits from liquidity are to 
some degree internalized by that market maker, but free-riding may take 
place as well.  It follows that a subsidy may be required: “In general, 
liquidity provision represents a positive externality in that traders who 
commit capital to make markets are not fully compensated for their 
liquidity services.  While the usual solution to this inefficiency is a 
Pigovian subsidy, the form that this payment should take is less clear.”49 
There are two major approaches to explaining externalities in the 
market for liquidity discussed in the relevant academic literature, and these 
forces may be operating at the same time.  The first approach focuses on 
the impact on issuers of securities.  After all, even issuers that do not 
participate in secondary trading cannot be excluded from enjoying potential 
benefits of additional liquidity, which may affect operating decisions of 
such companies and hence the real economy.50  Another explanation is 
 
47.  REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 162 (1963) [hereinafter SEC, 
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS]. 
48.  See, e.g., 1933–34 Senate Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 9, pt. 
15, at 6809 (testimony of Raymond Sprague, a member of the NYSE and a specialist) (“I do 
not wish to put myself on record as being a public benefactor, but give me a selfish motive 
and I create a better market in my stocks so that people will invest or speculate in my stocks.  
In that way a man can buy or sell with knowledge that there will be a market that he can buy 
or sell in. . .  [T]o that extent it is an advantage to the investor just as well as it is for 
speculator, because when an investor seeks stocks for investment purposes the first thing he 
looks at is marketability, liquidity, how he is going to get out once he gets in.”). 
49.  Kumar Venkataraman & Andrew C. Waisburd, The Value of the Designated 
Market Maker, 42 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 735, 755 (2007).  Interestingly, several 
empirical studies suggested that the value of improvements in market liquidity may be a 
large multiple of the amount of subsidies provided to market makers.  See Dolgopolov, 
Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, supra note 15, at 5 n.11, 44 
n.167 (discussing value-to-subsidy ratios produced by several empirical studies). 
50.  See, e.g., Kalman J. Cohen et al., The Impact of Designated Market Makers on 
Security Prices, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 219, 237, 245 (1977) (“[Price] stabilization [by 
designated market makers] is a public good type external economy to investors [that] would 
be internalized in a free market where contracts between corporations and stabilizers are not 
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based on the trading process itself with respect to different types of actual 
or potential participants in this process,51 and this explanation is also 
consistent with an ultimate impact on issuers and the real economy.  
Moreover, aside from the focus on one security’s trading process, liquidity 
externalities may extend to other securities.52 
The nature of externalities in the market for liquidity, embodied by a 
balance of trading obligations and privileges of market makers, implies a 
special regulatory status of these market participants.  Such obligations and 
privileges may take a variety of forms with different degrees of formality 
and transparency.  Over years, market makers have enjoyed a number of 
trading privileges, notably (i) time, place, and information-based 
advantages; (ii) inherent advantages built into trading venues’ respective 
architectures, including technology-based and competition-insulating 
measures; (iii) discounts/subsidies offered by trading venues or issuers 
themselves; and (iv) order-allocation guarantees.53  Likewise, trading 
obligations come in different shapes and sizes, such as (i) specific 
requirements for quotes/best price presence; (ii) constrains on certain 
 
restricted.”). 
51.  See, e.g., Jennifer Huang & Jiang Wang, Market Liquidity, Asset Prices, and 
Welfare, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 109 (2010) (“In our model, trading and liquidity provision 
generate externalities.  A trader’s participation in the market also benefits his potential 
counterparties, and a market maker’s supply of liquidity helps all potential traders. . . [I]n 
general, market mechanism fails to properly internalize these externalities and thus leads to 
inefficient supply of liquidity in the market.”). 
52.  See COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CGFS PAPER 
NO. 52, MARKET-MAKING AND PROPRIETARY TRADING: INDUSTRY TRENDS, DRIVERS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 37 (Nov. 2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs52.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CUS7-9NUZ] [hereinafter BIS, MARKET-MAKING AND PROPRIETARY 
TRADING] (arguing that incentives for market makers “could support market activity and 
robustness and generate positive spillovers into other market segments”); see also Yakov 
Amihud et al., Market Microstructure and Securities Values: Evidence from the Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 365 (1997) (finding “positive liquidity externalities 
(spillovers) across related stocks” attributed to an improved trading method); Giovanni 
Cespa & Thierry Foucault, Learning from Prices, Liquidity Spillovers, and Market 
Segmentation 1 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/researchProgrammes/paulWoolleyCentre/events/4thAnnualConfer
ence/S5_TFoucault_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8MZ-M38N] (providing a theoretic model 
for liquidity spillovers and arguing that, “[a]s prices of less liquid securities convey less 
precise information, a drop in liquidity for one security raises the uncertainty for dealers in 
other securities, thereby affecting their liquidity”). 
53.  Addressing the importance of order flow-related information, one commentator 
observed that “[m]arket making can be profitable, because the market makers have an 
informational advantage.”  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Tapping the Brakes: Are Less Active Markets 
Safer and Better for the Economy? 7 (Apr. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/14fmc/Stiglitz.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8F84-TFTP].  Yet, while such informational advantages have been 
common, this condition is not necessary for profitable market making. 
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trading activities; and (iii) support of less desirable securities/broader 
portfolios.  Moreover, empirical research generally indicates that the 
existence of combined trading obligations and privileges applicable to 
market makers improves market quality,54 which serves as an additional 
confirmation of the paradigm of liquidity externalities. 
The existence of interacting, although not completely solidified, 
trading obligations and privileges was evident by the time of the birth of 
the federal securities statutes, as illustrated by complex rules and 
conventions governing NYSE specialists.  While trading activities to 
provide liquidity were limited on paper to “the whim, caprice, or the will of 
the specialist,”55 these market participants were described as having “[the] 
duty to their customers, who are commission houses, to sustain and keep as 
close a market as possible, sometimes to their great disadvantage.”56  In 
other words, these trading obligations were informal and loosely defined, 
and the same was true of trading privileges, which were based on being at 
the hub of the trading process — adjusted for the existence of competing 
specialists at that time — and the knowledge of the order book.57 
Trading venues have often provided some protections to market 
makers or DMMs specifically, which could be seen as competition-
insulating.58  Overall, under the specialist system, the existence of one 
DMM per stock, although not the only viable model, perhaps made some 
sense in the context of that market participant’s role as a matching agent in 
a centralized auction, the existence of stock-allocation procedures, and the 
inherent competitive forces in that auction.59  Furthermore, the existence of 
just one DMM per security probably makes it easier to be held accountable 
for meeting its trading obligations and being able to recoup benefits 
through its trading privileges, which also serves as a much better 
 
54.  Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, 
supra note 15, at 5 & n.10. 
55.  1933–34 Senate Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 9, pt. 15, at 
6799 (question of Ferdinand Pecora, Counsel to the Committee on Banking and Currency). 
56.  Id. (testimony of Paul Adler, a specialist and a member of the NYSE). 
57.  The existence of informational advantages of specialists was a much debated issue 
during these hearings, with the importance of this issue being noted in a key congressional 
report. S. COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, supra note 32, at 
25–26. 
58.  For a discussion of formal economic models and other sources in support of the 
argument of why a monopoly-like franchise might be desirable in some circumstances, see 
Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, supra note 15, 
at 35 & n.134. 
59.  For a comprehensive historical discussion of various forms of competition among 
specialists on several securities exchanges, including the NYSE, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, REPORT ON THE PRACTICE OF PREFERENCING ch. I (1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/prefrep.htm [https://perma.cc/8T4J-LY26]. 
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explanation than, or a clarification of, the “natural monopoly” paradigm.60  
Yet another illustration of regulatory protection is the practice of off-board 
trading restrictions traditionally imposed on exchange members in the past, 
as this practice amounted to a boost to exchange specialists.61  Another 
similar measure, typically associated with the old structure of NASDAQ, is 
mandatory intermediation through dealers and hence the lack of direct 
interaction of investors’ orders.62  Interestingly, regulatory changes aimed 
to inject more competition by mandating direct interaction of orders may 
have unintentionally impacted the willingness of market makers to provide 
liquidity at least in some securities and decreased overall liquidity in such 
securities — despite the feasibility of additional participation.63 Likewise, 
market makers may be aided by governmental restraints on potential 
competition.  As an illustration, one historical phase created the situation in 
which floor traders on securities exchanges were reduced to mere ancillary 
market makers to specialists, with the latter possessing substantial 
institutional advantages over the former and thus dominating the trading 
process.64 The SEC’s hostility to floor trading had played a major role in 
 
60.  For a discussion of the “natural monopoly” paradigm in market making, see 
Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, supra note 15, 
at 35–36 & n.135; Dale Arthur Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Its Out 
Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17 J. CORP. L. 223, 295–
300 (1992). 
61.  See, e.g., Off-Board Trading by Members of National Securities Exchanges, 
Exchange Act Release No. 11,942, 41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4509, 4511 (Dec. 19, 1975) 
(“Because of exchange off-board trading rules, over-the-counter market makers are unable, 
as a practical matter, to compete effectively with exchange specialists in attracting these 
orders: competition between over-the-counter market makers and exchange specialists is 
distorted by the captive nature of agency orders represented by exchange members . . . 
[Furthermore, such rules] effectively prevent exchange members other than specialists from 
competing with specialists and over-the-counter market makers in the business of making 
two-sided, round lot markets in exchange-listed securities.”). 
62.  A similar practice of preventing broker-to-broker transactions was criticized in the 
context of trading on the LSE in the nineteenth century:  
It has to be considered that the Stock Exchange has a sort of vested right in every 
bargain, and that the profits of the operation are not to be confined to the broker, but that if 
two brokers deal together there is a kind of wrong practiced upon the jobbers. 
LSE COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 2, para. 3517, at 133 (testimony of 
Charles Branch, a former broker at the LSE). 
63.  See Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, 
supra note 15, at 21–23 (discussing the adoption of the order handling rules by the SEC in 
1996 and this measure’s impact on market makers). 
64.  See Seymour Smidt, Trading Floor Practices on Futures and Securities 
Exchanges: Economics, Regulation, and Policy Issues, in FUTURES MARKETS: REGULATORY 
ISSUES 49, 54 (Ann E. Peck ed., 1985) (“Exchanges regulated by the SEC generally exclude 
from the trading floor persons trading primarily for their own accounts unless it can be 
shown that they perform a market-making function. If they do, their floor trading is usually 
restricted to this market-making function.”); Jack Hirshleifer, Reflections on the Role and 
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this development,65 which was enabled by the underlying statutory 
framework.66  An unsurprising result was the strengthened position of 
exchange specialists at the expense of their potential competitors. 
Another practice intertwined with the paradigm of liquidity 
externalities is the one of cross-subsidization.  While cross-subsidization 
may merely reflect the nature of the integrated model of market making,67 
this practice is a potential tool for supporting the function of providing 
liquidity in a given security or enhancing liquidity in less desirable 
securities. Historically, cross-subsidization appears to have been practiced 
by some trading venues, although it might have been enforced indirectly 
and informally rather than explicitly.  It appears that the principle of cross-
subsidization had applied to NYSE specialists — the category including 
many non-integrated securities firms — with respect to different activities 
relating to the same stock and across different stocks.  For instance, there is 
some evidence that the role of “a broker’s broker” played by specialists 
effectively subsidized their activities as dealers.68  Moreover, it has been 
noted that the business model of specialists tended to be sensitive to 
 
Functioning of the Organized Exchanges 10 (RAND Corp., Paper No. P-4666, 1971) (“The 
independent floor speculator competes with the specialist in providing market depth (the 
reverse of thin-ness). In recent years the former [traders] have largely disappeared, while a 
rising fraction of transactions . . . involve specialists as buyer[s] or seller[s].”).  Of course, 
this policy had corresponded to an observation of an influential SEC study that floor traders 
could — and should — play “a highly useful function of ‘auxiliary specialists’.”  SEC, 
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 46, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 241–42. 
65.  For an analysis of the SEC’s approach to floor trading and its critique, see Smidt, 
supra note 64, at 77–79.  A critical approach to floor trading predates federal securities law 
and the birth of the SEC, and, traditionally, floor traders had been defended on the grounds 
that their transactions were “of great assistance in maintaining a continuous market [and] 
stabilizing prices.”  J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 101 (1922). 
66.  For several amendments relating to floor trading and the corresponding authority 
of the SEC see Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6, 89 Stat. 97, 
110–11; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 11, 48 Stat. 881, 891–92. 
67.  See, e.g., BIS, MARKET-MAKING AND PROPRIETARY TRADING, supra note 52, at 9 
(“Market-making serves the customer relationship. An assessment of the profitability of 
market-making is thus based not only on the [profit and loss position] of the market-making 
units – as would be the case for proprietary trading – but also on any associated client 
business ([e.g.,] underwriting, origination, asset management, prime brokerage) tied to the 
provision of market-making services. The importance of the customer franchise . . . can help 
explain why banks continue to provide market-making services even in less profitable 
markets and, to some extent, during times of elevated financial market volatility or stress.”). 
68.  See G. Keith Funston, Letter to the Editor, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1962, at 7, 
10 (“An important factor in the specialist’s willingness to shoulder dealer risks, in order to 
help maintain orderly markets, is the knowledge that in the long run an orderly market will 
encourage commission business in which he may participate.  Moreover, without such an 
incentive, specialists who had to rely solely on dealer profits would naturally step away 
from the market in times of stress, when they would be most needed.”). 
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changes in the commission structure,69 and, similarly, this commission 
business was not necessarily priced competitively on its own.70  Likewise, 
the NYSE’s policy of allocation of stocks in bundled lots among its 
specialists encouraged them to enhance liquidity of less actively traded and 
hence less profitable names at the expense of profits in more popular 
names.71  In fact, as early as 1968, the NYSE linked the ability of 
specialists “to make effective markets in normally inactive stocks” and “the 
financial incentive arising from market-making in more active issues,”72 
although the SEC was skeptical of the cross-subsidization argument on 
 
69.  See Interaction Between Trading and Investment Decisions, in COPING WITH 
INSTITUTIONAL ORDER FLOW 41, 49 (Robert A. Schwartz et al. eds., 2005) (“It seems to me 
the specialists used to earn their money by earning floor brokerage, by facilitating trading, 
and by making a fair and orderly market. We have taken them out of that business. Whether 
it is decimals or the market structure changes that have happened in the last 15 years, the 
specialists are now in a much more adversarial and proprietary trading model.”) (remarks of 
Andrew Brooks, Vice President and Head of Equity Trading, T. Rowe Price Associates); 
Louis Margolis, Before and After October 19: Structural Changes in U.S. Financial 
Markets, in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MARKETS: A REORDERING OF THE 
WORLD’S CAPITAL MARKET SYSTEMS 59, 63–64 (Daniel R. Siegel ed., 1990) (“[E]xchange 
specialists had incentives to make bids and offers that would stabilize the market.  At old 
commission levels [i.e., before the Mayday of May 1, 1975 that marked the end of the fixed 
brokerage commissions regime], they could afford to provide liquidity during periods of 
stress . . .  [But] the specialist has seen a sharp drop in his floor brokerage.”).  The 
elimination of specialists’ commissions on the NYSE, which was accompanied by a 
restructuring of their incentives, had taken place fairly recently.  For a further description of 
the abolition of specialists’ commissions and several other fees and the institution of a new 
revenue sharing program at that time, see Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a 
Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC To Prohibit Specialists from 
Charging Commissions on Transactions in Their Specialty Securities, Exchange Act 
Release No. 54,850, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,217 (Nov. 30, 2006). 
70.  See, e.g., RAYMOND VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERS 91 
(1941) (“With regard to the interrelationship between the broker and the dealer activities of 
specialists it must be realized that the cost of the present specialist system could not be 
justified alone by the brokerage duties which the specialist perorms, since such duties could 
be performed less exepensively by a machine or by a clerk.”). 
71.  For a discussion of policy goals, social welfare, and relevant empirical evidence 
relating to cross-subsidization, see Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and 
Capital Formation, supra note 15, at 28–29. For instance, one empirical study suggested the 
existence of a direct relationship for different types of stocks: “Our results reveal that the 
profits of beneficiary stocks are lower when donor stocks are more frequently traded.  This 
negative association is stronger when the beneficiary stocks are less actively traded. Less 
frequently traded stocks are more heavily subsidized when donor stocks have higher trading 
volumes.” Roger D. Huang & Jerry W. Liu, Do Individual NYSE Specialists Cross-
Subsidize Illiquid Stocks? 3 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
72.  N.Y. STOCK EXCH., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF NEGOTIATED COMMISSION RATES ON 
THE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE SECURITIES, AND THE INVESTING 
PUBLIC 24 (Aug. 1968). 
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some occasions.73  Some commentators on the current market structure also 
recognized the significance of cross-subsidization: 
Any market making program should be designed to recognise 
that the securities most attractive to market makers (high volume, 
low price securities) are in the least need of additional liquidity, 
and those most needing liquidity are also the least attractive to 
market makers. Market makers should be assigned obligations on 
a package of securities which include a small number of high 
volume securities and larger set of illiquid names.74 
There is some evidence that the phenomenon of cross-subsidization by 
DMMs still persists.75  Indeed, some trading venues, including new ones, 
explicitly use this principle.76  On the other hand, the feasible magnitude of 
cross-subsidization has diminished, given the competitive environment and 
the level of fragmentation of the trading process in liquid securities.77 
Yet another externality-related perspective relates to issuer-to-market 
maker compensation arrangements, which also may be formally set up by 
individual trading venues, as companies may benefit from enhanced 
liquidity via a net positive impact on their securities’ prices and hence 
 
73.  See, e.g., Off-Board Trading by Members of National Securities Exchanges, 
Exchange Act Release No. 11,942, 41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4509, 4518 (Dec. 19, 1975) (“With 
the respect to the argument that the quality of specialist market making in inactive securities 
is dependent on profits from market making in active securities (which will be diminished 
by increased competition in those securities [as a result of the anticipated abolition of 
restrictions on off-board by exchange members]), the Commission has not been able to 
ascertain that this cross-subsidy actually exists.”). 
74.  Letter from David Panko, Managing Dir., Automated Execution Grp., TD Sec., to 
Mkt. Regulation Branch, Ont. Sec. Comm’n 7 (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Marketplaces/com_20130927_aequitas_td-
securities.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TDS-J39L]. 
75.  See, e.g., Amber Anand & Kumar Venkataraman, Market Conditions, Fragility 
and the Economics of Market Making, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179259 [https://perma.cc/YD9U-TCYL] (“Results [from 
transactions in stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange] support two types of cross subsidies 
in market making.  First, the DMMs’ risk-adjusted profits are higher in large stocks than 
small stocks, implying a cross-subsidy from large to small stocks. Second, higher profits in 
normal conditions subsidize the risk assumed in stressful conditions.”). 
76.  See, e.g., Press Release, Aequitas NEO Exch. Inc., Building a Liquidity Safety Net 
for Public Companies and Investment Products in Canada 1 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://aequitasinnovations.com/stagingsite/wp-
content/uploads/sites/6/2015/08/NEO_DesignatedMarketMakers_PR_19mar15_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VZ8J-5GH7] (stating that DMMs on Aequitas NEO Exchange “are 
required to assume market-making responsibility for a number of assigned securities, with 
the appropriate balance of liquid and less-liquid securities”). 
77.  See Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, 
supra note 15, at 30 (discussing changes that restrain cross-subsidization). 
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valuation, whether they actually participate in the trading process or not.78  
Indeed, issuers have some advantages in creating liquidity in the sense that 
they can potentially provide much greater subsidies than those provided by 
trading venues at the expense of participants in the trading process.  In fact, 
issuer-to-market maker compensation arrangements have been popular in 
other countries, especially for smaller-cap stocks.79  On the other hand, the 
U.S. prohibition on such arrangements largely remains in place, notably 
with respect to securities of operating companies,80 and the SEC has 
relaxed this restriction only with respect to exchange-traded products, such 
as exchange-traded funds, under special programs administered and 
intermediated by several securities exchanges.81 
Private regulatory regimes provided by trading venues also need to be 
compared to over-the-counter markets and less formal trading 
networks/platforms, which are commonly employed for such assets as 
fixed-income or mortgage-backed securities.82  Some advantages of market 
 
78.  See generally id. at 39–50. 
79.  See Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ Stock Market LLC 
To Establish the Market Quality Program, Exchange Act Release No. 66,765, 77 Fed. Reg. 
22,042, 22,044 (Apr. 6, 2012) (“First North [a European subsidiary of NASDAQ] offers 
new or small public companies the benefits of listing on a public market and the potential 
for good markets through a paid for market making system.”); Letter from Amber Anand, 
Assoc. Professor of Fin., Whitman Sch. of Mgmt., Syracuse Univ., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Apr. 29, 2012), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-
2012-043/nasdaq2012043-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMR5-NS2Q] (“The combined evidence 
from other [countries] indicates that a paid market making program offers significant 
promise for improving the liquidity of the stocks of smaller firms.”). 
80.  See Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation, 
supra note 15, at 42–43 (noting the SEC’s reluctance to allow issuer-to-market maker 
compensation arrangements for operating companies despite other constituencies’ support 
for this measure). 
81.  For such programs currently approved by the SEC, see Order Approving a 
Proposed Rule Change by BATS Exchange, Inc. To Amend the Competitive Liquidity 
Provider Program, Exchange Act Release No. 72,692, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,908 (July 28, 2014); 
Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by NYSE Arca, Inc. To Implement a One-Year 
Pilot Program for Issuers of Certain Exchange-Traded Products, Exchange Act Release No. 
69,706, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,340 (June 6, 2013); Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by 
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC To Establish the Market Quality Program, Exchange Act 
Release No. 69,195, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,393 (Mar. 20, 2013). 
82.  Many of these securities are inherently illiquid for a variety of reasons, in addition 
to a more obvious gravitation toward typically large denominations, which make them less 
suitable for major trading venues. See, e.g., Julie Segal, The Bond Conundrum: A Plethora 
of Issues but Little Liquidity, INST. INVESTOR (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3423957/asset-management-fixed-income/the-
bond-conundrum-a-plethora-of-issues-but-little-liquidity.html [https://perma.cc/45ZR-
MEX2] (noting the presence of illiquidity in bond markets and citing a securities industry 
professional that one of the reasons lies in the difficulty of standardizing covenants that 
protect bondholders). For similar reasons, more modern trading mechanics have been 
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makers in such markets — in the absence of formal institutional advantages 
provided by a trading venue — may be embedded in the de facto monopoly 
role or based on the performance of multiple functions, such as providing 
additional services for an issuer or creating a specific security.  
Furthermore, another de facto advantage is represented by the opaque 
nature of some markets: “[I]n corporate bond markets, dealer banks were 
able and willing to provide liquidity to the secondary market, since a profit 
could be made from the opacity of bid-ask spreads – in the absence of price 
transparency.”83  Accordingly, policy debates over the desirability of 
transparency need to balance between the openness of markets and 
incentives of market makers: “On one hand, a fairer, more transparent 
market could attract new traders. On the other hand, removing market 
opacity may dampen the incentives for dealer-banks to [bear] the risk of 
making markets and at the least, confer benefits only to a small group of 
investors.”84  Another related — and game-changing — proposal for bond 
markets maintained that “brokers should be required to post their customer 
limit orders to an actionable electronically accessible order display 
 
gaining ground rather slowly in fixed income markets. See, e.g., BROOKINGS INST., ARE 
THERE STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN U.S. BOND MARKETS? 12 (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/08/03-bond-
markets/20150803_bond_markets_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3H-QH6B] (remarks 
of Annette L. Nazareth, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP) (“[N]otwithstanding the 
profound impact that technology has had on competition and intermediation in markets such 
as the equity and swaps markets, the fixed income markets, and particularly the corporate 
and municipal bond markets, remain largely manual and dealer centric, with a large number 
of separate CUSIPs, each with bespoke attributes. . .  [T]he number and complexity of the 
bond issues also make continuous auction-based electronic markets less attractive.”).  For a 
discussion of the proposal to standardize the issuance of corporate bonds as a way of 
moving to a more automated trading environment and several downsides to standardization, 
see PWC, LIQUIDITY STUDY, supra note 34, at 112. 
83.  Rohini Tendulkar & Gigi Hancock, Corporate Bond Markets: A Global 
Perspective 55 (IOSCO Research Dep’t, Staff Working Paper No. SWP4/2014, 2014), 
http://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/swp/SW4-Corporate-Bond-Markets-Vol-1-A-global-
perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR2V-LXA8]. 
84.  Id.; see also HILL, supra note 14, para. 32, at 16 (“[T]here is uniform recognition 
that if the market becomes too transparent, this will have a counterproductive impact on 
liquidity. This is a reflection of the fact that the European credit market is not homogenous, 
remains largely OTC, and is inherently illiquid.”).  This perspective is particularly important 
in light of a potential regulatory move by the SEC in fixed-income securities.  See, e.g., 
Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Georgetown 
University Center for Financial Markets and Policy Conference on Financial Markets 
Quality (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542966151#.VB5QXRb4XQj 
[https://perma.cc/HJJ6-HCPT] (“[T]he SEC, as the primary regulator of the fixed income 
markets for non-government instruments, can address the opacity of these markets by 
requiring greater price transparency. Additionally, we can address liquidity risks by 
facilitating electronic dealer-to-dealer and on-exchange transactions of these products.”). 
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facility,” and this proposal was accompanied by the following logic: 
Dealers will lose profits and withdraw only if buy-side traders 
out-compete them.  If so, the buy-side traders will be supplying 
liquidity and the markets will be no worse off, and certainly at 
least as liquid.  But, the customers will be better off because they 
will obtain better prices on average.  Transaction costs will be 
lower because buy-side traders will not be paying dealers for 
services that they can often provide to each other at lower cost.85 
Yet, without denying the presence of many inefficiencies in bond 
markets that may be addressed by such a display facility,86 the adequacy of 
customer-driven interaction and unambiguously greater liquidity in all 
segments are not foregone conclusions.87 More generally, it is not even a 
matter of old-school dealer networks versus electronic platforms: the issue 
is how new electronic platforms could be structured, by contrast to all-to-
all classless fishbowls, in order to grant trading privileges to certain market 
participants in exchange for trading obligations. In other words, the design 
of such electronic platforms needs, to some degree, to replicate or 
 
85.  FIN. ECONOMIST ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF TRADING IN 
BOND MARKETS (May 11, 2015), 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/FERBondStatementwithIntro.5.11.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/244U-MMGU]. 
86.  One historical example relates to the relatively active market in fixed income 
instruments on the NYSE, which employed the “open outcry” and limit order book-like 
“bond cabinet” methods.  There were no specialists, as orders were essentially matched by 
NYSE clerks, but transaction costs probably can be compared favorably to much later 
historical periods dominated by over-the-counter trading.  For a discussion of the applicable 
trading process and empirical analysis of transaction costs, see Bruno Biais & Richard C. 
Green, The Microstructure of the Bond Market in the 20th Century 6–9, 29–30 (Aug. 29, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=tepper 
[https://perma.cc/UB87-CLQR]. 
87.  See also Sinead Cruise et al., Middlemen the Key to Corporate Bond Market’s 
Electric Dreams, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/10/corporatebonds-liquidity-
idUSL1N13431Y20151110 [https://perma.cc/MP4T-RGBA] (noting a high failure rate 
among electronic platforms for bonds and asserting that “[p]latforms that have tried to 
bypass the broker-dealers and connect buyers and sellers directly have so far struggled to 
catch on, partly because of concerns over how confidential information would be handled”); 
Christopher Scott Mose, The Siren Call of All-to-All for Corporate Bonds, LINKEDIN PULSE 
(Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/siren-call-all-to-all-corporate-bonds-
christopher-scott-mose [https://perma.cc/Z2MN-YSK8] (arguing that “[t]he lack of 
uniformity, liquidity and infrequency of trading in the majority of corporate bonds limits or 
potentially inhibits the widespread adoption an order-driven market place . . . for the 
majority of institutional trading (except in the retail/odd-lot segment)” and that, “[w]ithout a 
‘lit’ order book from which to import a multi-lateral best-bid and best-offer, most matching-
platforms/crossing-networks will struggle to gain adoption due to an absence of reliable pre-
trade price discovery, (except when surreptitiously seeded with dealer quotes)”). 
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compensate for traditional dealer advantages, and this perspective is 
particularly important for inherently less liquid markets, such as corporate 
debt and secondary private markets. Interestingly, two leading consulting 
firms proposed the following design for an electronic platform for 
corporate bonds: 
First, the platform must enlist sell-side “specialists” (as the cash 
equities market has) to support price discovery and potentially 
sop up some of the buy or sell overhangs in assigned issues. 
Second, such systems should employ a call auction rather than a 
continuous-crossing format. . . . Within this construct, the 
specialists providing the winning quotes in a competitive bidding 
process (i.e., the highest bid and lowest offer) for a specific 
auction could be compensated through trade value-based 
markups or markdowns, with all trades crossed at the midpoint of 
the bid-ask spread.88 
Overall, the shifting balance of trading obligations and privileges of 
market makers will survive as a manifestation of externalities in the market 
for liquidity.  Moreover, such externalities do not necessarily disappear 
with a growing level of natural liquidity, lower trading costs, and hence 
attractiveness of the security in question, although their magnitude and 
nature are likely to evolve.89  Of course, critical viewpoints on the DMM 
model will persist as well.  For instance, it is still not easy to dismiss the 
traditional assertion that “rules specifying market making standards have 
not been susceptible to objective or effective enforcement.”90  On the other 
 
88.  MCKINSEY & CO. & GREENWICH ASSOCS., CORPORATE BOND E-TRADING: SAME 
GAME, NEW PLAYING FIELD 15 (Aug. 2013), http://web.greenwich.com/greenwichcom-
afzgt/pages/3601bee1f50be311aed602bf0a4d02bd.html [https://perma.cc/5JQW-32ER].  In 
fact, at least one trading platform for corporate bonds “offers incentives to Designated 
Market Makers who meet their DMM obligations.”  Trading on Electronifie, ELECTRONIFIE, 
https://www.electronifie.com/trading [https://perma.cc/V6T6-XMJL] (last visited Feb. 28, 
2016). 
89.  Interestingly, an advisory committee in the realm of futures and commodities held 
the view that “market maker structures should be dismantled once sufficient liquidity 
develops within a series/product,” but a qualified recommendation was provided: “If market 
maker structures are not dismantled after sufficient liquidity develops, then the quantity for 
which a market maker is held should be consistently proportionate to an appropriate 
liquidity criterion for as long as the market maker structure is then perpetuated.”  MKT. 
ACCESS SUBCOMM., TECH. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
BEST PRACTICES FOR ORGANIZED ELECTRONIC MARKETS 39 (Apr. 24, 2002) (footnote 
omitted), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/tac_042402_bestpractic
es.pdf [https://perma.cc/X89U-A7M4] [hereinafter CFTC’S TECH. ADVISORY COMM., BEST 
PRACTICES FOR ORGANIZED ELECTRONIC MARKETS]. 
90.  Off-Board Trading by Members of National Securities Exchanges, Exchange Act 
Release No. 11,942, 41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4512 (Dec. 19, 1975); see also REPORT OF THE 
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hand, the level of quantification of both trading obligations and privileges 
of market makers has been increasing, and technological advancements in 
securities markets have probably played a large role in this process.  
Moreover, while the very existence of trading obligations and privileges 
should not be too controversial, a confidential treatment of such 
arrangements may generate a backlash.  For instance, markets under the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) offer a confirmed example of confidential rules relating to 
market making programs, a revelation triggering heated debates and even 
influencing litigation.91 
II. MANAGING VULNERABILITY 
The very nature of the business of market making with its exposure of 
trading interest, oftentimes framed in terms of specific trading obligations, 
makes these market participants vulnerable to certain trading strategies.92  
This vulnerability of liquidity providers, whether formal or informal ones, 
largely overlaps with the concept of adverse selection, sometimes also 
referred to as the risk of “pick-off.”  This concept does not have a 
universally accepted definition, as it may cover the gamut of scenarios 
 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS VI–8 (Jan. 1988) (arguing that “[the] 
lack of precision [such as] the maximum or minimum amounts of liquidity, depth and 
continuity required to be provided by a specialist . . . is understandable given the vague 
nature of the concept of a ‘fair and orderly market’”); Oesterle et al., supra note 60, at 281 
(describing the specialist system on the NYSE in the early 1990s as characterized by “the 
continuous absence of meaningful standards for evaluating market-making activity”). 
91.  See Pam Martens, ‘Clandestine’ Conspiracy Documents Become Court 
Battleground in High Frequency Lawsuit, WALL ST. ON PARADE (June 5, 2014), 
http://wallstreetonparade.com/2014/06/%E2%80%98clandestine%E2%80%99-conspiracy-
documents-become-court-battleground-in-high-frequency-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/E6KS-
D8JS] (describing a class action lawsuit against the CME Group, which was partly based on 
allegations of “clandestine contracts” between the defendant and certain HFTs, and 
referencing specific requests of the CME Group to the CFTC to keep the details of several 
market maker incentive programs confidential).  In fact, the CFTC is aiming to address this 
problem in its proposed rule.  See Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,824, 
78,942 (proposed Nov. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§40.25–.26) (mandating a 
greater level of transparency for market maker and trading incentive programs in the form of 
disclosure to the general public and regulators). 
92.  Of course, any regulatory restrictions on the ability of market makers to manage 
inventory position/engage in hedging would make these market participants more vulnerable 
to price changes more generally.  As an illustration, one empirical study, confirming the 
popular wisdom, argued that certain restrictions on short-selling amidst the financial 
meltdown of 2008, which had a direct impact on options market makers, resulted in 
decreased liquidity.  Robert Battalio & Paul Schultz, Regulatory Uncertainty and Market 
Liquidity: The 2008 Short Sale Ban’s Impact on Equity Option Markets, 66 J. FIN. 2013 
(2011). 
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between the risk of entering into an unfavorable transaction with a 
counterparty with superior information and the risk of entering into an 
unfavorable transaction with a counterparty reacting to public information, 
with various interpretations of “superior” and “public.”93  A leading market 
making firm recently described this concern as follows: 
We may at times trade with others who have information that is 
more accurate or complete than the information we have, and as a 
result we may accumulate unfavorable positions preceding large 
price movements in a given instrument.  Should the frequency or 
magnitude of these events increase, our losses would likely 
increase correspondingly, which could have a material adverse 
effect on our business, financial condition and results of 
operations.94 
In practice, rather than being consistently harmed by true insider 
trading, which is typically based on long-lived information, market makers 
are seriously disadvantaged by counterparties that — quite legally — trade 
“on short-lived information stemming from non-instantaneous 
dissemination of public announcements, advance knowledge of certain 
trading trends or incoming orders, or certain advantages in acquiring, 
processing, and aggregating public information.”95  This problem may also 
be compounded by limited monitoring capabilities of a given market maker 
across different securities.96  Furthermore, it is not even required that a 
 
93.  For a discussion of adverse selection as a source of harm to market makers in the 
context of different types of informed trading, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, 
Informed Trading, and Market Making: Liquidity of Securities Markets in the Zero-Sum 
Game, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2012) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, Insider 
Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making]; Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker 
Pricing Model and Its Impact on the Securities Market Structure: A Can of Worms for 
Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231, 235–38 (2014) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, The 
Maker-Take Pricing Model and Its Impact]. 
94.  Virtu Fin., Inc., Registration Statement Under Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), 
at 27 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
95.  Stanislav Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity in Complex 
Securities: The Impact of Insider Trading on Options Market Makers, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 387, 397 (2010) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, The Impact of Insider Trading on 
Options Market Makers]; see also Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and 
Market Making, supra note 93, at 15 (“[M]arket makers are likely to be harmed by stale 
quotes caused by various institutional, regulatory, and other frictions.”). 
96.  As an illustration, one empirical study analyzed liquidity provided by individual 
specialists on the NYSE in their portfolio securities and concluded that “the specialist’s 
ability to provide liquidity for a particular stock is significantly affected by the attention 
requirements of other securities traded at the same location,” with adverse selection being 
one of the underlying factors.  Shane A. Corwin & Jay F. Coughenour, Limited Attention 
and the Allocation of Effort in Securities Trading, 63 J. FIN. 3031, 3036, 3064 (2008).  Of 
course, these results were obtained for a very different trading architecture compared to the 
NYSE today, and the study itself suggested that technological advancements “may relieve 
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market maker reacts slower to public information in revising/cancelling 
orders, as orders of that market maker and other market participants may be 
submitted at essentially the same time but still processed randomly.97  A 
classic illustration of the impact of short-term trading on market makers is 
the past phenomenon of “SOES bandits” on NASDAQ and “RAES 
bandits” on the Chicago Board Options Exchange dating back to the 1980s, 
as these bandits’ trading strategy was based on exploiting stale quotes of 
market makers in an automated trading environment for small orders rather 
than using true inside information of any kind.98  While the academic field 
of market microstructure, which often has assumed away key distinctions 
between different types of informed trading, may see recent developments 
in securities markets as something novel for the phenomenon of adverse 
selection, the current environment is not fundamentally different.  For 
instance, as discussed by a leading academic, 
[I]n the high frequency world, it is not clear that information-
based trading necessarily relates to fundamental information.  
This is because the time dimension that affects high speed trading 
also affects market makers. . . .  For example, markets and data 
providers now sell access to public information seconds (or even 
milliseconds) before it is seen by other traders [which] turns 
public information into private information and corresponds, 
albeit for a very short time, into the classic information-based 
trading of microstructure models.99 
Still, this example is not new compared to, for instance, the practice of 
 
specialist capacity constraints and reduce the necessity to allocate effort across stocks.”  Id. 
at 3064–65. 
97.  See Eric Budish et al., The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch 
Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1553–54 (2015) (discussing 
the random nature of processing of orders submitted at the same time and stating that 
“trading firms providing liquidity, even in an environment with only symmetric information 
and with no latency, still get sniped with high probability because of the rules of the 
continuous limit order book”). 
98.  For a discussion of this phenomenon on various trading venues, see Dolgopolov, 
Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making, supra note 93, at 15 & n.50.  For a 
discussion of the National Association of Securities Dealers’ efforts to regulate SOES 
bandits out of existence, while maintaining the platform itself, see Mark Borrelli, Market 
Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 865–66 (2001). 
99.  Maureen O’Hara, High Frequency Market Microstructure, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 
263 (2015); see also Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the 
Interim Fin. Policy Comm., Bank of Eng., Speech Before the Sixteenth World Congress of 
the International Economic Association 6 (July 8, 2011), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech509.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YHK2-N8WT] (“Adverse selection risk today has taken on a different 
shape.  In a high-speed, co-located world, being informed means seeing and acting on 
market prices sooner than competitors.”). 
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“tape racing,” the scourge of options market makers back in the 1970s.100 
However, certain market makers may be substantially exposed to 
insider trading for specific reasons, as historically seen in options 
markets.101  Furthermore, options market makers are vulnerable to short-
term trading that typically does not correspond to insider trading, and, for 
similar reasons, they are more vulnerable than their counterparts in equities 
markets. In fact, a greater level of exposure of options market makers to 
short-term trading102 has been cited as a reason for discrimination-based 
mechanisms, such as flash/step-up orders, in order to offer an additional 
layer of protection.103  One up-to-date illustration would be losses of 
“completely helpless” options market makers believed to have been caused 
by a Twitter-based trading algorithm.104 
 
100.  See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making, supra 
note 93, at 16 & n.52 (describing specific complaints of options market makers about “tape 
racing”).  An even earlier piece of evidence from the 1960s suggests that off-exchange 
market makers were harmed by “late tape” trading — “presumably by persons taking 
advantage of superior knowledge of prices on the floor of the exchange.”  SEC, SPECIAL 
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 46, pt. 2, ch. VIII, at 900. 
101.  See generally Dolgopolov, The Impact of Insider Trading on Options Market 
Makers, supra note 95.  Yet, as options markets, as well as underlying equities markets, 
become more liquid, the harm from insider trading is more dispersed among options traders 
and also transferred to traders in equities markets via hedging. 
102.  See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Simon, Sec’y, Int’l Sec. Exch., to Elizabeth 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 9 (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-83.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGH5-TTDF] 
(“By providing liquidity to multiple series of options on the same underlying instrument 
options market makers expose themselves to much greater risk than their equities 
counterparts.  Persons ‘sweeping’ liquidity in the options market can hit multiple quotations 
virtually simultaneously, requiring market makers to buy (or sell) a much higher dollar 
amount of securities than in the cash market.”). 
103.  See Letter from Thomas F. Price, Managing Dir., Equity Options Trading 
Comm., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 3 (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-95.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ERD6-SU8L] (supporting the practice of flash orders and pointing to “the 
increased difficulty of updating quotations in multiple series of options on the same 
underlying security, increasing the risk that a trader may trade against a still-displayed stale 
price”); see also Letter from Anthony J. Saliba, Chief Exec. Officer, LiquidPoint, LLC, to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-104.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS8T-XW89] 
(stating that “[t]he use of the ‘flash order’ in the options market is significantly different 
from the equity market” and pointing out that “[t]he option markets flash marketable orders 
to exchange market makers with displayed quoting responsibilities”).  Some commentators 
also favored an exclusive usage of flash orders by DMMs.  See Letter from Anthony J. 
Saliba to Elizabeth Murphy, supra, at 3 n.5 (“If only registered market makers are given the 
ability to refresh their quotes, there is no worry of the kind of two-tiered market about which 
the Commission expresses concerns with respect to equity market. Nor can the high-
frequency parasites benefit from option exchange ‘flash orders.’”). 
104.  Seth Stevenson, The Wolf of Wall Tweet, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2015), 
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Another form of vulnerability inherent in providing liquidity is 
transparency, which may be harmful in certain instances when a market 
maker has to reveal its transactions/position.  While not necessarily related 
to ex ante informational asymmetry or ex post reaction speed, such 
disclosures may be information-creating events in themselves.  
Transparency may invite other market participants to engage in trading 
strategies adverse to market makers or create unfavorable price movements 
for the latter more generally.105  This perspective, which is relevant for both 
organized and over-the-counter markets, involves countervailing 
objectives: 
[P]olicymakers will need to balance the trade-off between 
promoting market transparency by disclosing dealer data and 
sustaining the willingness of market-makers to take on large 
positions in less liquid markets where inventory can only be run 
down over an extended period of time.  Disseminating lagged and 
sufficiently aggregated data provides one option to achieving 
such a balance.106 
Furthermore, several empirical studies indicate that there are limits to 
mandatory transparency rules, as the ultimate impact on market quality 
may be ambiguous or even detrimental.107  This perspective has to be 
 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/04/bot_makes_2_4_million_reading
_twitter_meet_the_guy_it_cost_a_fortune.html [https://perma.cc/K2TS-GKRW]. 
105.  The possibility of transparency’s adverse impact on market makers, as well as the 
existence of competing interests, were clearly articulated in the context on trading on the 
LSE in the nineteenth century.  See LSE COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 2, 
para. 2641, at 96 (testimony of Robert Burt Marzetti, a jobber at the LSE) (“[If] a broker 
goes and records on the Board that he has sold stock at a certain price, it is very much to my 
prejudice as a jobber — it is one of the concessions to the public, but it is a grievance under 
which we labour to some extent.”). 
106.  BIS, MARKET-MAKING AND PROPRIETARY TRADING, supra note 52, at 36; see also 
ISDA & SIFMA, BLOCK TRADE REPORTING FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS 3–5, 8–9 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/Block-Trade-
Reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YML-27XQ] (discussing vulnerability of market makers to 
transparency, such as the scenario of costlier hedging, and pointing to the example of the 
LSE, which “has set its size thresholds and reporting delay periods in a manner that enables 
dealers to offset risk during the reporting delay period”); see also Mary Jo White, Chairman, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Intermediation in the Modern Securities Markets: Putting 
Technology and Competition To Work for Investors: Remarks Before the Economic Club of 
New York (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542122012 [https://perma.cc/38CZ-
9DD6] (stating that regulation needs “to strike the right balance of compelling the disclosure 
of meaningful pre-trade pricing information [in fixed income markets] without discouraging 
market participants from producing it because of concerns that it will compromise trading 
positions”). 
107.  See Ananth Madhavan et al., Should Securities Markets Be Transparent?, 8 J. 
FIN. MKTS. 266 (2005) (analyzing transactions in stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 
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balanced with the scenario of decreased liquidity as a result of 
anticompetitive behavior.108 
The existence of adverse selection, as manifested by its various forms, 
demands a solution from private regulatory regimes, given that no illegal 
insider trading is typically involved.  Traditionally, trading venues have 
employed a variety of mechanisms to protect their market makers.  Some 
trading venues even went as far as prohibiting computer-generated orders 
to offer this protection.109  Yet another historical illustration is the creation 
of the “professional customer” category in options markets, which aimed at 
the dynamics of competition between market makers and certain 
proprietary trading firms.110  In pioneering this trend, the International 
 
connection with the adoption of a computerized system to disseminate order information); 
Paul Asquith et al., The Effects of Mandatory Transparency in Financial Market Design: 
Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 19,417, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19417.pdf [https://perma.cc/W26C-AYT9] 
(analyzing transactions in corporate bonds in connection with the introduction of TRACE, a 
reporting system mandated by FINRA).  Interestingly, a related empirical study of 
transactions in stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange suggested that “specialists and options 
market makers benefit the most from the strategic use of anonymity.”  Carole Comerton-
Forde et al., Why Do Traders Choose to Trade Anonymously?, 46 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANALYSIS 1025, 1027 (2011).  One of the potential explanations considered by the study 
was that “market makers may trade aggressively when they have information about future 
price movements based on their knowledge of order flow, or when they have to adjust their 
inventory quickly.”  Id. at 1040.  However, the advantage based on advance knowledge of 
order flow traditionally enjoyed by market makers has been dissipated in many ways. 
108.  See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123784, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (containing the allegations that, 
“[b]y controlling real-time pricing data [in credit default swaps], Dealer-Defendants [acting 
as market makers] were able to maintain supracompetitive bid/ask spreads, even as 
increased liquidity and standardization should have driven those spreads down”). 
109.  See, e.g., Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule 
Change by Pacific Exchange, Inc. To Revise PCX Rule 6.88 To Eliminate the Prohibition 
on Computer Generated Orders, Exchange Act Release No. 51,608, 70 Fed. Reg. 22,738 
(Apr. 26, 2005) (stating that the prohibition on computer-generated orders “was originally 
adopted because it was necessary to protect market makers” and that “[w]ith the 
development of the Exchange’s new electronic trading system . . . market makers have the 
ability to manage their exposure more quickly and efficiently, thereby obviating the need for 
this rule”). 
110.  For a description of the spread of this feature at several trading venues, see Notice 
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by BATS Exchange, Inc. 
To Adopt a Definition of Professional and Require That All Professional Orders Be 
Appropriately Marked, Exchange Act Release No. 65,500, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,686, 63,687 & 
n.5 (Oct. 6, 2011).  The conflict between market makers and professional customers on 
options exchanges is illustrated by Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006), in which the plaintiffs described 
themselves as “direct access customers implementing arbitrage trading strategies which 
attempt to take advantage of price discrepancies of options,” id. at 791.  One commentator 
labeled this group of market participants “‘barnacle’ customer market makers of the options 
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Securities Exchange specifically pointed out that professional customers 
had been enjoying certain priorities vis-à-vis market makers and engaging 
in trading strategies characterized by “the entry of limit orders that join the 
best bid or offer and . . . a very high rate of orders that are cancelled.”111  
Likewise, another example is represented by dark pools’ efforts to monitor 
and censure aggressive/predatory trading,112 and some dark pools in fact 
allow their users to provide liquidity by exposing two-sided trading 
interests.113  At the same time, this conduct may be practiced by users 
characterizing themselves as “market makers,”114 and such monitoring may 
be ineffective and even fraudulent, as illustrated by the recent enforcement 
action relating to Barclays’ dark pool.115 
Another similar mechanism to address adverse selection gives market 
participants the “last look” feature to accept or reject proposed transactions 
against their own previously posted quotes/orders, which is common in 
foreign exchange markets and sometimes found in securities markets.116  
 
industry.”  HAIM BODEK, THE PROBLEM OF HFT: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING & STOCK MARKET STRUCTURE REFORM 7 (2013). 
111.  Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change by International Stock Exchange, 
LLC Relating to Professional Account Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 57,254, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 7345, 7346 & nn.6 & 9 (Feb. 1, 2008).  The exchange also observed that some of its 
member broker-dealers “provided their professional customers with multi-screened trading 
stations equipped with trading technology that allowed the trader to monitor and place 
orders on all six options exchanges simultaneously.”  Id. at 7346 n.8. 
112.  See Peter Chapman, Keeping Watch, TRADERS MAG., May 2012, at 20 (describing 
such measures taken by a range of dark pools). 
113.  See Sean Foley & Tālis J. Putniņš, Should We Be Afraid of the Dark? Dark 
Trading and Market Quality, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279719 [https://perma.cc/AXY5-XCKD] (“[D]ark liquidity 
provision can be profitable in a two-sided dark market because a liquidity provider can earn 
a non-zero spread in the dark. In contrast, there is zero spread in a one-sided dark market by 
construction and therefore there is little incentive for market participants to act as dark 
liquidity providers without an alternative reason for wanting to trade.”). 
114.  Chapman, supra note 112, at 20. 
115.  See Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,010, Exchange Act 
Release No. 77,001, at 2–3 (Jan. 31, 2016) (settled proceeding), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10010.pdf [https://perma.cc/467P-W8NA] 
(“Barclays made materially misleading statements and omitted to state certain material facts 
necessary to make statements made not misleading concerning [its] product feature called 
Liquidity Profiling, which Barclays described as a ‘powerful tool to proactively monitor [the 
dark pool]’ and as a ‘sophisticated surveillance framework that protects clients from 
predatory trading’ . . .”). 
116.  While definitely rarer, this feature is not unheard of on trading venues for equity, 
debt, and derivative instruments.  See, e.g., MTS, BONDVISION MTF MARKET RULES 1 (Jan. 
13, 2014),  
http://www.mtsmarkets.com/Documents/~/media/MTS/Legal%20docs/Jan%202014/BondV
ision%20MTF%20Rules%20English%20Effective%20as%20of%2013%2001%202014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W55T-X54V] (describing the application of the last look feature to equity 
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The rationale behind this feature was described by an industry group as 
follows: 
The right to exercise a last look may be to prevent arbitrage of 
prices by other proprietary or professional traders and therefore 
prevent the need for defensive pricing, rather than simply to 
avoid potentially unprofitable trades; firms with a right of last 
look may in fact choose to honour unprofitable trades with 
corporates and other genuine market users.117 
In practice, the last look feature may be granted by electronic 
platforms only to certain players, namely, large banks, as a result of their 
economic leverage and the fact that their trading systems may be slower 
compared to those employed by more agile HFTs,118 and this selectivity 
resembles a DMM feature.  More generally, the applicable “firm quote” 
regime, which may have both governmental and self-regulatory 
components, is important for addressing adverse selection.119 
The emergence of retail liquidity programs offered by several 
securities exchanges also illustrates efforts to protect market makers from 
adverse selection, while allowing these exchanges to replicate some 
practices of off-exchange market makers, i.e., internalizers/wholesalers, 
reverse the process of off-exchange segmentation, and grab a bigger 
portion of order flow.  This trend started with the approval of the programs 
for the NYSE and NYSE Amex (now NYSE MKT) that allowed “retail 
 
and fixed income instruments); Letter from Enrico Bruni, Managing Dir., Tradeweb Eur. 
Ltd., to the HM Treasury, Bank of Eng. & Fin. Conduct Auth. app. at 6 (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/tw.pdf [https://perma.cc/47FV-
BRG2] (stating that the last look feature is used in “fixed income and derivatives markets” 
in addition to foreign exchange markets). 
117.  BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, THE FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKET REVIEW 8 (2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/bba.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BXC-
FK3R]; see also HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENG. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FAIR AND 
EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW: FINAL REPORT 31 (2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6EF-WMAZ] (“This practice was developed to provide protection 
against unanticipated market movements and predatory trading practices, while allowing 
market makers to maintain tight bid-offer spreads for their clients.”). 
118.  Donald MacKenzie, A Sociology of Algorithms: High-Frequency Trading and 
the Shaping of Markets 56–58 (June 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/156298/Algorithms25.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YR42-3T5Z]. 
119.  In addition, specific quotation methods may play a significant role; for instance, 
in the “request-for-quote” mode: “Showing a two-way market keeps the dealer honest, in 
that if his bid/ask spread is wide, that’s an indication that his profit margin is possibly too 
high and may signal the client to go elsewhere.  Other markets . . . always required that the 
market maker quote a two-way price.”  SIMON A. LACK, BONDS ARE NOT FOREVER: THE 
CRISIS FACING FIXED INCOME INVESTORS 7 (2013). 
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liquidity providers” to offer subpenny price improvement to retail orders 
through special order types,120 and the universe of these market participants 
was limited to two categories of market makers, “designated market 
makers” and “supplemental liquidity providers.”121  The adverse selection 
rationale was specifically articulated by the exchanges,122 and the SEC also 
had a detailed discussion of this factor in its approval.123  Other securities 
exchanges launched similar retail price improvement programs, but this 
functionality generally became available to all members rather than just 
market makers,124 which suggests that capturing retail order flow — not 
providing an exclusive privilege for DMMs — was the dominant motive. 
Other special order types have been introduced by trading venues in 
order to address the issue of adverse selection.125  For example, the Market 
 
120.  Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange LLC 
and NYSE Amex LLC To Establish Retail Liquidity Programs on a Pilot Basis and Granting 
Exemptions Pursuant to Rule 612(c) of Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 
67,347, 77 Fed. Reg. 40,673 (July 3, 2012). 
121.  Id. at 40,675. 
122.  See Letter from Janet McGinness, EVP & Corporate Sec’y, NYSE Euronext, 
Gen. Counsel, NYSE Mkts., to Robert Cook, Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 8 (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-
noaction/nyse-nyseamex-070312.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HPY-8ERL] (“Among the market 
structure conundrums produced by the segmentation of retail order flow is that liquidity 
providers interacting with retail orders will not bid as aggressively for orders that do not 
originate with natural persons.  The reason is plain: professional traders are more likely to 
be highly informed as to short term price movements than natural persons.”); see also id. at 
9 (“[T]he Program represents a competitive response on the part of the Exchanges to 
bilateral internalization arrangements, and offers the potential of continued and beneficial 
competition in the retail execution segment.”). 
123.  See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange 
LLC and NYSE Amex LLC To Establish Retail Liquidity Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. at 40,680 
(“[L]iquidity providers are generally more inclined to offer price improvement to less 
informed retail orders than to more informed professional orders. . . By creating additional 
competition for retail order flow, the Program is reasonably designed to attract retail order 
flow to the exchange environment, while helping to ensure that retail investors benefit from 
the better price that liquidity providers are willing to give their orders.”).  The regulatory 
agency also cited several academic articles on the impact of informed trading on market 
makers and bid-ask spreads.  Id. at 40,680 n.72. 
124.  For examples of price liquidity programs available to all members, see Order 
Approving a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc. To Establish the Retail 
Price Improvement Program on a Pilot Basis, Exchange Act Release No. 73,702, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 72,049, 72,049 (Nov. 28, 2014); Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by 
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC To Establish the Retail Price Improvement Program on a Pilot 
Basis, Exchange Act Release No. 68,937, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,397, 12,397 (Feb. 15, 2013); 
Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by BATS Y-Exchange, Inc. To Adopt a Retail 
Price Improvement Program, Exchange Act Release No. 68,303, 77 Fed. Reg. 71,652, 
71,653 (Nov. 27, 2012). 
125.  In fact, certain order types on a number of securities exchanges are available only 
to DMMs, and such orders often contain compliance-related features, as well as complex 
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Maker Price Improving Order proposed by BATS Exchange was 
recognized by the SEC as a way for “BATS Options market makers to 
provide better prices to less informed order flow that they otherwise would 
not be willing or able to provide if they had to make those prices available 
to all incoming order flow.”126  While opposing this proposal, the 
competitor options exchanges similarly maintained that “only the directed 
market maker is able to enter prices secure in the knowledge that they are 
only at risk of being executed by select retail order flow at the non-
displayed price.”127  More generally, the existence of certain order types has 
been justified with a reference to the vulnerability of market making as 
such: “Without price sliding, market makers would need to cancel and 
replace their orders — as fast as possible — to retain priority in the queue.  
Price-slide orders typically help market makers be near the top of book — 
reducing the ‘technology arms race.’”128 
Overall, the issue of vulnerability of market makers, a persistent 
phenomenon in evolving securities markets, is an important component of 
regulation.  In fact, this issue is often raised in connection with a range of 
proposals, including those not directly focused on market makers.  For 
instance, the proposal to increase the tick size has been criticized on the 
grounds that “[w]idening spreads will also make the cost of reversion 
(getting picked off) even more costly,”129 although this relationship may 
 
functionalities that may potentially support advanced trading strategies.  For instance, 
NASDAQ has the Price to Display Order, which is “designed to comply with Rule 610(d) 
under Regulation NMS by avoiding the display of [locking or crossing] quotations” and 
may be designated as an “intermarket sweep order,” and the Market Maker Peg Order, 
which is “designed to allow a Market Maker to maintain a continuous two-sided quotation at 
a displayed price that is compliant with the quotation requirements for Market Makers 
[preventing stub quotes],” with these order types set by subsections (b)(2) and (b)(7) of Rule 
4702.  NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, NASDAQ, INC., http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com 
[https://perma.cc/H3SX-M5BR] (follow “Rule 4000” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
126.  Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by BATS Exchange, Inc. To Create, 
on a Six-Month Pilot Basis, a Directed Order Program, Exchange Act Release No. 64,781, 
76 Fed. Reg. 39,953, 39,957 (June 30, 2011).  Shortly after the SEC’s approval, BATS 
eliminated this feature without ever implementing it.  Notice of Filing and Immediate 
Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by BATS Exchange, Inc. To Amend BATS Rules 
in Connection with the Elimination of a Directed Order Program for BATS Options, 
Exchange Act Release No. 64,957, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,636 (July 25, 2011). 
127.  Boston Options Exch. Grp. LLC et al., SR-BATS-2011-009, Securities Exchange 
Release No. 64781: Petition for Review, at 8 (July 15, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/bats/2011/34-64781-petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/F77T-
2BRR]. 
128.  PHIL MACKINTOSH, KCG HOLDINGS, INC., DEMYSTIFYING ORDER TYPES 13 (Sept. 
2014), http://www.kcg.com//uploads/documents/KCG_Demystifying-Order-
Types_092414.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZP3-BZZC]. 
129.  Larry Tabb, TABB GRP., LLC, BACK TO THE FUTURE: WHY THE TICK PILOT HAS 
LITTLE CHANCE OF SPURRING PERMANENT CHANGE 8 (Dec. 2014), 
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work in the opposite direction as well.130  Another consideration is that 
time, place, and information-based advantages provided to market makers 
play the dual role of serving as a subsidy amounting to profitable trading 
opportunities and a device diminishing the risk of being “picked-off.” 
III. CONSTRAINING OPPORTUNISM 
Being in the eye of the trading hurricane, market makers are often in 
the position to play the role of aggressive traders as consumers of liquidity 
rather than its providers, and they may be inclined to minimize their 
presence or even abstain from providing liquidity during turbulent times.  
These types of conduct, as well as other forms of “gaming,” are likely to be 
otherwise legal and are not necessarily packaged with other violations that 
may be committed by market makers, such as market manipulation,131 
breaches of Chinese Walls,132 or even nondisclosure of market making 
activities.133  More generally, opportunism may be seen as something 
antithetical to the mandate of maintaining and focusing on “fair and 
orderly” markets imposed on DMMs by federal regulation and trading 
venues’ rules, an obligation that repeatedly has come up in litigation and 
enforcement.134  Likewise, the issue of market makers possibly gaming 
their trading privileges remains open.  As posed by a prolific commentator, 
How frequently do market making firms, armed to the teeth with 
an arsenal of regulatory privileges no one else has, turn 
 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/249645637/V12-068Tick-Pilot [https://perma.cc/A5H2-B6CT]. 
130.  See DURBIN, supra note 28, at 94 (“[W]hen spreads narrow to a penny or less, it’s 
that much easier for a small informational advantage by the well-informed trader to become 
a costly disadvantage to the less-informed market-maker.”). 
131.  See, e.g., SEC v. Diversified Corp. Consulting Grp., 378 F.3d 1219, 1222–23 
(11th Cir. 2004) (providing an example of market manipulation). 
132.  See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
63,760, 100 SEC Docket 957, 957–59 (Jan. 25, 2011) (settled proceeding) (providing an 
example of inappropriate sharing of confidential information relating to customer orders 
between different business units despite the requirement of internal barriers). 
133.  See, e.g., ITG Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9887, Exchange Act Release No. 
75,672, at 8, 12–15 (Aug. 12, 2015) (settled proceeding), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9887.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GGJ-XW2P]  
(providing an example of undisclosed de facto market making operations despite 
representations of agency-only trading). 
134.  See, e.g., Spicer v. Chi. Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 
1992) (relating to Rule 8.7(a) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange); United States v. Re, 
336 F.2d 306, 314–15 (2d Cir. 1964) (relating to section 11(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934); Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 10 (S.D.N.Y 1974) (relating to Rule 104 of 
the NYSE); Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,499, 82 SEC Docket 1895, 
1898–99 (Mar. 30, 2004) (settled proceeding) (relating to section 11(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 11b-1 of the SEC, and Rule 104 of the NYSE). 
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aggressive, and what is the effect on prices when they do?  What 
other trading strategies do market making firms deploy, and do 
they use their privileges – privileges intended only to help them 
provide liquidity to investors – when they deploy them?135 
Moreover, there are concerns about opportunism of informal liquidity 
providers, such as HFTs.  Indeed, one complaint is that some of their 
trading strategies may “look as if they are testing the boundaries of 
liquidity provision versus market manipulation.”136 
While a trading strategy focused on market making cannot be solely 
“passive”/liquidity-adding, as such a trader would have to periodically 
rebalance inventory and otherwise manage risks by consuming liquidity,137 
certain forms of conduct may be addressed by regulatory restrictions on 
this balance.  Moreover, constraints on opportunism may also serve as a 
signaling/commitment device for individual trading venues and their 
respective market makers.  Traditionally, trading venues and other 
regulators have addressed various manifestations of opportunism by 
subjecting DMMs to “affirmative” obligations to stay in and maintain the 
market and “negative” obligations to refrain from certain trading activities.  
The latter category of obligations, while associated with the specialist 
system for an extended period of time, has diminished in importance with 
the NYSE’s overhaul of its market making system.138  At the same time, the 
distinction between affirmative and negative obligations — or, for that 
matter, between market making and proprietary trading — is not 
 
135.  Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n 4 (May 15, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/equity-market-
structure-2013/equitymarketstructure2013-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PPM-H3WE]. 
136.  Senate Hearing on Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-Frequency Trading, and 
Other Market Structure Issues, supra note 13, at 42 (remarks of Robert C. Gasser, President 
and Chief Executive Officer, Investment Technology Group). 
137.  This theme was recognized in one of the foundational works on market 
microstructure: “[T]he specialists must pursue a policy of relating their prices to their 
inventories in order to avoid failure: it cannot be the case that they simply respond to 
temporary fluctuations in demand and supply . . .”  Garman, supra note 2, at 267. 
138.  See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange 
LLC To Create a New NYSE Market Model, Exchange Act Release No. 58,845, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 64,379, 64,380 (Oct. 24, 2008) (stating that “designated market makers” would no 
longer be subject to “a specialist’s negative obligation not to trade for its own account 
unless reasonably necessary to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market,” as this 
measure would “give the DMM greater freedom to manage the trading risks associated with 
their reduced responsibilities to the NYSE market”); see also id. at 64,382 (“Given the real-
time availability of market information and resultant increase in market transparency in 
today’s markets and the Exchange’s proposed elimination of the advance ‘look’ at incoming 
orders by the DMM, the Exchange believes that the imposition of a negative obligation on 
DMMs is unnecessary.”). 
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necessarily sharp.139  Another regulatory tool, which could be seen as a 
form of negative obligations, has amounted to guiding trading activities of 
other market participants and even suppressing certain types of conduct, as 
illustrated by the SEC’s approach to floor trading.140  Indeed, decades ago, 
an influential SEC study perceived floor traders as opportunistic liquidity 
providers and asserted that “this added liquidity is of limited value,” while 
giving the following rationales: 
 
(1) It vests largely in the active stocks rather than in the inactive 
stocks where it is most needed, (2) it tends to develop primarily 
on the buy side or the sell side in a manner that accentuates the 
imbalance of buyers and sellers, and (3) it disappears when it is 
needed most.141 
Imposing a fiduciary standard of some kind on market makers in that 
specific capacity appears to be unworkable and less preferable to concrete 
standards for trading obligations set by individual trading venues, 
especially given a number of recent developments in securities markets, 
such as the diminishing — if not disappearing — agency function of 
market makers on trading venues.142  Even in the context of the NYSE 
specialist controversy that raised the issue of fiduciary duties,143 those 
 
139.  For instance, distinguishing market making from proprietary trading more 
generally became one of the most contentious issues in the process of the inter-agency 
implementation of the Volcker Rule.  See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds, Bank Holding Company Release No. 1, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536 passim (Dec. 10, 2013) 
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 255) (discussing the market making exemption and 
referencing various concerns about its definition and scope). 
140.  For additional details on this position taken by the SEC, see supra notes 64–65 
and accompanying text.  
141.  SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 46, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 
220. 
142.  For a detailed discussion, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Two-Sided Loyalty?: 
Exploring the Boundaries of Fiduciary Duties of Market Makers, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
31 passim (2011) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, Exploring the Boundaries of Fiduciary Duties of 
Market Makers]  See also Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by International 
Securities Exchange, LLC Relating to Professional Account Holders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 59,287, 74 Fed. Reg. 5694, 5698 (Jan. 23, 2009) (“A specialist’s responsibility to a 
customer in his or her role as agent for the limit order book was based on common law 
notions of fiduciary duty and incorporated in the rules of some exchanges.  As exchanges 
increasingly have implemented automated trading systems, however, the specialist’s role in 
handling limit orders has diminished.”). 
143.  For several cases brought against individuals serving as specialists that 
emphasized the significance of the fiduciary status, see United States v. Finnerty, 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Hunt, No. 05 Cr. 395 (DAB), 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 64887 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). 
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market makers, while engaging in principal trading, had played a narrow 
role of matching agents charged with following mechanic procedures under 
the NYSE’s rules rather than a broadly defined role of fiduciaries of public 
customers responsible for a much more complex and discretionary process 
of effecting best execution.144  On the other hand, many market makers are 
subject to the order protection/trade-through rule of Regulation NMS,145 
which may be seen as a device constraining opportunism.  In fact, the SEC 
expressed its concern in the adopting release that “many trade-throughs are 
dealer internalized trades.”146 
Furthermore, market makers may play other roles in addition to the 
function of providing liquidity, and, saliently, the role of an agency broker 
is likely to impose some level of the fiduciary standard in connection with 
the duty of best execution.147  This perspective is also important for off-
exchange market makers, as some of them may be removed from ultimate 
customers by not directly serving as their agency brokers.  Pursuant to the 
applicable order handling agreement with a customer-facing broker, some 
of these off-exchange market makers may in fact discharge agency 
functions in addition to trading in the principal capacity.148  As a result, the 
 
144.  Historically, the SEC had taken the position that specialists should not be allowed 
to accept discretionary orders, such as “not-held” orders, although there had been some 
limited exceptions.  For several illustrations of this position of the regulatory agency, see 
Order Exempting Options Specialists from Section 11(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 When Accepting Certain Types of Complex Orders, Exchange Act Release No. 
47,319, 68 Fed. Reg. 7156 (Feb. 5, 2003); SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, 
supra note 46, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 146–48. 
145.  See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 
37,631 (June 9, 2005) (to be codified at Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.611(a)) 
(establishing that this regulatory measure applies to “trading centers”); id. at 37,623 (to be 
codified at NMS Security Designation and Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 240.600(b)(78)) (stating 
that the term “trading center” includes “an exchange market maker, an OTC market maker, 
or any other broker or dealer that executes orders internally by trading as principal or 
crossing orders as agent”). 
146.  Id. at 37,532. 
147.  For a general discussion of implications of a market maker’s dual role in 
connection with the fiduciary standard and the duty of best execution, see Dolgopolov, 
Exploring the Boundaries of Fiduciary Duties of Market Makers, supra note 142, passim.  
Moreover, a market maker may be bound by its own statements regarding “best execution,” 
as it “is a defined, specific concept in the securities context.”  Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. 
ASG Specialist Partners, 749 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
148.  While such agreements are rarely in the public domain, one important illustration 
of the assumption of agency functions is the agreement between UBS, a leading securities 
firm, and Charles Schwab, a leading retail broker.  See EQUITIES ORDER HANDLING 
AGREEMENT DATED AS OF OCTOBER 29, 2004 BY AND AMONG UBS SECURITIES LLC, 
SCHWAB CAPITAL MARKETS L.P., CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC., AND THE CHARLES SCHWAB 
CORPORATION passim, reproduced in The Charles Schwab Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 
10-Q) Exh. 10.262 (Nov. 8, 2004) (making numerous references to agency functions of 
UBS without any specific mention of the applicability of the duty of best execution).  For 
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standard of best execution may be applicable,149 which is likely to be higher 
than the one established by the trade-through rule.  In fact, one 
controversial issue is whether some off-exchange market makers are 
engaging in arbitrage between the consolidated and direct data feeds, 
which, if true, may raise the issue of violations of the duty of best 
execution — despite probably being acceptable under the trade-through 
rule and its exceptions.150 
Opportunism may be a flip side of various mechanisms aimed to limit 
market makers’ vulnerability, which implies the need for careful regulatory 
crafting.  For instance, the last look feature has been criticized as causing 
“[i]ncreased opportunities and incentives for market makers to delay a 
decision to observe market moves and profit from [them].”151  As similarly 
 
some criticism of this deal as ultimately too advantageous to UBS, see MICHAEL LEWIS, 
FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 180–81 (2014).  Another agreement from this 
category explicitly states that the off-exchange market maker in question, as well as the 
retail broker, are subject to the duty of best execution.  EQUITIES AND OPTIONS ORDER 
HANDLING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF NOVEMBER 29, 2007 BY AND AMONG E*TRADE 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, E*TRADE SECURITIES LLC, AND CITADEL DERIVATIVES GROUP 
LLC § 2.3(a) & (h), reproduced in E*Trade Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
Exh. 10.29, at 9–10 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
149.  Another requirement relating to the best execution standard is a FINRA rule, 
which probably covers the bulk of payment for order flow deals in the space occupied by 
off-exchange market makers: “The duty to provide best execution to customer orders 
received from other broker-dealers arises only when an order is routed from the broker-
dealer to the member for the purpose of order handling and execution.”  5310. Best 
Execution and Interpositioning, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/finramanual/rules/r5310 
[https://perma.cc/V3Y9-USCK] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
150.  See Eric Scott Hunsader, Retail Trades Disadvantaged by Direct Feeds, NANEX 
(July 31, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4665.html [https://perma.cc/KM8K-GKSK]  
(“While internalizers matching retail trades claim they use direct feeds for pricing, there is 
overwhelming evidence that retail customers, in fact, are getting prices based on the SIP 
(Securities Information Processor also known as the consolidated quote).  It may be that 
internalizers making this claim mean that they are using direct feed pricing for themselves to 
buy and sell stock on exchanges, but they give customers prices based on the SIP.  Perhaps 
the question to ask the internalizers paying for retail customer order flow: what prices are 
you assigning to retail customer trades?”); see also RICHARD REPETTO & MIKE ADAMS, 
SANDLER O’NEILL + PARTNERS,  A VIEW OF MARKET STRUCTURE FROM IEX 3 (Apr. 9, 
2014), https://www.thefinancialengineer.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/IEX_ViewMarketStructure0414.pdf [https://perma.cc/47N9-8676]  
(“IEX believes the fact that large wholesale market makers are willing to pay for order flow 
is indicative of the profit these market makers garner from retail customer flow.  And when 
asked about the 90% of price improvement realized on these retail trades the eBrokers 606 
reports support, IEX believes that could be from ‘stale pricing’ from the SIP as well.”). 
151.  Letter from Joseph Hoffman, Dir., Equity Derivatives & Foreign Exch., & Jean-
David Larson, Dir., Regulatory & Strategic Initiatives, Russell Invs., to H.M. Treasury, 
Bank of Eng. & Fin. Conduct Auth. 1 (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/ri.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX4K-
UHV8].  
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described by another commentator, 
Last Look was introduced to protect market makers from toxic 
clients [but this feature is abused by] holding the price for a 
period over which the client’s interest will only be honoured 
should the market move in the price maker’s interest, or if the 
price maker can effect a covering transaction.152 
Likewise, several affiliated industry groups with HFT ties provided 
the following critique: “Last look functionality is almost never specified in 
the rules and conditions applicable to trading on the relevant trading 
venue.”153  Moreover, a recent enforcement action penalized Barclays in 
connection with its electronic platform’s last look feature.154  On a related 
note, allegations of selective/discriminatory execution of orders by market 
makers and trading venues’ assistance in this conduct, including violations 
of the applicable “firm quote” rules, have been a litigation subject matter,155 
and these allegations have some resemblance to the controversy 
surrounding the last look feature. 
Another important aspect of regulatory restrictions on opportunism 
relates to trading obligations of market makers at times of market 
turbulence, and it is critical to recognize inherent constraints of this tool 
and its potentially ruinous consequences for these market participants.  One 
pivotal illustration is the use of “stub quotes,” a way of formalistic 
compliance with quoting obligations, during the Flash Crash of May 6, 
2010, and this practice was subsequently banned by individual trading 
venues in coordination with the SEC.156  In fact, one empirical study 
 
152.  The New Change FX Response to the Fair and Effective Markets Review’s 
Consultation Paper 1 (n.d.), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/ncfx.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N57P-ZWGV]. 
153.  Futures Indus. Ass’n, Futures Indus. Ass’n Eur. & FIA Eur. Principal Traders 
Ass’n, Reply Form for the ESMA MiFID II/MiFIR Discussion Paper 112 (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.foa.co.uk/admin/tiny_mce/jscripts/tiny_mce/plugins/filemanager/files/Regulatio
n/MiFID/ESMA_MiFID2_DP_FIA_18283C5.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3PU-BJS8]. 
154.  See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Announces Barclays To 
Pay Additional $150 Million Penalty, Terminate Employee for Automated, Electronic 
Foreign Exchange Trading Misconduct (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1511181.htm [https://perma.cc/D4RR-GE3U] (stating 
that “Barclays used [the] Last Look system to automatically reject client orders that would 
be unprofitable for the bank because of subsequent price swings during milliseconds-long 
latency . . . periods” and that it “did not seek to distinguish toxic order flow from instances 
in which prices merely happened to move in favor of the customer and against Barclays”). 
155.  For several relevant cases, see Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist 
Partners, 819 F. Supp. 2d 708, 711–12 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. 
Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788, 791–92, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Cathedral 
Trading, LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 199 F. Supp. 2d 851, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
156.  For a description of the occurrence of stub quotes during the Flash Crash and the 
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suggested that these “restrictions on stub quoting, which increase dealers’ 
obligations to quote near the [National Best Bid and Offer], may benefit 
financial markets in that it encourages dealers to provide liquidity.”157  In 
other words, given an apparent increase rather than a decrease in liquidity, 
this regulatory measure may have merely constrained opportunism of 
market makers instead of imposing persistent costs on them. 
Overall, opportunism of both formal and informal market makers 
remains an important theme raising a host of regulatory implications, such 
as the utility of negative obligations or the imposition of strengthened or 
entirely new affirmative obligations.  Interestingly, one empirical study 
pointed to the utility of a DMM regime for a marketplace that traditionally 
has lacked such market participants.158  While analyzing the transition of 
futures markets from manual to electronic trading and singling out the 
factors of anonymity and shorter trading horizons, the conclusion was as 
follows: “[I]n sharp contrast to the erstwhile locals in futures pits, 
electronic market makers reduce their participation and their liquidity 
provision in periods or significantly high and persistent volatility, in 
periods of significantly high and persistent customer order imbalances, and 
in periods of significantly high and persistent bid ask spreads.”159  The 
corresponding policy consideration was articulated: “[G]iven that 
electronic market-makers represent the irreversible and inevitable 
progression of technology, our results raise the question of whether 
exchanges and regulators should consider affirmative obligations for 
hitherto voluntary market makers.”160 
IV. THE PHENOMENON OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 
HFTs have been both critiqued and defended on the basis of their 
 
subsequent ban of this practice, see Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency 
World, supra note 33, at 345–46.  These events were preceded by NASDAQ’s decision to 
abolish the requirement, which was seen as made obsolete by “the regulatory changes, as 
well as the changes Nasdaq has made to the way its market operates,” that “a Nasdaq market 
maker’s quotations [must] be ‘reasonably related to the prevailing market.’”  Order 
Approving a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ Stock Market LLC To Amend Its Rule 
Governing the Relation of a Nasdaq Market Maker’s Quotations to the Prevailing Market, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,759, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,102, 64,103 (Nov. 7, 2007). 
157.  Jared F. Egginton et al., Dealers and Changing Obligations: The Case of Stub 
Quoting 23 (June 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192703 [https://perma.cc/V5ZN-UN3L]. 
158.  Vikas Raman et al., Electronic Market Makers, Trader Anonymity and Market 
Fragility (Dec 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445223 [https://perma.cc/6BNM-R565]. 
159.  Id. at 8–9. 
160.  Id. at 24. 
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overall contribution to liquidity in securities markets, and this perspective 
drives a big chunk of regulatory debates on the complex phenomenon of 
HFT as a whole.  It is also frequently featured in connection with holistic 
assessments of the current market structure.  For instance, as asserted by 
one commentator, 
[I]f you understand that liquidity provision is a benefit, and that 
21st century technology can allow for liquidity provision at a 
lower cost than the old system, you start to understand that all 
this talk about market “rigging” is a bunch of red herring 
garbage. . . .  HFT is a form of liquidity provision — that activity 
is a service — that has replaced an older, less efficient, more 
expensive form of liquidity provision (floor traders and market 
makers).161 
Still, an opinion from the opposite camp is scalding: “Though 
‘liquidity provider’ and ‘market maker’ are stripped of their former 
meaning in the equities markets, high frequency firms wear these 
designations as if they were a rented tux.”162  Indeed, in the context of HFT, 
there is a debate on the very meaning of “providing liquidity” in the sense 
whether only entering “passive” orders should count or entering 
“aggressive” orders should be viewed as another dimension.163  In any 
 
161.  Justice “Jack” Litle, Dumb Tourist: Michael Lewis “Flash Boys” Review, 
MERCENARY TRADER (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.mercenarytrader.com/2014/04/dumb-
tourist-michael-lewis-flash-boys-review/ [https://perma.cc/2S9U-A28H]; see also Cliff 
Asness et al., High Frequency Hyperbole, Part Deux, REALCLEARMARKETS (May 22, 
2014), 
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2014/05/22/high_frequency_trading_hyperbole_p
art_deux_101072.html [https://perma.cc/WUE3-W3E3] (asserting that “HFTs are viciously 
competitive with each other and don’t enjoy monopolies like the specialists in the prior 
single-exchange market structure did” and “the relative speed advantage of market makers 
in the old days was actually far larger than it is today, even if all the speeds today are 
faster”). 
162.  Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) to the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Comm. 
(Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-26/265-26-51.htm 
[https://perma.cc/25VK-3NEW]. 
163.  For a discussion of this debate, see Eric Scott Hunsader, Adding Liquidity, NANEX 
(rev. Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4501.html [https://perma.cc/62KB-
E8CN].  Notably, this commentator made the following observation: “When a liquidity 
provider removes liquidity, they are no longer a liquidity provider: they are removing 
liquidity and competing with other investors who thought the liquidity providers would be 
providing liquidity.”  Id.  For a counterpoint that stresses that “a liquidity provider will both 
add to and also remove liquidity, sometimes evenly spread across their activities,” see 
Remco Lenterman, Does a Liquidity Provider Also ‘Remove’ Liquidity?, EPTA BLOG (Dec. 
12, 2013, 10:30 PM), https://epta.fia.org/articles/does-liquidity-provider-also-remove-
liquidity [https://perma.cc/KP2C-XELQ].  Once again, for the purpose of inventory 
management, a market maker cannot be entirely passive, but constraints on aggressive 
trading established by the applicable regulatory regime are critical. 
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instance, an analysis that “focuses on HFTs as liquidity providers”164 is 
bound to be one-sided, if not ultimately leading to misguided policy 
recommendations.  Even as characterized by an industry insider in his 
counter-criticism of the “rigged markets” viewpoint, “Market-makers are, 
by default, high-frequency traders. . .  However, many high-frequency 
traders are not market-makers.”165 
While the universe of trading strategies in HFT is not by any means 
homogenous, many of these strategies or at least some of their 
facets/phases amount to or at least resemble market making.  Moreover, 
given the existing level of fragmentation, many HFTs could be thought of 
as market makers — or perhaps, quite frequently, as arbitrageurs — across 
numerous trading venues, as well as across different securities.166  Some 
HFTs even characterize all of their principal trading activities as “market 
making,” although even the DMM status that they might possess on some 
trading venues does not guarantee this result.167  Overall, it is hard to accept 
 
164.  Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 
191, 247 n.133 (2015). 
165.  PETER KOVAC, FLASH BOYS: NOT SO FAST: AN INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE ON HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING 15 (2014). 
166.  See CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM., REGULATORY RESPONSES REPORT, supra note 
13, at 10 (“[HFTs] often engage in multi-market arbitrage activities that essentially result in 
liquidity provision to and across markets.”); O’Hara, supra note 99, at 259 (“HFT market 
making differs from traditional market making in that it is often implemented across and 
within markets, making it akin to statistical arbitrage.  Conceptually, HFT market making 
uses historical correlation patterns in price ticks to move liquidity between securities or 
markets.”).  Given the decentralized nature of the trading process and the role played by 
HFTs in displaying essentially the same trading interest on different trading venues, it is not 
surprising to observe, as described by one study, “heightened uncertainty about the overall 
available liquidity in the market,” and this study offered evidence from markets in 
government securities and related futures contracts in support of the view that “rapid depth 
reduction by low-latency liquidity providers contributes to the liquidity mirage.”  Dobrislav 
Dobrev & Ernst Schaumburg, The Liquidity Mirage, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Oct. 9, 2015, 7:00 
AM), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/10/the-liquidity-mirage-.html 
[https://perma.cc/68FB-8S4F].  Another perspective on the same issue is the phenomenon of 
high order cancellation rates by HFTs that may be engaged in providing liquidity, as the 
multiplicity of trading venues magnifies the need for cancelations necessitated by the nature 
of inventory management and the arrival of new information, as well as an increased “pick-
off” risk.  For a discussion of this perspective and a justification of high order cancelation 
rates in the form of the argument that “because it is a market maker, and its business is 
about getting the price right, and it is doing its best to get the price right,” see Matt Levine, 
Why Do High-Frequency Traders Cancel So Many Orders?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 8, 
2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-08/why-do-high-
frequency-traders-cancel-so-many-orders- [https://perma.cc/E6LM-MDFP]. 
167.  See Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the 
Evolution of the Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower’s Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 145, 166 n.112 [hereinafter 
Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the Securities 
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the approach that HFT is naturally gravitating to market making, however 
technologically modernized, and automatically equating opportunistic 
liquidity provision to the DMM model fails for the same reason.  Looking 
back to the events of the Flash Crash, one commentator made the following 
observation: 
High-frequency market maker firms are not “passive liquidity 
providers,” as they long claimed.  The phrase is absurd and 
obsolete. They are very active and aggressive traders, committing 
fratricide when it suits them, or withdrawing altogether from 
volatile markets. With inventory half-lives measured in seconds, 
when these market makers reach their risk thresholds and start 
liquidating inventory - without regard to time or price - they can 
easily stoke a self-sustaining firestorm while prices collapse. . . .  
“Liquidity providers” with the freedom to provide liquidity for 
just a few seconds before demanding liquidity without regard to 
time or price are an unpredictable prelude to inevitable disaster, 
and our markets now completely depend on them.168 
 
Market Structure] (noting that a leading HFT firm “described virtually all of its short-term 
trading activities on the principal basis as ‘market making’”)). 
168.  Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) on File No. S7-02-10 (Oct. 31, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-300.htm; see also U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE 
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE 
JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES 15, 48 (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3VC-
9FND] (analyzing the Flash Crash and finding that, with respect to futures markets, “net 
holdings of HFTs fluctuated around zero so rapidly that they rarely held more than 3,000 
contracts long or short on that day [while] there was an unusually high level of ‘hot potato’ 
trading volume – due to repeated buying and selling of contracts – among the HFTs” and, 
with respect to securities markets, a subset of HFTs “traded with the price trend on May 6 
and, on both an absolute and net basis, removed significant buy liquidity from the public 
quoting markets during the downturn”).  An interagency report on the relatively short period 
of turbulence in the market for U.S. Treasury instruments and related markets on October 
15, 2014 provides an additional data point.  The report compared “principal trading firms” 
(“PTFs”), a category that may serve as a proxy for HFTs, and more traditional “bank-
dealers” and concluded that both of these categories “were the main contributors to the 
pattern of net aggressive flows, consistent with their large share of overall trading volume, 
with PTFs accounting for much of the imbalance in aggressive flows during the event 
window across futures and cash markets.”  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURE TRADING COMM’N, JOINT STAFF REPORT: THE U.S. 
TREASURY MARKET ON OCTOBER 15, 2014, at 23 (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-studies/treasury-market-volatility-10-14-2014-joint-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD2R-FLR6].  Furthermore, the report suggested that “the 
aggressive buying [by PTFs] during the first part of the event window was unlikely to be 
hedging flows arising from . . . market making activities.”  Id. at 24.  However, the 
comparison was still in favor of PTFs vis-à-vis banks, as these market participants 
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Yet another consideration is that certain HFT strategies, while 
sometimes labeled as market making, really amount to market 
manipulation, and some of them indeed cross the legal line.  For instance, 
the SEC recently penalized “an algorithmic, high-frequency trading firm 
[for] us[ing] complex computer programs to carry out a familiar, 
manipulative scheme: marking the closing price of publicly-traded 
securities.”169  Despite the settlement with the regulators, the company still 
argued “its trading activity helped satisfy market demand for liquidity 
during a period of unprecedented demand for such liquidity.”170 
Indeed, even in the context of market making, HFTs are often viewed 
with suspicion as at-will liquidity providers.171 Another critical — and 
 
collectively “remained engaged as liquidity providers throughout the event window, thus 
pointing towards more than one type of PTF strategies at work.”  Id. at 23.  An early critique 
of the report asserted that the relevant data set shows the existence of the “hot potato” effect 
among HFTs, as an explanation for volatility: “HFTs were aggressively buying from other 
HFTs on the way up, and HFTs were aggressively selling to other HFTs on the way down.”  
Eric Scott Hunsader, HFT Hot Potato 2 – The Treasury Flash Crash, NANEX (July 14, 
2015), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4703.html [https://perma.cc/3LP4-NR6C].  Indeed, 
while describing this period of market turbulence, a government official stated “both sides 
of the order book were predominantly from PTFs and the aggressive orders were also 
predominantly from PTFs.  So really throughout the spike – that 70 to 75 percent that we 
identified, PTFs were on both the passive and the aggressive side of things.”  BROOKINGS 
INST., supra note 82, at 61 (remarks of Antonio F. Weiss, Counselor to the Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Treasury). 
169.  Athena Capital Research, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 73,369, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3950, at 2 (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-73369.pdf [https://perma.cc/KMA7-HDTW]. 
170.  Press Release, Athena Capital Research LLC, Athena Capital Research LLC 
Agrees to Settlement with SEC (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/athena-capital-research-llc-agrees-to-settlement-with-sec-279468512.html 
[https://perma.cc/QFN2-FRJP]. 
171.  See, e.g., Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & CEO, Interactive Brokers Grp., 
Comments Before the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory 
Issues 3 (June 22, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-26/265-26-23.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KK3F-BW5V] (“High Frequency Traders are currently only fair weather 
liquidity providers, making markets when times are calm but leaving the market temporarily 
or permanently during turbulent periods.  To enhance liquidity and stability and to integrate 
these HFTs into the National Market System, they should be encouraged and rewarded to 
become bona fide, registered Market Makers.”); see also BENOÎT LALLEMAND, FIN. WATCH, 
INVESTING NOT BETTING: MAKING FINANCIAL MARKETS SERVE SOCIETY 31 (Thierry 
Philipponnat et al. eds., Apr. 2012), http://docs.edhec-risk.com/mrk/000000/Press/25-
EBBSGCUGLNAFMHO.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V5U-Z6V6] (“A business model built on 
being sufficiently fast to trade only certain selected transactions is by definition 
contradictory with liquidity providing.”); SE. ASSET MGMT., INC., SOUTHEASTERN’S 
PERSPECTIVE ON MARKET STRUCTURE AND HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 2–3 (Apr. 11 ,2014), 
http://southeasternasset.com/sites/default/files/commentary/Market%20Structure%20April
%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTR3-K3XY] (“[M]any HFTs are electronic market makers 
and provide significant volume to the market. Less clear, however, is how much true 
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controversial — argument is that HFTs’ lower profits margins than the 
ones enjoyed by old-style specialists are more than compensated for by a 
higher level of intermediation.172  Moreover, HFTs as informal market 
makers have been able to utilize certain “plumbing” features, often 
nontransparent, that may be characterized as market structure shortcuts that 
go far beyond speed: 
HFT scalping [is] an opportunistic and discriminatory mimic of 
traditional market making – where HFT uses opaque advantages, 
including special order types, instead of explicit market making 
privileges – without the market making obligations.  It is not a 
traditional spread-scalping strategy that posts on each side of the 
spread, relying on speed to jump ahead of the rest of the 
market.173 
This insight is particularly important in light of claims that HFTs’ 
market making does not depend on structural advantages, unlike the old 
model of liquidity provision.174  Moreover, some institutional investors are 
now open about the adverse impact of certain order types, which also 
points at a related problem of the costs of liquidity provided by HFTs.175 
Another critical perspective pertains to the nature of interaction of 
HFTs and other types of market makers.  One argument points to an 
additional strain on DMMs in the form of an uneven playing field, as HFTs 
“compete with DMMs when market-making is profitable but withdraw 
altogether from the market when it is not, leaving DMMs to bear the brunt 
 
liquidity that volume provides . . .”). 
172.  Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n 2 (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-
346.pdf [https://perma.cc/58DG-A3XL]. 
173.  Haim Bodek & Mark Shaw, Introduction to HFT Scalping Strategies, in BODEK, 
supra note 110, at 18, 23. 
174.  See, e.g., Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell. Exec. Vice President, Managing Dir. & 
Gen. Counsel, Managed Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 23 (May 7, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-178.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6EM-3X5G] (“[I]t would be unfair for the Commission to impose 
affirmative and negative obligations on today’s liquidity providers as they are not receiving 
special trading privileges, such as registered specialists in the past and market makers who 
in return are required to maintain continuous two-sided displayed quotes.”). 
175.  See, e.g., High Frequency Trading’s Impact on the Economy: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 69–70 (2014) (prepared statement of Andrew M. Brooks, Vice President and Head of 
U.S. Equity Trading, T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.) (“[I[n the race for increased market 
share, exchanges and alternative trading venues continue to offer various types of orders to 
compete for investor order flow.  Many of these order types facilitate strategies that can 
benefit certain market participants at the expense of long-term investors and, while 
seemingly appropriate, often such order types are used in connection with predatory trading 
strategies.”). 
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of market-making obligations in a stressed market.”176  A very similar 
concern is whether the very presence of HFTs may impose a cost on other 
liquidity providers, resulting in longer-term consequences for securities 
markets: 
HFTs might crowd out slow liquidity providers, who trade on 
long term fundamental information but are exposed to the risk of 
being picked off in the short term.  Now, these slow liquidity 
providers have greater long-term risk-bearing capacity than 
HFTs.  Hence the latter exert negative externality on other market 
participants by depriving them from liquidity supply at the time 
of significant shock that only slow traders could accommodate.177 
A theoretical analysis of the nature of interaction of “fast” and “slow” 
market makers somewhat analogously concluded that “[l]iquidity in the 
market may deteriorate unless high-frequency market makers fully replace 
low-frequency market makers in liquidity provision.”178  A resulting 
recommendation pointed to the desirability of “some restrictions on high-
frequency trading, such as minimum resting times [that] may improve 
market liquidity by leveling the playing field among market makers with 
different speeds.”179  Given that such regulation has not been implemented 
on the market-wide basis, which may be difficult to do in any instance, a 
more practical, if not inevitable, result of this competitive environment is 
the integration of HFTs, such as KCG, Virtu Financial, and IMC, with the 
DMM segment of the securities industry, with some firms even entering the 
wholesaling business.180  At the same time, any efforts to outlaw informal 
liquidity providers, however opportunistic and whether HFTs or otherwise, 
is bound to be a “red herring” regulatory option. 
 
176.  Benos & Wetherilt, supra note 46, at 349. 
177.  Bruno Biais & Thierry Foucault, HFT and Market Quality, BANKERS, MKTS. & 
INVESTORS, Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 5, 15; see also Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors, 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Recent Changes in the Resilience of Market Liquidity: Remarks at 
Salzburg Global Forum on Finance in a Changing World (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20150701a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/RAT6-B9HM] (“HFTs may have more limited capacity to support 
liquidity resilience since, on average, HFTs appear to trade with smaller inventories and 
lower capital than traditional traders.  Although having less inventory and capital reduces 
the cost of trading, it also means that markets increasingly dominated by HFTs may be less 
able to absorb large shocks.”). 
178.  Jungsuk Han et al., Liquidity with High-Frequency Market Making 1 (Swedish 
House of Fin., Research Paper No. 14-06, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416396 
[https://perma.cc/W3RQ-VTT6]. 
179.  Id. 
180.  See also DURBIN, supra note 28, at 94 (“Bottom line, in the most actively traded 
stocks, the market-maker can only expect to make profitable markets by getting just as 
smart as the predictor [i.e., an HFT].”). 
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While HFT has become associated with the term “front-running,” 
which is rarely used in its legal sense,181 the counterargument is that the 
capability to engage in trading strategies frequently labeled as “order 
anticipation”/“liquidity detection” is important for market making in the 
context of adverse selection: 
To the extent that market makers — be they humans or machines 
— can get signals about the informativeness of order flow, and in 
particular about undisclosed flow that may be hitting the market 
soon, they can adjust their quotes accordingly and mitigate 
adverse selection problems.  The ability to adjust quotes quickly 
in response to information about pending informed orders allows 
them to quote narrower markets. By pinging dark pools or 
engag[ing] in other strategies that allow them to make inferences 
about latent informed order flow, HFT can enhance liquidity. . . .  
[I]nformed traders’ anger at market makers that anticipate their 
orders is no different tha[n] the anger of a cat that sees the mouse 
flee before it can pounce.  The criticisms of both dark pools and 
HFT (and particularly HFT strategies that attempt to uncover 
information about trading interest and impending order flow) are 
prominent examples.182 
A similar defense of this practice maintained, based on the rationale 
that “[t]he greatest threat to a liquidity provider is that one or several large 
orders move the market,” that HFTs as “liquidity providers need to 
identify, as quickly as possible, when the market moves in a certain 
direction through large orders (usually generated by institutional 
customers) [and they] may witness price changing orders through liquidity 
detection strategies only.”183  While it is very problematic, if not futile, to 
 
181.  Indeed, the term “front-running” is used rather broadly in the context of the 
current market structure.  See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 5, at 4 (“Technological front-
running is a predatory High Frequency Trading tactic that leverages speed advantage, 
resulting from latency differences between different marketplaces, preferential access to 
data, co-location, faster communication networks, special order types, and internal 
processing capabilities, to detect, process and act upon information ahead of all slower 
market participants.”); see also Clifford S. Asness, Why I Love High-Speed Trading, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 20, 2014, 11:15 AM), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-06-20/why-i-love-high-speed-trading 
[https://perma.cc/3XA4-JZDQ] (criticizing the view that the meaning of the term “front-
running” should be extended to “encompass ‘order anticipation with speed advantages’”). 
182.  The Professor [Craig Pirrong], Pinging: Who Is the Predator, and Who Is the 
Prey?, STREETWISE PROFESSOR (Apr. 5, 2014, 11:59 AM), 
http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=8340 [https://perma.cc/VFE8-6JEA]. 
183.  EUREX EXCH., HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING — A DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT ISSUES 
22 (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.eurexchange.com/blob/426058/d66b6713e508ca546b5f2785386c958c/data/pres
entation_hft_media_workshop_chi_nyc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WPQ-RKJN]. 
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outlaw order anticipation/liquidity detection as such, the argument has been 
extended even further: 
[W]ithout electronic front running, HFTs would find it harder to 
detect indications of possible trading on private information and 
as a result would increase their spreads.  Informed traders would 
get all of the gains from being better able to hide the informed 
nature of their trades.  But they pay, through the increased 
spreads, only part of the added costs incurred by HFTs as a result 
of entering into more losing transactions.184 
However, putting aside the overall contribution of HFTs to liquidity 
and hence the need to protect them as liquidity providers, this argument has 
to be balanced with the realization that HFTs themselves are short-term 
informed traders par excellence that could be either providing or 
consuming liquidity, as they have been able to exploit their speedy reaction 
to fundamental and trading process-based information — for instance, by 
utilizing private data feeds and corresponding latency differentials.  
Moreover, the arsenal of HFT has included numerous and often 
nontransparent market structure shortcuts, as contrasted to true quantitative 
models, effectively allowing to anticipate and respond to price moves.185  
 
184.  Fox et al., supra note 164, at 231. 
185.  Indeed, one category of HFT strategies, “HFT scalping,” is described as 
“predatory in its aim of stepping ahead of institutional order flows [with] speed [being] 
simply a prerequisite for effective utilization of special order types and market 
microstructure,” and this approach is said to “use the market liquidity itself as insurance 
against large losses via its superior queue position and execution.”  Haim Bodek & Mark 
Shaw, Introduction to HFT Scalping Strategies, in BODEK, supra note 110, at 18, 23.  A 
related question is whether certain HFT strategies are simply “stepping ahead” of all other 
market participants rather than “front-running,” “anticipating,” or “detecting” specific 
trading interests.  See also id. at 26–27 (“[U]ndocumented ‘queue jumping’ features at the 
exchanges can give the appearance of ‘statistical front running,’ as traditional orders fall to 
the back of the queue and tend to miss execution at the expected time and/or price.”).  
Furthermore, empirical evidence on “predictive” strategies of HFTs need to be viewed 
through the prism of market structure shortcuts.  For instance, one study analyzed 
transactions in stocks on NASDAQ during the first quarter of 2011, while specifically 
flagging HFTs, and concluded that, despite very similar order cancellation ratios for HFTs 
and non-HFTs, “HFT firms tend to cancel buy (sell) limit orders ahead of a short-term price 
decrease (increase), while for non-HFT firms the relation is the opposite for large-cap stocks 
and significantly weaker for the medium- and small-cap stocks.”  Avanidhar Subrahmanyam 
& Hui Zheng, Limit Order Placement by High-Frequency Traders 2–4 (Nov. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2688418 
[https://perma.cc/4PEJ-M66E].  The study drew a number of inferences, such as that, 
“compared with non-HFT firms, HFT firms are more capable of using order cancellation to 
manage the risk of trading with limit orders, which results in their liquidity being more 
informed,” id. at 4, that “[HFT] liquidity providers are informed about short-term price 
movements and strategically charge a liquidity premium in addition to the effective spreads 
to assert a competitive stance against the informed liquidity takers,” id. at 26, and that “the 
ARTICLE 2 (DOLGOPOLOV) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:33 PM 
702 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
Collectively branding HFTs as uninformed market makers — while 
acknowledging the existence of many shades of informed trading — might 
lead to questionable policy recommendations. 
A critical issue for the phenomenon of HFT is whether it provides 
additional liquidity and improves market quality, which is a multifaceted 
empirical question. One better-known survey of HFT-focused empirical 
research concluded that “[v]irtually every time a market structure change 
results in more HFT, liquidity and market quality have improved because 
liquidity suppliers are better able to adjust their quotes in response to new 
information.”186  Furthermore, there are empirical insights into whether 
HFT as a whole provides or consumes liquidity, as well as specialization of 
certain types of HFTs, and the role played by HFTs during periods of 
market turbulence.187  Another issue relates to the nature of liquidity 
 
technology that HFT liquidity providers employ helps them to effectively manage risk under 
normal trading conditions, which in turn enhances market quality,” id. at 35.  However, such 
results from this time period, which probably qualifies as the pre-cleanup heyday of HFT, 
may also indicate a heavy usage of market structure shortcuts rather than quantitative 
models on their own, with both types of these strategies potentially relying on private data 
feeds.  See also BODEK, supra note 110, at 50–51 (pointing out that the beginning of the 
cleanup of the HFT space occurred in late 2011–2012 and that “[s]ome of the more 
egregious HFT-oriented features appear to have been neutralized through order matching 
engine modifications”). 
186.  Charles M. Jones, What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading?, at i 
(Columbia Bus. School, Research Paper No. 13-11, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236201 
[https://perma.cc/5SK5-4VXN]. 
187.  See Evangelos Benos & Satchit Sagade, High-Frequency Trading Behaviour and 
Its Impact on Market Quality: Evidence from the UK Equity Market 20 (Bank of Eng., 
Working Paper No. 469, 2012), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2012/wp469.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VF4X-Y3BA] (analyzing transactions in FTSE 100 stocks and concluding 
that, while some HFTs “mostly supply liquidity,” others “mostly consume it”); Anand & 
Venkataraman, supra note 75 (manuscript at 2–5) (analyzing transactions in stocks on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, identifying “[e]ndogenous [l]iquidity [p]roviders” as market 
participants that “exhibit short holding periods, actively manage inventory, and earn the 
majority of trading profits from passive, liquidity supplying trades,” and concluding that 
“[h]igher stock volatility is associated with [their] higher . . . participation, even under 
conditions when market volatility is high”); Matthew Baron et al., Risk and Return in High 
Frequency Trading 3 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_riskandretur
n0414.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FSH-JME7] (analyzing transactions in the E-mini S&P 500 
futures contract, finding that “HFT firms who specialize in liquidity-taking (aggressive) 
strategies generate substantially more revenue than those who specialize in liquidity-
providing (passive) strategies,” and suggesting that “HFT firms have strong incentives to 
take liquidity”); Bruno Biais et al., Who Supplies Liquidity, How and When? 3, 16 (June 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
https://www.bis.org/events/conf150626/biais.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V2Z-KMDR] 
(analyzing transactions in French stock on Euronext around the Greek crisis of 2010 and 
suggesting that “fast proprietary traders supply liquidity to the market via contrarian 
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provided by HFT.  For instance, an empirical study of “the evolving Tokyo 
equity market and the mature London equity market” suggested that HFT is 
“highly concentrated in mega-cap names with the highest floating shares 
[and] mostly involved in opportunistic liquidity provisioning rather than 
engaging in predatory strategies,” but it “does not aim to maximize 
liquidity provision to [long-term investors].”188  Furthermore, the same 
study pointed to another implication of HFT market making: 
[T]he concentration of liquidity among top stocks results in a 
significant disparity in expected transaction costs per dollar 
traded.  High correlations among stocks, which we have observed 
lately, limit the divergence of expected excess returns and force 
portfolio optimizers to prefer cheaper-to-trade securities, which 
ultimately contributes to crowdedness of the trade, further 
increases in correlations and more liquidity polarization.189 
Other empirical studies question the value of HFT in terms of its 
contribution to the level of liquidity.190  Furthermore, there is some 
 
marketable orders and non-immediately executed limit orders”); Jonathan Brogaard et al., 
High Frequency Trading and Extreme Price Movements 7–8, 26 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2531122 
[https://perma.cc/W44K-E3ME] (analyzing transactions in stocks listed on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ and finding that “[HFTs] provide liquidity to [non-HFTs] during extreme price 
movement . . . episodes”). 
188.  Nataliya Bershova & Dmitry Rakhlin, High-Frequency Trading and Long-Term 
Investors: A View from the Buy Side, J. INV. STRATEGIES, Spring 2013, at 3, 3. 
189.  Id. at 42–43. 
190.  See George J. Jiang et al., High-Frequency Trading Around Macroeconomic 
News Announcements: Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Market, at iii (Bank of Can., 
Working Paper No. 2014-56, 2014), http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/wp2014-56.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR9C-BTU9] (analyzing 
transactions in U.S. Treasury notes on BrokerTec, an electronic communication network, 
and concluding that “[high-frequency] activities have a negative effect on liquidity around 
economic announcements,” although “[high-frequency] trades improve price efficiency”); 
Álvaro Cartea et al., Ultra-Fast Activity and Market Quality, at i (Jan. 29, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616627 
[https://perma.cc/YG8B-H64H] (analyzing transactions in stocks on NASDAQ and finding 
that “[a]n increase in [ultra-fast activity] leads to greater quoted and effective spreads and 
lower depth posted in the limit order book”); Amy Kwan & Richard Philip, High-Frequency 
Trading and Execution Costs 2, 8, 23–24 (June 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), 
http://www.cifr.edu.au/assets/document/HFTExecutionCosts%20Kwan%20WP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J9NB-HZ3R] (analyzing transactions in stocks on the Australian Securities 
Exchange in connection with the introduction of “a new, lower latency data feed,” 
concluding that “institutional and retail limit order trading costs increase, relative to the 
costs for HFT,” tracing this impact of HFT to “higher implementation shortfalls” for other 
market participants, and arguing that “HFT[s] typically supply liquidity to the thick side of 
the limit order book, where it is not required [and] strategically demand liquidity from the 
thin side, where liquidity is most needed, thus contributing to market instability”). 
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skepticism whether the adoption of Regulation NMS, which is seen as one 
of key ingredients in the rise of HFT, has improved market quality,191 
although the ultimate long-term impact of this regulatory measure is 
certainly hard to quantify.192  Moreover, a cost-benefit analysis in terms of 
different facets of liquidity is needed.193  In fact, one empirical study of 
transactions in stocks traded on NASDAQ asserted that “HFT represents a 
short-lived and expensive source of liquidity provision” to institutional 
investors, as expressed by execution shortfall, a multidimensional measure 
that “captures the bid-ask spread, the market impact, and the drift in price 
during order execution.”194  On the other hand, a study of transactions in 
stocks traded on Canadian securities exchanges has a different conclusion: 
“Both HFTs and DMMs provide liquidity to large institutional trades, with 
HFTs providing substantially more. In high volume stocks, HFTs reduce 
liquidity provision for ‘stressful’ trades by 42 percent while DMM liquidity 
provision remains mostly unchanged.”195  Yet, once again, it is problematic 
to lump together all forms of HFT and different market structure 
environments, and controlling certain types of conduct via regulatory 
measures, including stricter enforcement, is bound to be more productive 
 
191.  See Kee H. Chung & Chairat Chuwonganant, Regulation NMS and Market 
Quality, FIN. MGMT., Summer 2012, at 285, 285 (analyzing transactions in stocks listed on 
the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ around the implementation of 
Regulation NMS in 2007, and arguing that “both the quoted and effective spreads increased, 
the quoted depth decreased, and the market quality index decreased after the implementation 
of Regulation [NMS],” which was accompanied by “an increase in the price impact of 
trades and the dispersion of the pricing error”). 
192.  But see Barardehi et al., supra note 12, at 6, 13 (analyzing transaction in stocks 
listed on the NYSE from 2001 to 2012 and concluding that “illiquid stocks become more 
illiquid post Reg[ulation] NMS, and that liquid stocks became more liquid”). 
193.  See Stephen Bain & Shary Mudassir,  The Hidden Cost of Tighter Spreads, TABB 
FORUM (Mar. 25, 2013), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/the-hidden-cost-of-tighter-spreads 
[https://perma.cc/GH8D-8EWV] (“[I]t seems clear that the behavior incented by today’s 
market has increased effective spread costs for investors by eroding the quality and 
reliability of the liquidity provided.  This is particularly true when ‘liquidity providers’ have 
the ability to instantaneously morph into active position takers.”); see also PRAGMA SEC., 
HFT AND THE HIDDEN COST OF DEEP LIQUIDITY 5 (2012), 
http://www.pragmatrading.com/research/ [https://perma.cc/8R8L-L6G5] (registration 
required) (“By competing to earn spreads and rebates by providing liquidity, HFTs crowd 
out directional traders’ passive orders, force them to cross the spread more often, and result 
in higher trading costs for investors.”). 
194.  Lin Tong, A Blessing or a Curse? The Impact of High Frequency Trading on 
Institutional Investors, at ii, 4 (Oct. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330053 [https://perma.cc/U946-PRX3]. 
195.  Robert Korajczyk & Dermot Murphy, High Frequency Market Making to Large 
Institutional Trades 1 (Nov. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
www.iiroc.ca/Documents/2014/747f94fd-69b6-400f-bf49-fe8165e5da95_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T6GV-Z4A7]. 
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than reversing technological developments as such with blunt measures. 
In additional to clear parallels between HFT and the much older 
phenomenon of “scalping” in futures and commodities markets,196 one 
important analogy pertains to historical debates over the nature and some 
practices of floor trading, including its contribution to liquidity.  The 
reasoning articulated decades ago in an influential SEC study on the nature 
of such liquidity and the lack of market making obligations would be 
familiar to HFT critics: 
[T]he liquidity [floor traders] provide is in most cases marginal, 
for they tend to enter the market only when other investors have 
already provided activity, a fact that poses the interesting  
question, “Who is providing liquidity for whom?” 
 
It is indeed probable that on occasion the liquidity added to the 
marketplace by floor traders constitutes a positive disservice to 
the public by creating a misleading impression of a given stock’s 
actual liquidity.  Thus investors who purchase a stock with a 
view to liquidity may find in stress situations that the floor 
traders, who are under no obligation to maintain fair and orderly 
markets, have abandoned the stock and its liquidity has been 
impaired when it is most needed.197 
Likewise, the advantages of floor traders were said to include “an 
opportunity to observe and act upon floor developments instantaneously” 
and “access to much greater and more current market information than 
individuals relying on tape reports and quotation systems,”198 as well as 
lower trading fees and the ability to place and withdraw orders 
momentarily.199  Moreover, concerns about obligations of HFTs to the 
marketplace also resemble the much earlier critique of floor trading: “Of all 
classes of exchange members on the floor, the floor trader stands alone in 
having no fiduciary status, no duty to execute transactions, and no market 
responsibilities or obligations in relation to the operation of the market as a 
public institution.”200  In other words, concerns about opportunistic trading 
 
196.  See, e.g., Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) to the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory 
Comm., supra note 162 (“Defining a ‘scalper’ as a firm that ‘typically buys and sells in 
large quantities, expecting to hold the trade open only a very short time’ and that ‘intends to 
be even as to quantities bought and sold at the close of the business day and is reluctant to 
carry a trade over night,’ the U.S. government’s 1920 [sic] definition of scalping tracks what 
today’s high frequency market maker firms say about themselves almost word for word.”) 
(quoting 7 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN TRADE 4, 70 (1926)). 
197.  SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 46, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 
221. 
198.  Id. pt. 2, ch. VI, at 208, 210. 
199.  Id. pt. 2, ch. VI, at 239. 
200.  Id. pt. 2, ch. VI, at 238–39; see also Sean Hendelman & Brandon Rowley, A 
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combined with information- and speed-based advantages are nothing new, 
just as possible regulatory measures.  At the same time, it was much easier 
to single out and monitor floor traders, compared to the current 
environment characterized by electronic trading, greater complexity, and 
fragmentation.  A similar suppression of HFT as such may be a problematic 
policy option, given the diversity of trading strategies and their underlying 
purposes. 
The value of HFT as a mechanism providing liquidity has been 
impaired in a number of instances by nontransparent market structure 
shortcuts created by recent transmutations of securities markets, such as 
certain order types, along with the growing level of complexity, with 
stealth wealth transfers as a result.  In that respect, as observed by one 
commentator, many forms of HFT have amounted to “opportunistic 
skimming” coupled with “discriminatory advantages,” bringing memories 
of “the SOES bandits of the 1990’s and ‘barnacle’ customer market 
makers.”201  Of course, these historical examples pertain to practices of a 
limited scope of somewhat marginalized groups, which were essentially 
stamped out with certain regulatory changes largely by trading venues 
themselves.  On the other hand, the phenomenon of HFT is much more 
diverse in its scope, and some of its constituencies are well-entrenched.  
Accordingly, while the phenomenon of HFT as a whole cannot be stamped 
out or turned into bona fide market making, the elimination of such 
asymmetries will serve the market as a whole: 
If the features that unjustly enrich HFT profitability [such as 
certain order types and matching engine practices] are eliminated 
from electronic exchanges, either by regulators or by industry 
pressure, the adverse impact of HFT activity in the market will 
rapidly dissipate.  HFT strategies will still exist, but their role 
will once again be limited by their natural scale and volume.202 
In any instance, these nontransparent features should not be coopted, 
either explicitly or implicitly, into the market making segment of the 
securities industry, and the regulators already seem to be on the path of 
eradicating the latest iteration of such features.203  Moreover, this cleanup is 
 
Flawed Model: Relying on High Frequency Traders as Liquidity Providers, WALL ST. & 
TECH. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/trading-technology/a-flawed-
model-relying-on-high-frequency-traders-as-liquidity-providers/d/d-id/1263989? 
[https://perma.cc/YR8F-G9VB] (stating that HFTs “simply owe no fiduciary duty to anyone 
to create markets in stocks and thus should not be depended on for liquidity”). 
201.  BODEK, supra note 110, at 7. 
202.  Id. at 7–8. 
203.  For two recent SEC enforcement actions that specifically focused on order type 
practices, see UBS Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9697, Exchange Act Release No. 
74,060 (Jan. 15, 2015) (settled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-
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likely to be beneficial for both formal and informal liquidity providers and 
a variety of market making strategies that might have been displaced in the 
past. 
Overall, the phenomenon of HFT presents a complex issue for 
regulation of market makers and touches on such key concepts as trading 
obligations and privileges, vulnerability, and opportunism in connection 
with HFTs, as well as their potential competitors and counterparties.  While 
it is easy for an outside observer to picture this phenomenon as a parade of 
horribles, some HFT strategies may be providing liquidity, while others 
may be aggressive, predatory, or outright illegal.  A more difficult task is to 
quantify the costs of opportunism and parasitic intermediation associated 
with certain forms of HFT and to evaluate the pros and cons of the 
interaction of HFTs as informal market makers and DMMs, while mapping 
the space for their healthy competition.  Moreover, the rise of narrowly 
focused HFT firms that function as market makers, often playing the DMM 
role, definitely compresses the space for problematic practices.  While this 
trend may appear to deemphasize the integrated model of market making, 
which is of particular importance for securities of smaller-cap/emerging 
companies204 contrasted to highly liquid large-cap stocks preferred by 
HFTs, there is no inherent reason why these two models cannot function 
side-by-side.  HFT market makers can hardly be forced to become 
integrated securities firms, but there no inherent obstacles for the integrated 
model of market making to be successful. 
V. THE REGULATORY OUTLOOK FOR MARKET MAKERS 
Market making is one of the most fertile debate topics for regulatory 
reassessment and reform of modern securities markets, especially in the 
equities space, covering such themes as the shifting balance of trading 
 
9697.pdf [https://perma.cc/29VN-K5QV]; EDGA Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
74,032 (Jan. 12, 2015) (settled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-
74032.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHU3-2TGB].  In one of these settlements, the SEC censured 
UBS for “failing to disclose PPP [the PrimaryPegPlus order type] to all UBS ATS 
subscribers [while] PPP was pitched almost exclusively to market makers and/or high-
frequency trading . . . firms, which UBS expected to be the primary users of the order type.”  
UBS, Exchange Act Release No. 74,060, at 3 (footnote omitted).  Furthermore, as specific 
examples of market participants favored by UBS, the SEC used unidentified firms that 
“engaged in high-frequency trading and market making.”  Id. at 6–8.  For an additional 
discussion of the so-called “order type controversy” from the standpoint of legal liability, 
see Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the Securities 
Market Structure, supra note 167, passim. 
204.  For a discussion of the importance of the integrated model of market making as a 
key component of capital formation process, see Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market 
Structure and Capital Formation, supra note 15, passim. 
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obligations and privileges, mandatory market making obligations, market 
disruptions, consolidation of the trading process, issuer-to-market maker 
compensation arrangements, the trade-at rule, the tick size regime, and the 
maker-taker pricing model.  Sometimes, even the very existence of DMMs 
is still questioned.  Yet, despite the concern that “no regulatory mechanism 
can ensure that the value of the liquidity provided is equal to the value of 
the special privileges exercised,”205 no such precision is needed in the 
constantly evolving market structure.  Distortions caused by various 
combinations of trading obligations and privileges are inevitable, and an 
analogy to a moving target is quite appropriate.  Likewise, there are reasons 
to qualify the argument that “during normal times, traders will avoid 
markets with designated market makers to avoid losses associated with the 
exercise of their special privileges,” and the corresponding conclusion that 
“[s]ystems with special privileges for designated market makers can only 
work well in markets in which all trading is consolidated by regulation to 
the sponsoring market”206 is not universally true. Overall, the mix of self-
regulation and governmental regulation with respect to market makers 
remains important in the broader context of the architecture of securities 
markets: “Liquidity in a high-speed world is not a given: market design and 
market structure must ensure that liquidity provision arises continuously in 
a highly fragmented, highly interconnected trading environment.”207 
A key issue is the shifting balance of trading obligations and 
privileges of market makers, as well as their mismatch in the current 
market structure.  One common theme, as described by a leading HFT 
market maker, is that “the obligations, expectations and incentives for 
market makers have not kept pace with the evolution of our market 
structure.”208  Even years ago, a leading industry group described the 
growing crisis as follows: 
The change to decimal quotes from fractions impacted liquidity 
by reducing the incentive for market makers and specialists to 
commit capital.  The result has been a collapse in spreads, 
equating to reduced profit potential for these participants, or 
simply put, not enough reward to justify the risk for market 
makers and specialists. . . . The advent of fast markets further 
reduced the value of the incentives offered to liquidity providers. 
The specialist could no longer participate on a great enough scale 
to provide meaningful liquidity or profits.  Market making 
 
205.  James J. Angel et al., Equity Trading in the 21st Century: An Update, 5 Q.J. FIN. 
1550002-1, 1550002-29 (2015). 
206.  Id. 
207.  CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM., REGULATORY RESPONSES REPORT, supra note 13, 
at 2. 
208.  A Parting Thought, supra note 25, at 8. 
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incentives are no longer valuable enough to incentivize 
participants to risk their capital.209 
Indeed, the current debates are searching for a new balance of trading 
obligations and privileges of market makers. 
Another persistent theme is the balance between governmental 
regulation and self-regulation in setting up market making regimes.  More 
universal rules on market making promulgated by regulatory agencies, 
including definitional aspects, are possible and sometimes asked for by 
certain major players.  For instance, a leading market making firm 
proposed to create a new category of market makers that would “be 
recognized under SEC rules and be subject to SEC approved market 
making obligations” such as “best price, minimum size requirements, depth 
of liquidity, a minimum size basket of stocks for which they serve as 
market makers and enhanced capital requirements.”210  Yet, in addition to 
very basic harmonization, anything detail-specific would be difficult to 
formulate and even more difficult to implement, given the wide variety of 
business models employed by trading venues and their market makers.  
Moreover, additional trading obligations imposed on DMMs would require 
further regulatory subsidies in the form of trading privileges.  The 
following summary of a survey by an international group of securities 
regulators illustrates this question’s importance: 
[Many respondents hold] the view that contractual arrangements 
should be left entirely to trading venues on the grounds that 
market making arrangements and liquidity provision are some of 
the dimensions on which trading venues compete. . . . As a result, 
regulatory authorities mandating a market making regime would 
reduce investor choice and stifle innovation by trading venues. A 
possible reduction in liquidity offered by some firms was also 
cited as a possible unintended consequence of a mandatory 
 
209.  SEC. TRADERS ASS’N, THE STA’S PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. MARKET STRUCTURE 6 
(2008), https://securitytraders.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/STA-WHITE-
PAPER2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/F56Q-JR88]. 
210.  Roundtable on Equity Market Structure, Testimony of Douglas A. Cifu, Chief 
Executive Officer, Virtu Financial, at a Roundtable Discussion Hosted by U.S. 
Representative Scott Garrett (July 28, 2014), http://www.virtu.com/news-23/roundtable-on-
equity-market.html [https://perma.cc/87EW-NXXJ].  An earlier comment letter from a 
major HFT firm maintained that “the definition of market making activity and the 
establishment of incentives for this activity should not be the left to individual market 
centers” and called to avoid “a situation which leads either to a race to the bottom in which 
market maker obligations are completely eviscerated, or to exclusive market maker 
designations that increase dependence on single firms.”  Letter from Peter Kovac, Chief 
Operating Officer & Fin. & Operations Principal, EWT, LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 19 (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
02-10/s70210-279.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7MQ-CBT3]. 
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regime.  [O]ther respondents expressed mixed views and 
suggested that although the fine details of a market making 
schemes offered by a trading venue should be left to the trading 
venue as part of its competitive offering, implementation of 
regulation in this area may also lead to a harmonization of 
standards that could ensure that the integrity of the term “market 
maker” is upheld, thus providing confidence to the investing 
community.211 
Overall, the most likely scenario for market makers is an evolving 
patchwork design via SEC-vetted rules adopted by individual trading 
venues, which may include strengthened trading obligations and additional 
trading privileges. 
Another area of discussion relates to proposals for mandatory market 
making obligations for certain groups, such as HFTs in general and off-
exchange market makers.  While such proposals have been advanced by a 
range of commentators,212 this regulatory option seems unlikely or even 
infeasible, given its potentially broad application and the absence of 
counterbalancing incentives.213  Furthermore, pursuing this course of action 
in the form of governmental regulation would likely require crafting a 
comprehensive set of market making obligations adopted and monitored by 
the regulators.  As a counterargument, advantages conferred by superior 
technology and speed are sometimes thought of as a class privilege of 
“fast” traders, rather being confined to DMMs.  Indeed, one academic 
paper argued that certain technology-based privileges, which are 
represented by the “information transmission distance,” should entail the 
obligation to become an “e-specialist.”214  However, the argument that 
 
211.  TECH. COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FR09/11, FINAL REPORT, 
REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET 
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 59 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7DD-
8Y6P]. 
212.  For a description of such proposals, as well as the opposition to them, see 
Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World, supra note 33, at 352–53 & 
nn.256–58. 
213.  For a discussion of analogous proposals dealing with a minimum order duration 
and capped cancelation rates, see id. at 356–58.  Interestingly, some trading venues have 
experimented or plan to experiment with minimum exposure order types with special 
compensation incentives, such as greater liquidity rebates or queue priority.  For several 
examples of such order types, see Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ 
OMX PHLX LLC To Introduce the Minimum Life Order as a New Order Type, Exchange 
Act Release No. 65,926, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,057 (Dec. 9, 2011); Press Release, TMX Grp., 
TSX Long Life Order Type Receives Regulatory Approval (Aug. 19, 2015), 
https://www.tmx.com/newsroom/press-releases?id=352 [https://perma.cc/T8NW-VGWM]. 
214.  KHALDOUN KHASHANAH ET AL., STEVENS INST. OF TECH., ON THE IMPACT AND 
FUTURE OF HFT 18 (May 10, 2014), http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-
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market making obligations should attach to de facto class privileges is still 
difficult to make, as these advantages do — and, very likely, should — 
support a wide variety of trading strategies.  Even more tangible 
advantages, which may amount to mere access to services, such as co-
location, do not present a strong case for applying a special regulatory 
regime based on that fact alone.  Many representatives of the securities 
industry in fact critiqued this approach to co-location, offering several 
reasonable arguments.215  Regulatory efforts to segment different tiers of 
technology are likely to be a difficult task, and, once again, regulatory 
sticks would work better with regulatory carrots.  Furthermore, not all 
categories of HFTs could be converted to DMMs, given the sheer variety of 
trading strategies and potential problems with eradicating the ones with a 
very short time horizon.216 
In the context of debates about mandatory market making obligations, 
 
content/uploads/2015/09/HFT-Academic-White-Paper1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR2E-F8A5]. 
215.  See, e.g., Letter from Suhas Daftuar, Managing Dir., Hudson River Trading LLC, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-171.pdf [https://perma.cc/58PF-24GH]  
(“[P]lacing obligations on co-location customers would mean that brokers would generally 
be unable to offer services harnessing the benefits of co-location to their retail or 
institutional customers, as their order flow presumably wouldn’t meet whatever obligation 
are being imposed.”); Letter from Janet M. Kissane, SVP – Legal & Corp. Sec’y, NYSE 
Euronext, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 17 (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-154.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC3R-BLUF] 
(“Application of obligation requirements to all co-location participants would be 
unnecessary and impractical, especially because only certain proprietary firms would be in a 
position to control their activity to meet such requirements (for example, firms with 
institutional agency algorithmic order flow would have no means to ensure obligations were 
met).  It would be difficult to adequately define the scope of obligation requirements for co-
location participants, and we are concerned that any such obligations could be inequitably 
applied.”); Letter from Ann Vlcek, Managing Dir. & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & 
Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (Apr. 29, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-167.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QWR-
PK3K] (“We do not believe . . . that firms engaging in co-location arrangements should 
have affirmative or negative obligations solely as a result of such arrangements.  Co-
location arrangements are unlike exchange specialist status (where . . . specialists enjoyed 
unique time and space advantages on exchange floors) because they should be available to 
any firm willing to devote resources to entering into such an arrangement.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
216.  See also PETER GOMBER ET AL., HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 61 (Mar. 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858626 [https://perma.cc/6C5S-FXA4] (“HFT quoting obligations 
are in sharp contrast to the business model of HFTs that relies on minimizing risk, keeping 
positions for shortest periods and staying mostly flat. . .  The key challenge both for 
regulators and market operators is the design of the right economic incentives rather than 
imposing obligations/fines that drive liquidity providers temporarily or completely out of 
markets.  The incentives should be based on the respective contribution to market liquidity 
of market makers independent of whether they are designated or voluntary liquidity 
providers.”). 
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the SEC’s leadership indicated its preference for “more flexible, 
competitive solutions that could be adopted by trading venues,” such as 
“affirmative or negative trading obligations for high-frequency trading 
firms that employ the fastest, most sophisticated trading tools [that are] 
analogous to the ones that historically applied to the proprietary traders 
with time and place advantages on manual trading floors.”217  Approaches 
chosen by other jurisdictions are also informative.  For instance, the 
European Union is on the path to impose certain trading obligations on 
“[a]n investment firm that engages in algorithmic trading to pursue a 
market making strategy . . . taking into account the liquidity, scale and 
nature of the specific market and the characteristics of the instrument 
traded.”218  This regulatory measure amounts to a constraint on 
opportunism in the course of providing liquidity, applying to 
[any] strategy [that], when dealing on own account, involves 
posting firm, simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size 
and at competitive prices relating to one or more financial 
instruments on a single trading venue or across different trading 
venues, with the result of providing liquidity on a regular and 
frequent basis to the overall market.219 
In other words, this regulatory measure would not cover all 
manifestations of HFT, and, furthermore, it is meant to be implemented 
through “a binding written agreement with the trading venue” to specify the 
applicable trading obligations.220  Overall, this approach attempts to co-opt 
certain HFTs into the DMM space through trading venues rather than 
impose a detailed set of trading obligations.221 
Another area of concern is the role of market makers during periods of 
market turbulence.  The futility of market making obligations is often 
asserted in connection with such conditions,222 although this approach 
 
217.  Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Enhancing Our Equity 
Market Structure: Remarks at Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and 
Brokerage Conference (June 5, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.U99FBGN5WEc 
[https://perma.cc/U5XS-4225]. 
218.  Directive 2014/65/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU, art. 17(3), 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 399. 
219.  Id. art. 17(4), at 399. 
220.  Id. art. 17(3)(b), at 399. 
221.  The same document specifically mandates agreements between trading venues 
and market makers providing “incentives in terms of rebates or otherwise offered by the 
regulated market to an investment firm so as to provide liquidity to the market on a regular 
and predictable basis and, where applicable, any other rights accruing to the investment firm 
as a result of participation in the scheme.”  Id. art. 48(3)(b), at 432. 
222.  See Fox et al., supra note 164, at 272–73 (“The historical evidence . . . suggests 
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needs to account for the distinction between crashes attributed to external 
events and crashes traced to or greatly magnified by market structure-
related weaknesses.223  In order to prevent and contain self-inflicted market 
turbulence, one commentator has called for a resurrection of combined 
negative and affirmative obligations without necessarily imposing them on 
everyone, pointing to the problem of the cumulative impact of inventory 
management: 
Without negative obligations, affirmative quoting obligations 
make quotes still more toxic – firms required to provide liquidity 
will trade even more aggressively to manage inventory.  Negative 
obligations will prevent scalper fratricides, and stop high 
frequency market maker firms from unloading inventory onto the 
firms behind them.  Without that kind of “hot potato” trading, the 
volume sensitive algorithm that tipped into the Flash Crash 
would not have descended into a lethal feedback loop as it traded 
against cart wheeling toxic quotes.  The simplest negative 
obligations will extend market maker inventory cycles, 
preventing these firms from flipping into a liquidity crisis, as they 
did in the Flash Crash.224 
Interestingly, even some major players in this segment of the 
securities industry are not too far behind with their recommendations.  As 
articulated by an executive of an HFT market maker, “Flash crashes, 
miniflash crashes and other market disruptions demonstrate the need for 
additional obligated liquidity in our market.”225 
 
that strong paper obligations have proved insufficient in the past to motivate market makers 
to continue supplying liquidity during periods of extreme volatility.”).  Interestingly, Virtu 
Financial was reported as having one of the most profitable days in its history during the 
turbulent day of August 24, 2015, which was strongly influenced by fears about the Chinese 
economy.  See Bradley Hope, Historic Profits for High-Frequency Trading Firm, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 24, 2015, 4:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/historic-profits-for-high-
frequency-trading-firm-today-1440446251 [https://perma.cc/F3KN-EREV] (reporting on 
Virtu Financial’s profits on that day and stating that “Virtu and other such trading firms, 
along with exchanges, emerged as early beneficiaries of the heightened volatility and 
volume”). 
223.  See also Demosthenes N. Tambakis, Endogenous Market Turbulence 15 (Ctr. for 
Fin. Analysis & Pol’y, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 27, 2006), 
http://www.cfap.jbs.cam.ac.uk/publications/downloads/wp27.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D57-
GWVH] (building a formal economic model under which “the link between feedback 
trading and asset returns can change qualitatively despite the absence of fundamentals 
driving the asset price [which] highlight[s] the critical role of market-making conditions for 
safeguarding financial stability”). 
224.  Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) to the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Comm., 
supra note 162 (emphasis added). 
225.  Senate Hearings on Computerized Trading, supra note 25, at 47 (prepared 
statement of Chris Concannon, Partner and Executive Vice President, Virtu Financial, 
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Moreover, many crash-related concerns may be resolved by other 
regulatory means,226 while market making obligations would be 
consistently needed in calmer scenarios.  Likewise, while criticizing the 
idea that “privileges will encourage liquidity provision in extraordinary 
time,” an industry insider maintained that “[m]arket maker obligations 
come with special privileges and some markets may need this to encourage 
liquidity providers in the ordinary course of business.”227  Finally, one 
novel weapon against glitches, which constitutes an alternative to a broader 
and burdensome scheme of market making obligations for all HFTs, is 
“anti-disruptive” regulation that would cover some currently legal 
practices.  More specifically, the SEC is currently considering a market-
wide approach that would be “carefully tailored to apply to active 
proprietary traders in short time periods when liquidity is most vulnerable 
and the risk of price disruption caused by aggressive short-term trading 
strategies is highest.”228 
Another key concern is presented by the space occupied by smaller-
cap/emerging companies.  A potential solution, which has some support at 
the SEC, is a mandatory concentration of the trading process for certain 
securities, such as stocks of smaller-cap/emerging companies,229 which 
 
LLC); see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING 
MONETARY POLICY CHALLENGES AND MANAGING RISKS 34 (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2015/01/pdf/text.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z29J-
LLCL] (“With lower liquidity, less market making, and more benchmarking, asset prices are 
more likely to be driven by common shocks, particularly at higher frequencies, than by their 
respective idiosyncratic fundamentals.”). 
226.  See Letter from Brian T. Durkin, Chief Operating Officer & Managing Dir., 
Products & Servs., CME Grp., to Werner Bijkerk, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns 11 (Aug. 12, 
2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf (“[E]ffectively 
calibrated market-wide circuit breakers, coupled with automated volatility mitigation and 
risk management mechanisms and certainty regarding trade cancellation policies, are 
straightforward steps that will be much more impactful than mandated affirmative quoting 
obligations in encouraging liquidity providers to remain in the market during highly volatile 
periods.”).  Such approaches are preferable to “protracted civil litigation over the duty of 
market makers to ‘catch a falling knife.’”  Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-
Frequency World, supra note 33, at 359. 
227.  Michael A. Mendelson, AQR Capital Mgmt. LLC, Statement Before the Joint 
CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues 4 (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-26/265-26-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SDG-9D4U]. 
228.  White, supra note 217. 
229.  See, e.g., Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Whatever 
Happened to Promoting Small Business Capital Formation? Remarks at the Institute for 
Economic Freedom and Opportunity, The Heritage Foundation (Sept. 17, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542976550#.VCFCoBb4XQh 
[https://perma.cc/9ERA-KS66] (“I’ve called for the creation of ‘Venture Exchanges’: 
national exchanges, with trading and listing rules tailored for smaller companies, including 
those engaging in issuances under Regulation A. . . The exchanges themselves would be 
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would amount to an additional advantage for market makers on these 
trading venues.230  While supporting such concentration on these “venture 
exchanges,” some commentators also articulated the need to suppress dark 
liquidity for the benefit of market makers: “[W]e believe it is essential that 
rules also be adopted to require lit liquidity . . . be given primacy over dark 
liquidity . . .  [Otherwise] the incentive for market makers to participate in 
venture exchanges will be lost and liquidity will remain anemic in these 
securities.”231  Other similar measures proposed for venture exchanges 
would also implicitly or explicitly benefit market makers.232  As a unilateral 
concentration-related initiative in the less liquid segment, the BATS–Direct 
Edge group of securities exchanges adopted a softer policy that these 
exchanges “may determine not to designate for trading any security 
admitted to unlisted trading privileges that does not meet certain 
consolidated average daily trading volume thresholds.”233  The articulated 
 
exempted from the Commission’s national market structure and unlisted trading privileges 
rules, so as to concentrate liquidity in these venues.”); Thomas Wittman, Executive Vice 
President, NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., Statement at the Equity Market Structure Advisory 
Committee Meeting 5 (May 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-29/26529-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2VK-EHTR] (“Affording . . . small companies the option to 
suspend unlisted trading privileges in their securities would deepen liquidity and re-ignite 
competition among orders by focusing all trading onto a single platform.  To the extent that 
this competition results in improved spreads and deeper liquidity, smaller companies 
electing this option could enjoy many benefits, including reduced capital costs.”). 
230.  See also Letter from Dr. Jörg Walter, Joint CEO, Börse Berlin AG, et al. to the 
Eur. Sec. & Mkts. Auth. 2–3 (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/12622/download?token=JkrHYv5a 
[https://perma.cc/JTN2-FCMR] 
 (“[A market making] incentive scheme for securities that do not fall into the ‘blue 
chip’ category has to provide for a degree of ‘liquidity concentration’ if it is to be attractive 
to traders and if it is to be sustainable. . .  In addition to having a potentially deleterious 
effect on the provision of liquidity, unlimited access to ‘market making schemes’ 
irrespective of whether the security in question is liquid or illiquid is also likely to have 
other unintended consequences [such as] the technological ‘arms race’ that has so far been a 
characteristic only of high frequency trading . . .”). 
231.  Venture Exchanges and Small-Cap Companies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 28 
(2015) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on Venture Exchanges and Small-Cap Companies] 
(prepared statement of Thomas W. Farley, President, NYSE Group). 
232.  See, e.g., DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, THE U.S. NEED FOR VENTURE 
EXCHANGES 17 (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/c4bcbd_a7218106b4504d98a22c04df863b969a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3CCH-H8JT]  (maintaining that venture exchanges should be exempt from 
several key regulations, such as the order handling rules and the penny-wide tick size 
requirement). 
233.  Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by BATS Exchange, Inc., BATS Y-
Exchange, Inc., EDGA Exchange, Inc., and EDGX Exchange, Inc. Relating to Liquidity 
Requirements for Securities Admitted to Unlisted Trading Privileges, Exchange Act Release 
No. 75,354, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,462, 39,462 (July 2, 2015). 
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rationales included the assertions that “liquidity providers will have an 
incentive to quote more competitively because concentrating the quoted 
liquidity on the listing exchange would: (1) reduce liquidity providers’ risk 
of adverse selection when quoting in a fragmented market [and] (2) provide 
greater certainty of execution on the one exchange at which liquidity 
providers are quoting.”234  Yet another proposal aimed at smaller-
cap/emerging companies reemphasizes the concept of issuer-to-market 
maker compensation arrangements,235 which, once again, points to the 
importance of incentives originating outside the trading process, as well as 
the existence of liquidity externalities. 
Another actively discussed proposal also deals with mandatory 
consolidation, but this approach is framed in terms of restrictions on off-
exchange trading and not necessarily confined to less liquid securities.  
This proposal illustrates the conflict between on- and off-exchange market 
makers, although some securities firms wear both hats, and the relevance of 
adverse selection in the context of “cream-skimming” of retail order 
flow.236  Moreover, options markets, which essentially prohibit off-
exchange trading in listed securities, are viewed as a desirable model: 
 
234.  Id. 
235.  See, e.g., Senate Hearing on Venture Exchanges and Small-Cap Companies, 
supra note 231, at 90 (prepared statement of Nelson Griggs, Executive Vice President, 
NASDAQ OMX Group) (“We believe that such support programs would also help growth 
companies. Market quality incentive programs of this kind have successfully enhanced 
liquidity and market quality for investors in Europe for several decades.”); Letter from Rey 
Ramsey, President & CEO, TechNet, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 1 (June 20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2012-
043/nasdaq2012043-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GQU-F9Y3] (“Looking forward, [issuer-to-
market maker compensation arrangements] could benefit promising tech companies that 
today may lack liquid, quality markets.”); Wittman, supra note 229, at 5 (“We also believe 
that issuers should have the choice to compensate market makers that support their 
securities, with the goal of better spreads for their investors and enhanced liquidity. . .  We 
believe that [such arrangements] could also be useful to smaller, less liquid companies, 
where it is currently not profitable for market making firms to provide liquidity and 
support.”). 
236.  See, e.g., Computerized Trading Venues: What Should the Rules of the Road Be?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 56 (2013) (prepared response of Joseph Mecane, Executive 
Vice President and Head of U.S. Equities, NYSE Euronext) (“Trading with retail flow is 
regarded as advantageous for two reasons — on average, the ‘informational’ content tends 
to be lower than other types of order flow encountered in the market, and secondly, retail 
flow tends to be smaller and have less liquidity impact in a given stock.”); id. at 75 
(prepared response of  Robert C. Gasser, Chief Executive Officer and President, ITG) 
(“[R]etail order flow carries little risk of adverse selection; specifically, interaction with 
retail order flow does not involve many of the concerns that arise when interacting with 
orders from certain high frequency trading strategies, such as information leakage and price 
deterioration.”). 
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[Options market makers] are motivated to provide liquidity 
because they get to interact with all of the flow.  Some flow has 
less knowledge in it, so our liquidity providers are able to make 
markets for that flow.  And mixing information-based flow 
together with the more ‘informationless’ flow will support a more 
profitable business.237 
Conversely, “the good flow has been removed” from equities 
exchanges, making this environment more problematic for many liquidity 
providers.238  Accordingly, measures to restrict off-exchange trading in the 
equities space and thus make lit markets less toxic overall are seen as 
beneficial.239  The counterargument from the perspective of off-exchange 
market makers is as follows: 
[A]s a market maker if I am making prices – if it’s a retail 
investor that flow is relatively uninformed and so I can give it a 
better price than an institutional investor who will likely have a 
much bigger order behind it. So by allowing this practice you’re 
allowing retail investors to get better prices than they otherwise 
would. If you forced everything on a lit venue where everyone 
would get the same price you would have a huge transfer of 
wealth from retail investors to institutional investors because 
[your] average spread would be the weighted average of both the 
retail and institutional which would mean institutional clients 
would get slightly better prices and retail clients would get worse 
prices.240 
 
237.  May 6: Lessons Learned and Questions Raised, in THE QUALITY OF OUR 
FINANCIAL MARKETS: TAKING STOCK OF WHERE WE STAND 29, 39 (Robert A. Schwartz et 
al. eds., 2013) (remarks of Gary Katz, President and Chief Executive Officer, International 
Stock Exchange). 
238.  Id. 
239.  See repscottgartett [U.S. Rep. Scott Garrett], Rep. Garrett Equity Market 
Structure Roundtable – Panel 2 (5/13/13) at 34:33–35:09, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBm7YZ73lqk [https://perma.cc/754E-QKQ7]  
[hereinafter EMS Roundtable: Creating a Level Playing Field for Equity Market 
Participants] (remarks of Gary Katz, President and Chief Executive Officer of International 
Securities Exchange, LLC) (arguing that the consolidation of order flow on lit exchanges 
would benefit liquidity providers by diluting “exhaust” order flow and “take us further away 
from a fragile lit market to a more robust market.”); Letter from Christopher Nagy & Dave 
Lauer, KOR Grp. LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Dec. 
22, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-657/4657-87.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZLM-
JE4K] (arguing that “the decrease in off-exchange trading [would] reduce adverse selection 
on lit markets” and treating this approach as one of the steps to “a virtuous cycle that will 
enhance market quality overall, and most importantly will reduce market and order book 
fragility”). 
240.  BROOKINGS INST., TRADING STOCKS IN AMERICA: KEY POLICY ISSUES 65 (Jan. 30, 
2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/1/30%20trading%20stocks/20140130_tradi
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In other words, this regulatory measure would reverse the process of 
segmentation, while benefitting market makers on trading venues at the 
expense of their off-exchange counterparts, but a market-wide beneficial 
impact is not an implausible scenario.  Its twin proposal is the so-called 
trade-at rule, which would effectively ban the practice of de minimis price 
improvement that effectively sidesteps the tick size regime.  While 
expressing its strong support for “a meaningful trade-at provision, as a 
critical means to protect displayed liquidity and limit off-exchange passive 
price matching,” one leading market maker articulated the following 
position: 
With the rise of off-exchange trading . . . the publicly displayed 
quotes that we and other market makers generate are too often 
used by internalizers and alternative trading systems . . . to price 
and facilitate off-exchange business. Rather than facilitating 
interaction amongst all market participants, off-exchange trading 
limits such opportunities to a select and privileged group.241 
Once again, the trade-at rule is likely to strike at the heart of off-
exchange market makers while benefitting their counterparts operating on 
trading venues, and quite a bit of criticism of this measure, often citing 
potential wealth transfers, decreased competition, and diminished liquidity, 
has come from that camp.242 Additionally, there are concerns articulated by 
 
ng_stocks_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCT9-WXE5] (remarks of Jamil Nazarali, Head 
of Citadel Execution Services, Citadel Securities); see also Letter from David Panko, to 
Mkt. Regulation Branch, Ont. Sec. Comm’n, supra note 74, at 4 (raising the issue of 
“whether it is fair for natural retail and institutional clients to pay wider spreads than 
necessary as a result of their orders being co-mingled with more toxic active orders”). 
241.  Letter from Andrew Stevens, Gen. Counsel, IMC Chi. LLC, to Brent Fields, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2–3 (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
657/4657-89.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BKD-KAHK]. 
242.  See, e.g., EMS Roundtable: Creating a Level Playing Field for Equity Market 
Participants, supra note 239, at 44:16-:26 (remarks of Thomas Matchett, Managing 
Director, Retail Market Making, UBS Americas, Inc.) (arguing that the trade-at rule would 
result in “a systematic transfer of very large numbers from retail investors and long-term 
investors to professionals and market makers [on lit markets]”); Letter from Leonard J. 
Amoruso, Gen. Counsel, Knight Capital Grp., Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-
156.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK2Z-FP2E] (arguing that the trade-at rule “would minimize the 
opportunities for price improvement (and eliminate sub-penny price improvement) to retail 
orders [and] would reduce liquidity provided by market makers as increased costs would 
outweigh their liquidity provision ability in most cases”); Letter from Daniel Keegan, 
Managing Dir., Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 5 (May 5, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-174.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J7SL-X9X8] (arguing that “the [trade-at] rule will reduce the amount of 
liquidity readily available to the market, and could correspondingly increase volatility”); 
Letter from John A. McCarthy, Gen. Counsel, KCG Holdings, Inc., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3, 12 (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
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other commentators that the trade-at rule may be detrimental to the 
integrated model of market making,243 although many off-exchange market 
makers do not use this model. 
One broad category of incentives relevant for the ongoing process of 
regulatory reform concerns traditional — but now diminished — time, 
place, and information-based advantages of market makers.  Several policy 
recommendations aim at smaller-cap/emerging companies. For instance, 
one commentator suggested the following comprehensive set of trading 
privileges for a hypothetical trading platform in that space: “[M]arket 
makers would have very specific advantages to ensure that they had greater 
flexibility in managing quotes and sitting on the best bid/offer [such as] co-
location, minimum time in force for non-market makers, or even quote 
precedence over non-market makers.”244  The countervailing factor is that 
time, place, and information-based advantages may be not as valuable in 
illiquid securities,245 which highlights the relative advantages of issuer-to-
market maker arrangements that originate outside the trading process or the 
traditional model of cross-subsidization based on mixing liquid and illiquid 
securities. 
Another relevant approach to time, place, and information-based 
advantages relates to more liquid securities and stresses the importance of 
such advantages as a regulatory tool for protecting market makers from 
HFTs’ predatory strategies.  For instance, as proposed by a leading industry 
 
657/4657-62.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL9L-A83D] (arguing that “the trade-at rule is anti-
competitive” and that “[w]holesale market makers . . . provide a valuable service to retail 
broker-dealers and institutions by handling complex order types . . . that directly compete 
with exchange offerings”); Letter from John C. Nagel, Managing Dir. & Sr. Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, Citadel LLC, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-657/4657-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z92P-R6ZB] 
(criticizing a feature of the proposed tick size pilot, stating that “the trade-at rule should 
allow a market maker quoting on an exchange to trade-at that price internally,” and asserting 
that the SEC “should not force market makers to route all of their orders to the exchanges 
who would then reap the full benefit of their unnecessarily high, but permitted, ‘taker’ 
fees”). 
243.  See Letter from Eric Hess, Gen. Counsel, Direct Edge Holdings, LLC, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 17 (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-159.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUW6-SHNM] 
(“Dealers who have traditionally provided liquidity coupled with value-added services, such 
as the creation, compilation and dissemination of valuable company and related securities 
information to the marketplace, would be further marginalized under such a market structure 
regime.”). 
244.  Larry Tabb, A New Structure for Smaller Cap Stocks?, TABB FORUM (Feb. 15, 
2012), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/a-new-structure-for-smaller-cap-stocks 
[https://perma.cc/HCH9-4Y8V]. 
245.  For a discussion of this factor, see Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market 
Structure and Capital Formation, supra note 15, at 34–35. 
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figure, “Hold every order for a tenth of a second with the exception of 
market maker quote updates for products in which the market maker is 
registered and has affirmative obligations.  There is simply no other 
measure that can protect market makers against being picked off.”246  Even 
a blue ribbon panel suggested that trading privileges of market makers 
“might include preferential co-location provisions,”247 and this statement 
could be interpreted in terms of tiers of informational advantages.  Yet, 
despite numerous suggestions about granting time, place, and information-
based advantages to market makers, the SEC still appears to have 
reservations about this course of action, which is illustrated by its recent 
disapproval of directed orders on NASDAQ OMX BX that would have 
granted a special priority to such market participants.248 
A close — but more egalitarian — substitute for time, place, and 
information-based advantages of market makers is represented by the 
proposal to address the problem of adverse selection caused by certain 
forms of HFT through frequent batch auctions.  As described by some of its 
proponents, this approach would “eliminate the cost of liquidity provision 
in continuous limit order book markets associated with stale quotes getting 
sniped.”249  On the other hand, the frequent batch auction mechanism was 
criticized as self-defeating with the argument that “liquidity providers’ total 
revenue would decrease because some investors’ orders offset each other in 
each auction [while] the cost associated with adverse selection stays the 
same because liquidity providers would still absorb the same imbalance of 
supply and demand.”250  In any instance, the concept of frequent batch 
auctions, as well as their possible randomization, may be a useful tool for 
experimentation by individual trading venues.251 
 
246.  Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & CEO, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments Before 
the 2010 General Assembly of the World Federation of Exchanges 6 (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://investors.interactivebrokers.com/download/worldFederationOfExchanges.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9T6R-SQR7]. 
247.  CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM., REGULATORY RESPONSES REPORT, supra note 13, 
at 10. 
248.  Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ OMX BX Inc. To 
Adopt a Directed Order Process, Exchange Act Release No. 70,756, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,396 
(Oct. 25, 2013). 
249.  Budish et al., supra note 97, at 1556. 
250.  FIA PRINCIPAL TRADERS GRP., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FREQUENT BATCH 
AUCTIONS AS A MARKET DESIGN 3 (2014), 
http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/WHITEBOARD%20Frequent%20Batch%20
Auctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/B87S-MSV9]. 
251.  One recent illustration is the approval of such a device proposed by the Chicago 
Stock Exchange. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by Chicago Stock Exchange, 
Inc. To Adopt and Implement CHX SNAP℠, an Intra-Day and On-Demand Auction 
Service, Exchange Act Release No. 76,087, 80 Fed. Reg. 61,540 (Oct. 6, 2015). 
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Another key regulatory issue that has relevance for market makers 
relates to the tick size regime.  One common argument is that the process of 
decimalization has greatly contributed to the current market making crisis 
and led to additional liquidity-related problems for smaller-cap 
companies.252  In other words, while the tick size regime is not directly 
aimed at DMMs, it has a powerful impact on market making strategies.  
Indeed, in some instances, adopting a coarser price grid has been a 
conscious policy decision to attract liquidity providers.253  Some market 
makers have declined to endorse this measure as a must-have for securities 
markets,254 although this situation might be explained by these firms’ focus 
on very liquid securities.  Moreover, there is some skepticism that an 
increased tick size would encourage market making firms to provide 
ancillary services or enhance such offerings.255 
Despite the much-criticized recommendation of the SEC’s own 
Investor Advisory Committee,256 the leadership of this regulatory agency 
still decided to proceed with a tick size pilot, ordering the securities 
industry to submit such a plan.257  Moreover, the SEC specifically 
articulated its goal of evaluating the impact of the tick size pilot on market 
makers,258 but, on the other hand, they would not be granted special 
 
252.  For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities 
Market Structure and Capital Formation, supra note 15, at 11–21. 
253.  See, e.g., RICHARD L. SANDOR, GOOD DERIVATIVES: A STORY OF FINANCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION 94 (2012) (“The tick size of the GNMA contract was 
designed to be larger than that of the grain contract so as to attract market makers — if 
market makers could buy at the bid price and sell at the offer price, they would make $25.00 
per contract.”). 
254.  See, e.g., Letter from John C. Nagel to Brent J. Fields, supra note 242, at 3 (“It is 
telling that market makers with significant market share are not pushing for wider tick 
sizes.”). 
255.  See TABB, supra note 129, at 2 (“This might be easier if smaller investment banks 
earned market-making spreads, but the current crop of high-speed market makers are not the 
integrated merchant and investment banks of the past. Currently, most market-making 
activity is conducted by small, independent market-making firms that have no research 
capabilities or banking prowess.”); Letter from John C. Nagel to Brent J. Fields, supra note 
242, at 3 (“[M]any of the most active and competitive market makers . . . do not even 
provide research or investment banking services.”). 
256.  Investor Advisory Comm., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Minutes of January 31, 
2014 Meeting, www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac013114-
minutes.htm [https://perma.cc/R57Y-N5HK] (last modified Apr. 14, 2014). 
257.  Order Directing the Securities Exchanges and FINRA To Submit a Tick Size 
Pilot Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 72,460, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,840 (June 24, 2014); see also 
Notice of Filing of a Proposed National Market System Plan by the Securities Exchanges 
and FINRA To Implement a Tick Size Pilot Program on a One-Year Pilot Basis, Exchange 
Act Release No. 73,511, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,423 (Nov. 3, 2014) (describing the proposed tick 
size pilot and soliciting public comments). 
258.  Order Directing the Securities Exchanges and FINRA To Submit a Tick Size 
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privileges vis-a-vis other market participants.  As expected, this pilot, with 
the applicable price increment set at five cents, will be focused on smaller-
cap/less liquid stocks rather than top tier/more liquid stocks, where HFTs 
play a big role.  The criteria for participating stocks notably include the 
market capitalization of $3 billion or less and the average daily trading 
volume of a million shares or less.259  In its approval order, the SEC recited 
the argument on the link between tick sizes and the attractiveness of market 
making, thus recognizing the necessity of testing this theory: “The wider 
tick size may incentivize market makers to increase their market making 
activities in these stocks.  This, in turn, may attract more investors and with 
increased interest in those stocks, trading activity may increase, which may 
also improve liquidity and market quality.”260  Moreover, the participants in 
the pilot study would be responsible for collecting data on market makers 
and their profitability.261 
While the tick size pilot focuses on the smaller-cap space, another 
important perspective is that the existing penny-wide tick size may be too 
large for high-volume stocks.262  Interestingly, the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
recently slashed its price grid for stocks in the TOPIX 100 Index, which 
represents the most actively traded securities.263  The new share price-based 
 
Pilot Plan, 79 Fed. Reg. at 36,841–43, 36,846–48. 
259.  For the final criteria, as modified by the SEC, see Order Approving the National 
Market System Plan To Implement a Tick Size Pilot Program by Securities Exchanges and 
FINRA, as Modified by the SEC, for a Two-Year Period, Exchange Act Release No. 
74,892, 80 Fed. Reg. 27,514 Exh. A, at 27,548–49 (May 6, 2015). 
260.  Id. at 27,516. 
261.  Id. at 27,518–19. 
262.  See, e.g., Letter from Chris Isaacson, Chief Operating Officer, BATS Exch., Inc., 
Eric Noll, Exec. Vice President, NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. & Larry Leibowitz, Chief 
Operating Officer, NYSE Euronext, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec & Exch. 
Comm’n 1 (Apr. 30, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regnms/jointnmsexemptionrequest043010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/83HD-6ERC] (arguing that “the imposition of [a minimum price variation] 
of $0.01 has resulted in a publicly displayed quote that is artificially wide for certain lower 
priced, liquid securities, and has caused a detrimental impact to the public price discovery 
process, resulting in worse execution prices for investors” and petitioning the SEC to adopt 
a half-penny tick increment for such securities); Letter from John C. Nagel, Managing Dir. 
& Sr. Deputy Gen. Counsel, Citadel LLC, to Kevin M. O’Neill, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 4 (July 21, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/equity-market-structure-
2013/equitymarketstructure2013-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5AR-SKFQ] (recommending to 
the SEC to “establish a half-penny tick increment for the highest trading volume stocks 
trading under a specified dollar value”). 
263.  See Anna Kitanaka & Yuko Takeo, Tokyo Bourse Cuts Tick Sizes for Some of 
Biggest Stocks, BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2014, 3:45 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-21/tokyo-bourse-cuts-tick-sizes-for-some-of-
biggest-stocks.html [https://perma.cc/4TX6-L3R7] (describing this introduction of smaller 
tick sizes and motivations behind this measure). 
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tick sizes can go as low as 0.5 or 0.1 yen, which is a radical departure from 
the prior tick sizes not exceeding the one yen mark,264 and the contrast to 
the penny-wide tick size in U.S. securities markets is quite significant.  
Furthermore, preliminary results of this measure indicate that “trading-
related costs under the [implementation shortfall] method fell, following 
the change in tick size.”265 
Another contested topic in regulatory debates addresses the maker-
taker pricing model, which differentiates between “makers” and “takers” of 
liquidity by charging access fees and paying out liquidity rebates.266  While 
this pricing model may be crafted to provide special incentives for DMMs, 
such as larger liquidity rebates for these market participants, a more salient 
debate is about its utility as a universal “democratic” tool to encourage 
market making trading strategies and compensate for the cost of adverse 
selection, thus enhancing liquidity.267  For example, institutional investors, 
a group that tends to take liquidity, seem to remain uneasy about the extent 
and cost of liquidity provided by the maker-taker pricing model, as 
evidenced by a recent comment letter by a coalition of these market 
participants.268 Furthermore, there are reasons to be cautious about a 
consistent enhancement of liquidity offered by the current implementation 
 
264.  See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., TICK SIZES FOR TOPIX100 CONSTITUENT STOCKS 
WILL BE CHANGED 2 (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/files/tse/news/20/b7gje6000004313n-att/leaflet_english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SVE7-QZRF] (listing revised share price-based tiers of tick sizes for the 
TOPIX 100 constituent stocks and comparing them to other stocks).  The chief reason 
behind this measure was described as “bring[ing] investors the benefits of price 
improvements due to lower spread costs, which would likely be seen mainly for issues of 
high liquidity.” TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., OPTIMIZATION OF INCREMENTS OF BIDS AND 
OFFERS IN STAGES 1 (May 14, 2013), http://www.jpx.co.jp/files/tse/rules-participants/public-
comment/data/b7gje60000048plb-att/130514_kabu-_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH5J-Z2EH].  
However, another important rationale appears to be the goal of “win[ing] back business 
from private trading venues [with sub-yen tick sizes].” Kitanaka & Takeo, supra note 263. 
265.  Masafumi Kondo, Impact of Tick Size Pilot Program on Trading Costs at Tokyo 
Stock Exchange 1 (Japan Exch. Grp., Working Paper No. 7, 2015), 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/research-study/working-paper/b5b4pj000000i468-
att/JPX_working_paper_No7.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM8L-2BNM]. 
266.  For a detailed discussion of this pricing model and its implications, such as the 
usage in the context of nontransparent trading advantages, the overall contribution to 
liquidity, and the emergence of perverse incentives, see Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker 
Pricing Model and Its Impact, supra note 93, passim. 
267.  For a discussion of the relevant issues and debates, see id. at 233, 235–38, 261. 
268.  See Letter from Ari Burstein, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Brent Fields, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (May 11, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-
29/26529-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7KP-5E73] (“If the current incentives for making 
routing decisions based on the availability and amount of liquidity rebates offered, and 
access fees charged, by trading venues are reduced or eliminated, we believe a number of 
benefits to the markets would be brought to bear.”). 
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of this pricing model, as it depends on a specific mixture of liquidity-
making and liquidity-taking activity.269  An even more troubling 
development is that certain “order matching engine practices that served to 
preference HFTs over the public investor” effectively amounted to 
penalizing other market participants’ exposure of liquidity via “unfair 
conversion of investor orders eligible for maker rebates into unfavorable 
executions incurring taker fees.”270 
Overall, the abolition of the maker-taker pricing model or a significant 
restriction on its magnitude, potentially through a lower cap on access fees, 
may be a welcome step to a simplification of the current market structure 
and a removal of certain undesirable incentives.271  Still, this regulatory step 
needs to be evaluated from the standpoint of the attractiveness of providing 
liquidity, and other dimensions, such as a contained enhancement and even 
further concentration of liquidity in the most liquid segment, need to be 
considered as well.272  A typical claim against the abolition of liquidity 
rebates is as follows: “[R]ebates lead to tighter quoted bid-ask spreads and 
eliminating liquidity rebates would widen quoted bid-ask spreads.  This 
would benefit internalizers and dark pool operators, but would increase 
transaction costs for investors without contributing to price discovery in the 
public markets.”273  Another claim is that a lower cap on access fees would 
also imply lower liquidity rebates, which are largely funded by such fees, 
and hence a diminished incentive to provide liquidity, leading to wider bid-
ask spreads.274 
While the existence of liquidity rebates does provide an additional 
 
269.  See, e.g., LALLEMAND, supra note 171, at 31 (“The net effect of the liquidity 
maker/taker fee model is simple to understand: the liquidity making activity, despite the fact 
that it does not provide true liquidity, subsidises the liquidity taking activity.”). 
270.  BODEK, supra note 110, at 11–12. 
271.  See Dolgopolov, The Maker-Take Pricing Model and Its Impact, supra note 93, 
passim (describing the connection between the maker-taker pricing model and complexity 
and assessing the likely impact of potential regulatory restraints on this model); see also 
Letter from Douglas A. Cifu, Chief Exec. Officer, Virtu Fin., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
657/4657-63.pdf [https://perma.cc/286L-TDYN] (“[A] reduction in the market access fee 
cap to a level that is reflective of current market dynamics will ultimately reduce the 
distortive effect of the maker-taker pricing and simplify our overall fragmented market 
structure.”). 
272.  See Dolgopolov, The Maker-Take Pricing Model and Its Impact, supra note 93, at 
262 & nn.116–17 (describing these factors in the context of a potentially non-uniform 
impact of incentives provided the maker-taker pricing model on liquidity). 
273.  Letter from Liam Connell, Chief Exec. Officer, Allston Trading, LLC, et al. to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 12 (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-155.pdf [https://perma.cc/47UB-P7Q4]. 
274.  EMS Roundtable: Market Making and Trading in the 21st Century, supra note 
22, at 35:14-:40 (remarks of Patrick Hickey, Head of Market Structure, Optiver). 
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incentive to expose an order at a given price, another question is whether 
this mechanism encourages price improvement and thus narrower bid-ask 
spreads, as it is often asserted,275 given that a typical liquidity rebate is less 
than a typical tick size.276  Furthermore, a double rebate, assuming a two-
sided quote, would still be less than one tick for most securities.  From this 
perspective, there is a substantial wedge between a marginal benefit and a 
marginal cost, which may imply that price improvement is not necessarily 
an unambiguous outcome, although some incentive is possible in the 
context of a binding price grid and an aggregate — rather than transaction-
by-transaction — perspective.  In any instance, the flip side of the coin that 
the very incentive for liquidity providers to offer price improvement is 
essentially financed by access fees passed onto/ultimately borne by end 
consumers of liquidity, and any true liquidity improvement must be traced 
to some fixed imperfection in the market for liquidity rather than a 
mechanic economic reallocation between makers and takers through access 
fees and liquidity rebates.277  Another important perspective is whether a 
 
275.  See, e.g., Letter from IMC Fin. Mkts. to the Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators 8 
(Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/IMC_CESR_responsex.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7LPF-RU8Z] (“The maker/taker fee structure provides the benefit of 
incentivizing liquidity providers, resulting in more liquidity at narrower spreads than 
otherwise would be available.”).  A recent memorandum by the SEC’s key unit has given 
this argument quite a bit of weight, while realizing some of its limitations.  For this analysis, 
see Memorandum from the SEC Div. of Trading & Mkts. to the SEC Mkt. Structure 
Advisory Comm. 14–16 (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-
maker-taker-fees-on-equities-exchanges.pdf [https://perma.cc/97YM-4DFH].  More 
specifically, this memorandum posed the following scenario: “[I]f the maker-taker model 
was eliminated or substantially impaired, retail execution quality could suffer in stocks 
where maker-taker fees narrow the displayed quote, resulting in less money in the pockets 
of retail investors.” Id. at 16. 
276.  This relationship largely follows from Regulation NMS, as this regulatory 
measure caps access fees, which serve as a funding base for liquidity rebates, at $0.003 per 
share and restricts subpenny pricing, with some exceptions for low-priced stocks applying to 
both of these provisions.  Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 
37,496, 37,631–32 (June 9, 2005) (to be codified at Access to Quotations, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.610(c) & Minimum Pricing Increment, 17 C.F.R. § 240.612). 
277.  There are several empirical studies on the connection between the maker-taker 
pricing model and bid-ask spreads, with some of them specifically accounting for access 
fees.  Compare Katya Malinova & Andreas Park, Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of 
Make/Take Fees on Market Quality, 70 J. FIN. 509, 511 (2015) (analyzing transactions in 
stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange in connection with the introduction of liquidity 
rebates and concluding that “the ‘cum fee’ trading costs, measured by the effective bid-ask 
spread plus (twice) the taker fee, did not change, despite the decline in the ‘raw’ bid-ask 
spread, which does not include the taker fee”), with Marco Lutat, The Effect of Maker-Taker 
Pricing on Market Liquidity in Electronic Trading Systems – Empirical Evidence from 
European Equity Trading 1 (E-Fin. Lab, Paper No. 2010-2, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752843 [https://perma.cc/A5LW-QY7G] (analyzing transactions 
in stocks on the SWX Europe Exchange in connection with the introduction of the maker-
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broad category of maker-taker-based trading strategies even aims to 
provide more aggressive prices: 
[T]he HFT scalping [entails] profitable rebate capture when 
making a “zero width” market by buying and selling at same 
price is possible.  Its core intent is, on every round trip trade, to 
step ahead of supply-and-demand imbalances evident in market 
depth, and to capture a micro-spread by closing on the other side 
for a tick or to scratch out by closing on the same side, both of 
which are favorably subsidized by rebate in the maker-taker 
market model that is currently prevalent in US equities.278 
Moreover, while some commentators have expressed the view that the 
maker-taker pricing model offers a valuable incentive for liquidity 
providers in less liquid securities,279 others point to its insufficiency.280  
 
taker pricing model and concluding that “maker-taker pricing does not affect [relative 
quoted] spreads”), with Laura Cardella et al., Make and Take Fees in the U.S. Equity Market 
36–37 (Apr. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2149302 [https://perma.cc/ST53-4V3K] (analyzing transactions in 
stocks on U.S. securities exchanges and concluding that “a change in the total fee [i.e., the 
fee retained by the securities exchange in question after accounting for liquidity rebates and 
access fees] has no effect on both the quoted spread as well as the net-of-fees spread [while] 
the allocation of the total fee across the make and take sides has a significant effect on the 
quoted spread and the net-of-fees spread”), and with Shawn M. O’Donoghue, The Effect of 
Maker-Taker Fees on Investor Order Choice and Execution Quality in U.S. Stock Markets 
4, 35 (Jan. 23, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607302 [https://perma.cc/4N42-LJ5U] (analyzing transactions in 
stocks on U.S. trading venues and finding evidence that “suggests that the fall in effective 
spread more than compensates for the increase in the taker fee”). 
278.  Haim Bodek & Mark Shaw, Introduction to HFT Scalping Strategies, in BODEK, 
supra note 110, at 18, 19–20. 
279.  See Letter from Daniel Keegan, Managing Dir. & Head of Equities for the Ams., 
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-416.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FS42-8B47] (“[I]t is unlikely that the amount of trading in high-volume 
securities is driven by access fees and rebates.  Conversely, certain lower-volume securities 
benefit from this incentive for market participants to provide liquidity.”); see also David 
Weisberger, Grand Bargain?, REGONE SOLUTIONS (Feb. 5, 2015), 
http://www.regonesolutions.com/regone/web/me.get?WEB.websections.show&SITE_924 
[https://perma.cc/F4YK-3MYR] (“[M]arket making in less liquid stocks will get more 
difficult when there is a lower rebate paid for liquidity provision.  The predictable result of 
lower rebates will be wider and more volatile bid offer spreads in these stocks on 
exchanges.”); Open Letter from Joe Ratterman, Chief Exec. Officer & Chris Concannon, 
President, BATS Global Mkts., Inc., to U.S. Sec. Indus. Participants 4 (Jan 6, 2015), 
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/newsletters/OpenLetter010615.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D89N-7Y5B] (“BATS believes that a more tiered and dynamic approach 
to access fees would preserve the benefits the current market structure has delivered, while 
offering enhanced opportunities to improve the trading experience for illiquid securities.”). 
280.  See How Roadblocks in Public Markets Prevent Job Creation on Main Street, 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs 
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Since less liquid securities are typically traded in an environment with wide 
spreads, the incentive provided by liquidity rebates is not as significant 
compared to an environment for more liquid securities with much lower or 
even one-tick spreads and a potentially greater number of competing 
trading venues.  More generally, on the more liquid part of the securities 
spectrum, maker-taker arrangements essentially serve as a key driver of 
order flow across different trading venues and a competitive tool in the 
shadow of the constraints imposed by the tick size regime and its uneven 
application to such players.281 
Experimentation by individual trading venues with lower access fee 
caps and hence lower liquidity rebates is subject to the collective action 
problem.282  As an illustration, NASDAQ’s recent step in that direction 
with lower fees and rebates resulted, as indicated by an in-house study, in a 
smaller “equally-weighted market share in the experiment stocks” and a 
smaller “time at the [National Best Bid and Offer] in the experiment 
stocks” vis-à-vis the control sample.283  The same study also documented a 
sharp decline in the participation rate by dominant liquidity providers under 
the old regime, suggesting that they are “rebate sensitive traders.”284  
 
of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 34–35 (2012) (remarks of 
Joseph Mecane, Executive Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer, U.S. Markets, 
NYSE Euronext) (discussing “various market maker programs on our exchange where we 
incentivize those liquidity providers to meet certain liquidity and quoting obligations,” 
stating that, “in some of these [smaller-cap] names . . . we’re paying out all the revenue that 
we generate and it’s not necessarily enough to help get the liquidity to where we would like 
it to be,” and expressing support for issuer-to-market maker compensation arrangements). 
281.  For instance, a recent memorandum originating within the SEC has focused on 
maker-taker arrangements as a competitive tool in the context of the co-existence of 
different types of trading venues and alternative allocation mechanisms such as payment for 
order flow.  Memorandum from the SEC Div. of Trading & Mkts. to the SEC Mkt. Structure 
Advisory Comm., supra note 275, at 14–16.  One key argument was that “[t]he payment of 
transaction-based rebates is a primary tool that exchanges use to compete with off-exchange 
venues.”  Id. at 13.  Furthermore, the memorandum considered a possible competitive 
disadvantage from restraints on the maker-taker pricing model, as well as the trade-at rule as 
a potential fix.  Id. at 13–14.  However, these two allocation mechanisms do not always 
compete for same types of orders via monetary inducements: a securities exchange with 
typical maker-taker arrangements would charge market orders access fees, while an off-
exchange market maker would pay for those orders.  
282.  See Gary Stone, The Maker-Taker Model and Access Fees: It’s Time for the SEC 
To Correct the Prisoner’s Dilemma, BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/blog/maker-taker-access-fees/ 
[https://perma.cc/GG3H-87FM] (providing the collective action approach to this issue and 
stating that “exchanges are reticent to lower their take rates independently”). 
283.  FRANK HATHEWAY, NASDAQ OMX GRP., INC., NASDAQ ACCESS FEE 
EXPERIMENT 1–2 (Mar. 2015), http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/97/97754_nasdaq-
access-fee-experiment—-first-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNC5-4XTX]. 
284.  Id. at 3–4.  Such “rebate sensitive traders” are most likely to be HFTs.  See PHILIP 
PEARSON, INV. TECH. GRP., INC., NASDAQ PILOT PROGRAM: A RACE TO ZERO (MARKET 
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Another important result provided by a different study is that “[t]he average 
spread before and after the change is virtually identical for both the NYSE 
and NASDAQ-listed names.”285  Interestingly, a NASDAQ executive 
provided the following evaluation of the link between the maker-taker 
pricing model and liquidity, while discussing other relevant concerns: 
Complex order types exist, in large part, to capture liquidity 
rebates and avoid paying access fees.  I see this both in equities 
and options trading. . . .  I believe our fee experiment shows that 
access fees and rebates in the most active stocks serve solely as 
one means for exchanges and dealer systems to compete with 
each other [for order flow].  These charges are largely 
unnecessary as incentives to provide liquidity in these stocks.286 
In any instance, given the limitations of unilateral experimentation, 
maker-taker-related issues “could be resolved through appropriate 
regulatory action,”287 including a possible pilot program on several trading 
venues and across a range of securities.288 
To summarize, regulation of market makers is a bubbling field, and 
the impact on these market participants is a factor for even much broader 
regulatory measures.  One likely scenario captures a (modest) revival of 
market making in certain segments as a result of regulatory stimulation, 
such as the permitted use of issuer-to-market maker compensation 
arrangements, changes in the tick size regime, the trade-at rule and the 
concomitant order flow diversion to lit exchanges, and consolidation-
related measures for certain securities.  A comprehensive set of market 
making obligations for HFTs in general and off-exchange market makers is 
 
SHARE) 3 (Mar. 3, 2015), 
http://www.itg.com/marketing/ITG_Report_Pearson_20150309.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6YNE-SWWR] (“NASDAQ will have to market these changes to 
institutional brokers for it to pay off, as the HFT community seems to disfavor lower rebates 
in all but the deepest-queued names.”). 
285.  Pearson, supra note 284, at 2. 
286.  Wittman, supra note 229, at 5 (emphasis added).  Other industry heavyweights 
had spoken in favor of abolishing the maker-taker pricing model as such.  See, e.g., The 
Role of Regulation in Shaping Equity Market Structure and Electronic Trading: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 42 (2015)  (prepared 
statement of Jeffrey Sprecher, Chairman and CEO of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.) (“We 
should eliminate and ban maker-taker pricing schemes at trading venues. Rebates that were 
used to encourage participants to quote on regulated, transparent markets add to complexity 
and the appearance of conflicts of interest.”). 
287.  Aguilar, supra note 27. 
288.  For a discussion of the push for a maker-taker pilot, including a legislative 
proposal, see Rick Baert, Managers Push SEC for Limits on Brokers’ Maker-Taker Rebates, 
PENSIONS & INVS. (July 13, 2015),  
http://www.pionline.com/article/20150713/PRINT/307139986/managers-push-sec-for-
limits-on-brokers-maker-taker-rebates [https://perma.cc/7B7U-82AS]. 
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not a likely policy option, but additional HFTs might be drawn into the 
DMM space.  At the same time, the balance of trading obligations and 
privileges for DMMs is bound to shift, while informal liquidity providers 
might feel additional pressure — for instance through changes in the 
implementation of the maker-taker pricing model. 
CONCLUSION 
Regulation of market makers, which is to a large degree driven by the 
dynamics of liquidity externalities, vulnerability, and opportunism, stands 
firm as a permanent fixture of securities markets.  A range of liquidity 
commitment devices is needed in order to fix various imperfections in the 
market for liquidity and essentially spread liquidity around for a broader 
economic effect rather than for its own sake, and, without such devices, a 
further redistribution of liquidity from less liquid securities to more liquid 
ones is an expected outcome.289  Technological developments do not make 
 
289.  In fact, this phenomenon of the continuing concentration of liquidity in some 
markets, notably, the equities space, is of some worry to some commentators.  For instance, 
this concentration was characterized as “another challenge [for] our current equity market 
structure,” while pointing out the market structure evolution went from “decent liquidity for 
a fairly large number of stocks” to “liquidity [being] jammed up into [the] top hundred 
names.”  Eric Noll & Nicolas Colas, U.S. Equity Market Structure “Flashback” Webinar at 
6:27-7:08, CONVERGEX (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.convergex.com/the-share/market-
structure-survey-results-webinar-replay [https://perma.cc/DKY3-DTF9].  Furthermore, in 
connection with options markets, another commentator observed that “[l]iquidity has 
become concentrated in the top 100 names,” while noting that “[s]preads continue to 
increase as shifts in market structure diminish incentives for market makers to quote.”  
Andy Nybo, Head of Derivatives Research, Tabb Grp., US Options Trading 2014/2015: The 
Buy-Side’s Insatiable Thirst for Liquidity 4–5 (Mar. 4, 2015) (unpublished presentation) (on 
file with author), http://www.cboe.com/rmc/2015/Day-1-Session-3-Andy-Nybo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RA4L-Y7AZ].  Indeed, the concentration of liquidity in options markets is 
a longer-term trend.  See Andy Nybo, Head of Derivatives Research, Tabb Grp., US Listed 
Options Trading: State of the Industry 2014, at 5 (Oct. 2, 2014) (unpublished presentation) 
(on file with author), http://www.securitytraders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TABB-
STA-10-2-14-FINAL-c.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD76-GGF9] (showing the increased 
concentration of liquidity for the top 10, 50, 100, and 500 names from 2007 to 2014).  
Interestingly, an earlier comment letter to the SEC analyzed market-structure related 
changes in the options industry and the diminishing role of market makers trading 
obligations and painted the scenario of “ultimately leading to liquidity limited to certain 
active option series during periods of low volatility.”  Letter from Anthony J. Saliba, Chief 
Exec. Officer, LiquidPoint, LLC to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 
(July 9, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-10/s70910-32.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5W67-6WDM].  Yet another illustration is offered by fixed income 
markets, in which this concentrations appears to be caused by a reassessment of business 
models by market makers and new regulations in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2008–09: “Changes in market-makers’ behaviour have had varying effects on the liquidity 
of different bond market segments.  Market-making has concentrated in the most liquid 
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obsolete the model of dedicated liquidity provision in securities with a 
range of characteristics, whether in connection with the integrated model or 
on the stand-alone basis.  While forcing market makers to “catch a falling 
knife” is meaningless, this model has value during both turbulent and stable 
market conditions. 
The use of market making regimes by trading venues as a dimension 
of competition implies a gravitation to self-regulation rather than 
governmental regulation, although the latter is more appropriate for 
market-wide/collective action issues.  On the other hand, the line between 
these spheres of authority is sometimes blurry, as government agencies 
often resort to formal and informal channels of influence, while the 
securities industry and trading venues, in their turn, try to predict, preempt, 
and soften direct regulation.290  Furthermore, broader regulatory shifts, such 
as the trade-at rule, may substantially, yet indirectly, impact the mix of 
trading obligations and privileges of market makers or favor different 
constituencies among these market participants. 
Recognizing that some balance of trading obligations and privileges is 
required in order to improve markets for liquidity is a fairly simple concept, 
but it is often missing from public policy debates.  Moreover, an 
elimination of obstacles for the interaction of natural liquidity, while 
largely commendable in terms of unlocking value and decreasing 
transaction costs, does not always present a complete solution, as important 
incentives for providing liquidity may disappear as well.  While it has been 
postulated that “giv[ing] a large number of potential buyers and sellers easy 
access to the market” would result in a diminished or eliminated need for 
market makers and produce orderly markets without such intermediaries,291 
 
bonds [leading to] liquidity bifurcation . . .”  BIS, 85TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 
37–38. 
290.  For instance, one early example relates to possible state regulation: “In 1910, 
probably in response to the Hughes committee criticism, the [NYSE] adopted a rule 
prohibiting specialists from trading with the book, i.e., dealing as principal with a customer 
whose order the specialist holds as agent, without the customer’s consent.”  SEC, SPECIAL 
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 46, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 65.  As a much more recent 
example relating to the Flash Crash, the securities exchanges as a group, backed by several 
major market making firms, abolished the practice of stub quotes with a threat of direct 
intervention by the SEC in the background.  For a description of this episode, see 
Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World, supra note 33, at 345 & 
nn.221–24; Letter from John A. McCarthy, Gen. Counsel, GETCO, LLC, Christopher R. 
Concannon, Partner, Virtu Fin., LLC, & Leonard J. Amoruso, Gen. Counsel, Knight Capital 
Grp., Inc., to Robert Cook, Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 
9, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-255.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX9T-
4JXT]. 
291.  Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange (pt. 1), FIN. ANALYSTS 
J., July–Aug. 1971, at 28, 34. 
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this argument should not be overused.  Even putting aside existing players’ 
self-interested resistance to change as a threat to their entrenched position, 
technological advances coupled with universal access cannot be a panacea 
in every instance.  Indeed, “a huge misconception that somehow electronic 
markets are substitutes for the commitment of capital”292 deserves to be 
criticized.293 
The current strain on the market making business may be attributed to 
the disappearance of many advantages traditionally enjoyed by these 
market participants.  Ironically, quite a few of these advantages had been 
nontransparent and thus often criticized, but their removal has had an 
adverse impact on liquidity in certain segments of securities markets.  On 
the other hand, there is room for strengthening the market for liquidity 
through tested and novel means, including the use of transparent 
advantages for market makers.294  Likewise, an “external incentive” might 
be needed to encourage market making in certain securities,295 and this 
perspective once again highlights the underlying externality in the market 
for liquidity.  Increasing the size of the pie can be achieved by involving 
issuers in the process of enhancing liquidity. 
Dating back to crowded floors of old, market makers have jealously 
guarded their formal and informal class privileges, with the franchise value 
being enhanced by insulation, whether for technological imperfections or 
otherwise, and the sheer dominance enjoyed by major trading venues.  One 
may recall the ancient story of how market makers on the LSE opposed the 
efforts of brokers to use a supporting pillar as a notice board for indications 
of interest in less liquid securities, which resulted in such notices being torn 
down and finally the installation of a locked glass case that served as yet 
another obstacle.296  Indeed, the image of traditional market makers as rent-
 
292.  Alternative Call Auction Designs, in CALL AUCTION TRADING: NEW ANSWERS TO 
OLD QUESTIONS 49, 64 (Robert A. Schwartz et al. eds., 2003) (remarks of Ian Domowitz, 
Smeal Professor of Finance, Pennsylvania State University). 
293.  See also Letter from Colm Kelleher to the Bank of Eng., HM Treasury & Fin. 
Conduct Auth., supra note 42, at 7 (“Current corporate bond market liquidity issues will not 
be solved by electronic trading or greater market transparency . . .”). 
294.  On a related note, in the context of futures and commodities markets, it has been 
suggested that direct monetary payments are preferable to time, place, and information-
based advantages: “[F]ee or other monetary incentives alone, should provide adequate 
incentive to attract sufficient liquidity provider(s) with far less public costs than violating 
the time/price paradigm.  Said another way, all financial incentive alternatives should be 
exhausted before pursuing non-financial alternatives.”  CFTC’S TECH. ADVISORY COMM., 
BEST PRACTICES FOR ORGANIZED ELECTRONIC MARKETS, supra note 89, at 37 (footnote 
omitted). 
295.  EMS Roundtable: Market Making and Trading in the 21st Century, supra note 
22, at 48:30-:49 (remarks of Douglas Cifu, CEO of Virtu Financial). 
296.  For a description of this practice, see LSE COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 
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seeking intermediaries — often protected by regulation or its selective 
enforcement — has proved to be correct on many occasions, but this 
experience does not justify abandoning a balance of trading obligations and 
privileges applicable to these market participants.  Navigating between the 
Scylla of anticompetitive profits and the Charybdis of illiquidity and 
preserving a viable mix of formal and informal liquidity providers remain 
necessary for regulatory design. 
 
 
supra note 2, para. 3493, at 132 (testimony of Charles Branch, a former broker at the LSE); 
id. paras. 4558-62, at 179 (testimony of Frederick Banbury, a broker at the LSE).  The same 
hearing also witnessed the perception that “jobbers are said to rule the Stock Exchange” and 
that “the market is over-jobbed,” although combined with the realization that the existence 
of jobbers even in widely traded securities was “both an advantage and a necessity.”  Id. 
paras. 3515, 3519, 3527, at 133 (testimony of Charles Branch, a former broker at the LSE).  
For a description of the historical struggle of the NYSE specialists for the influence over, if 
not control of, the Big Board, which provides a similar example, see SELIGMAN, supra note 
32, passim. 
